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ABSTRACT 
Mihal, D., Ph.D., University of Saskatchewan, March, 2008. The Economic Impact of 
Non-Compliance in the Carbon-Offset Market.  
Supervisor: M.E. Fulton 
 
Addressing climate change is a major undertaking. Agricultural soil has the potential to 
assist in decreasing the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere by storing CO2 in the 
soil. Carbon offset markets have been suggested as a cost effective means of reducing 
GHG emissions. Farmers can increase their soil sink potential by applying Beneficial 
Management Practices (BMPs) that enhance carbon sequestration through 
improvements to soil, nutrient and livestock management practices (Fulton et. al., 
2005). Whether or not a market for carbon offsets will emerge depends on a number of 
factors which mainly are related to the profitability of the BMPs and the costs of 
implementing a carbon contract. Provided that a market for carbon offsets emerges, the 
effectiveness of the market depends, in part, on the degree to which buyers and sellers 
in the market comply with the terms of the contracts they sign. The resource costs 
associated with monitoring and verification may result in incomplete monitoring. As 
long as monitoring is not perfect, non-compliance will be an issue.  
 
The analysis that will be performed in this thesis introduces non-compliance in the 
economic analysis of carbon-offset market. The purpose of this work is to examine the 
overall cost effectiveness of the carbon-offset market when introducing non-
compliance.  
 
Firstly the theoretical model investigates the incentives for different farmers to 
participate in the carbon offsets market as well as incentives for engaging in cheating. 
The model recognizes farmers’ heterogeneity with respect to cost differences and 
examines the economic determinants of farmers’ non-compliance as well as the 
consequences of non-compliance on the performance of the carbon-offset market. 
Results support the standard finding that the extent of producers’ non-compliance 
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decreases with an increase in the audit probability and/or an increase in the penalty per 
unit of non-compliance. In addition, the number of producers participating in the carbon 
offsets market is shown to increase with an increase in the carbon-offset price. 
 
 The analysis then introduces intermediaries in the market that will take care of trading 
carbon offsets as well as monitoring producers. The traders’ role in this study is played 
by an IOF (investor owned-firm) or a PA (producers’ association). Within the IOF, the 
analysis focuses on the monopoly and oligopoly structures. The key role of the traders 
is to guarantee, based on the amount of monitoring that is undertaken, that the emitters 
purchase only carbon offsets that actually correspond to sequestered carbon. The 
analysis then examines three cases for the group that monitors farmers’ compliance – a 
group owned by for-profit traders, a government-run agency and a group owned by the 
PA trader. This part of the thesis examines what impact the involvement of the traders 
in the carbon-offset market has on non-compliance, as well as how the structure of the 
monitoring group affects non-compliance and the amount of carbon offsets traded in the 
market. The results of the analysis show that the monitoring groups always undertake 
sufficient monitoring to ensure that full compliance is achieved – thus, while non-
compliance is possible, it does not occur in equilibrium. The finding suggests that the 
formation of a government monitoring agency can potentially increase traded output 
and lower the price paid by emitters, still these changes are likely to be small, 
particularly when the trading sector is monopolistic. The overall analysis in this chapter 
shows that the optimal amount of enforcement, and as a result the cost effectiveness of a 
carbon-offset market, depends on the nature of the organization that undertakes the 
enforcement.    
 
The next consideration of the thesis is the heterogeneity attributed to the timing of 
sequestration by different farmers. The analysis focuses on the carbon offsets pooling 
by considering two structures for the aggregator: a for-profit aggregator and a 
producers’ association. Pooling resources enables the farmers to benefit from 
economies of scale. The pricing schedule used by the aggregator is a two-part tariff. The 
two-part tariff is used as a way of providing an incentive for the farmers sequestering 
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large amounts of carbon to participate in the pool. The study considers two alternatives 
for the coefficients that might be used to decide on the amount of carbon offsets to 
which each farmer will be entitled: default coefficient and custom coefficients. Each 
situation is modeled in a principal agent framework.  
 
The analysis examines how the aggregator will target the monitoring service for 
different group of farmers. The investigation reveals that, under different scenarios, a 
PA or a FPA (for-profit aggregator) might lead to the formation of a heterogeneous pool 
or a homogeneous pool of each type.  
 
The last issue investigated in this dissertation is the coexistence of a FPA and a PA in 
the default coefficient case. The analysis show that both aggregator structures can exist 
together in the market in the same time if the savings in the monitoring costs made 
possible by the PA are smaller than the cost of organizing the pool. If this condition is 
not satisfied the FPA cannot survive in the market and the producers’ association will 
dominate.   
 
In addition to providing a better understanding of how the carbon-offset market may 
perform when introducing non-compliance, the results of this study can assist in 
assessing the cost effectiveness of the carbon-offset market when enforcement is 
undertaken by different organizations. Furthermore, the last consideration of the pooling 
option might help in selecting which type of pool – a heterogeneous or a homogeneous 
one – might perform better under different alternatives.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The growing amount of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere is regarded as 
responsible for climate change and global warming. In response to increased GHG 
emissions and in an attempt to reduce them, countries have entered into international 
agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol (KP), which came into effect on February 16, 
2006. The Protocol requires Annex B countries to reduce their emissions of six 
greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, 
perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride) by at least 5 percent below 1990 levels over 
the first commitment period 2008-2012. A key feature of the KP is its use of market 
based instruments to deal with carbon emissions. The Protocol allows for the use of 
three flexible implementation mechanisms: emissions trading (ET), Joint 
Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (IPCC, 2007). 
 
The treatment of carbon sinks – i.e., the sequestering of carbon rather than a reduction 
in its production – was left open during Kyoto negotiations. The negotiating parties 
reached a compromise on this issue during the Conference of Parties in Bonn (July 
2001) by allowing a substantial credit to Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan and 
Russia for carbon dioxide sinks ( ). The subsequent COP7 in Marrakech 
(November 2001) approved carbon sinks to be used as a means of carbon reduction by 
the Annex B countries.  
Bohringer, 2004
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A sink is defined as any process that removes CO2 from the atmosphere (United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992). Forests and agricultural soil have 
the potential to assist in decreasing the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere by 
storing CO2 in soil or in trees. Farmers can increase their soil sink potential by applying 
Best Management Practices (BMPs) that enhance carbon sequestration through 
improvements to soil, nutrient and livestock management practices (Fulton et. al., 
2005), while forest managers can enhance carbon sequestration through afforestation, 
reforestation and forest management. Each unit of carbon stored in the soil or trees can 
be used to offset one unit of emission released from large final emitters (LFEs). If these 
units can be verified and certified, they can be sold as carbon offsets or credits in a 
carbon-offset market.   
 
Allowing the trading of carbon offsets is one of the institutional innovations of Kyoto. 
Carbon-offset markets have been suggested as a cost effective means of reducing GHG 
emissions (Vercammen, 2002, Bloomfield et. al., 2003). An offset system can increase 
the efficiency of meeting emission targets by allowing entities with potential GHG 
sequestration capabilities to supply offset credits to those that are required to reduce 
GHG emissions. This option offers greater flexibility in achieving emission reductions 
and hence the possibility of reaching environmental goals at a lower cost than would be 
possible if the countries did not have this alternative.  
  
About half of Canada’s total GHG emissions by 2010 is anticipated to be released from 
LFEs (Government of Canada, 2005a). Based on their historical emissions, the level of 
production and an emission intensity factor, the government could be expected to 
allocate a large portion of initial permits to LFEs. Each permit gives LFEs the right to 
emit one unit of emission; LFEs will be allowed to trade these permits. High cost 
companies can meet their additional permit requirements by purchasing permits from 
LFEs with lower abatement costs. Permits can be expected to be traded until the point 
where the marginal abatement costs of all traders will be equalized. It is this cost 
equalization aspect that makes permit trading more cost-efficient than regulatory 
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approaches. Provided that sinks will be eligible as an option, LFEs can use offset credits 
as well to address their emission potential.  
 
Although both forests and agricultural soil can serve as sinks, the focus of this work will 
be on soil carbon offsets created as result of adapting BMPs in agriculture under 
contract. Whether or not the market for carbon offsets will emerge depends on a number 
of factors which mainly are related to the profitability of the BMPs and the costs of 
implementing a carbon contract. BMPs build up organic matter in the soil. Adoption of 
these practices brings a number of environmental and economic benefits such as: 
improving soil quality and increasing productivity, improving moisture retention and 
decreasing irrigation needs, and decreasing soil degradation and erosion. Because of the 
economic benefits, farmers have incentives to adopt BMPs voluntarily. In addition, they 
may find an incentive to adopt these practices in order to participate in carbon-offset 
market. Whether or not farmers will produce carbon offsets by applying BMPs under a 
sequestration contract depends on the net benefits of such an undertaking.   
 
Provided that a market for carbon offsets emerges, the effectiveness of the market 
depends, in part, on the degree to which buyers and sellers in the market comply with 
the terms of the contracts they sign. Compliance, however, should not be presumed. 
Each tonne of emission reduced or offset created has a value that is equal to the price of 
a permit or a credit. This value can create an incentive for LFEs to underreport their 
actual emissions and/or for sink generators to overreport the carbon offsets created from 
their emission reducing actions.  
 
Non-compliance will be an issue as long as monitoring is imperfect. The possibility of 
non-compliance arises because it is costly to determine the actions of LFEs or farmers. 
Because of this cost, farmers, as well as LFEs, are in a position to misreport. The 
monitoring and verification costs vary depending on the frequency of monitoring and 
verification, accuracy of measurement, the quantification techniques employed and the 
size of the contract.  
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Given the above considerations, it is important to explore how the carbon offset market 
will be affected by non-compliance on both sides. What role will market intermediaries 
play in order to guarantee that the carbon credits purchased by LFEs are legitimate? 
Which organizational structure is more efficient in trading and monitoring? What is the 
impact of heterogeneity in the cost of providing carbon offsets? What is the likelihood 
of a homogeneous or a heterogeneous pool being formed in the carbon offset market? 
How do the various coefficients that might be used to convert the land management 
practices into carbon sequestration amounts perform relative to each other? This study 
tries to answer these questions. 
 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The analysis that will be performed in this thesis introduces non-compliance in the 
economic analysis of carbon-offset market. The purpose of this work is to examine the 
overall cost effectiveness of the carbon-offset market when non-compliance on both the 
demand side (i.e., the LFEs) and the supply side (e.g., agricultural/forestry producers) of 
the offset market is introduced.  
 
Monitoring and verification has the potential to reduce or deter non-compliance. One 
prospective approach to address monitoring and verification of the carbon-offsets is the 
involvement of a trader in the market with the responsibility of undertaking carbon 
offset trading. Traders will buy carbon offsets offered from farmers and sell verified 
carbon offsets to LFEs. Even though traders can have different structures – e.g., a for 
profit firm, governmental agency, an association of LFEs or an association of carbon 
offset suppliers – this paper will focus on the trading undertaken by for-profit firms and 
a producers’ association.  
 
The analysis then examines three cases for the group that monitors farmer compliance – 
a governmental run agency, a monitoring group operating on behalf of the for-profit 
firms and a group operating on behalf of the producers’ association. The optimal 
amount of enforcement is likely to depend on the nature of the organization that 
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undertakes the enforcement since these organizations differ in their objective functions 
and their access to information. Thus, an important part of the analysis will be an 
examination of the impact of organizational form on compliance and hence on the cost 
effectiveness of a carbon-offset market. 
 
Carbon offset pooling is examined under two organizational structures for the 
aggregator: a for-profit aggregator (FPA) and a producers’ association (PA) – both of 
which are emerging in the carbon offset market. These two organizations differ in a 
fundamental way – in the FPA case, the aggregator chooses the farmers’ type while in 
the PA case, the farmers choose the type of the pool they form. The FPA chooses the 
alternative that provides her the highest profit, whereas in the PA case the farmers 
choose the alternative that provides them the highest benefit. This distinction drives the 
analysis performed in Chapter VI.  
1.3 METHODOLOGY  
To achieve the above objectives, this thesis uses different theoretical approaches. The 
decisions by LFEs and farmers about participation in the carbon offset market are 
critical to the creation of such a market as well as to the performance of the market. The 
thesis starts by examining the LFEs’ and farmers’ behaviour. The LFEs’ problem, 
whether to undertake abatement or to buy carbon offsets, is visited under two scenarios: 
a full compliance scenario and a scenario in which non-compliance is introduced in the 
model. The farmers’ problem of whether to adopt the beneficial management practices 
is similarly examined under full-compliance and non-compliance. The LFEs’ and the 
farmers’ behaviour are both modeled as decision making under uncertainty. 
 
The study continues by developing models that examine the decisions made by traders 
and monitoring groups, decisions that are crucial in ensuring the reliability of the 
offsets’ market. In this part of the thesis, the inspection probability is endogenized. The 
involvement of the intermediaries in the market serves as a guarantee for LFEs that the 
offsets they are buying are genuine. The monitoring group monitors the land 
management practice used by the farmers who sign the sequestration contract. The 
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decision of the traders is modeled as a constrained maximization problem. Trading and 
pricing decisions made by traders are examined as a response to the monitoring group’s 
choice of the auditing rate. A two stage game is used where the decision of the 
monitoring group is made in the first stage. The game is solved by using backward 
induction. Both analytical and graphical illustrations are used to perform the analysis. 
When considering the producers’ association as the selected organizational structure, 
we deal with a pooled pricing strategy. The study then examines the trading and 
monitoring efficiency by comparing the results obtained when considering different 
organizational structures for the trader and the monitoring group.     
 
This thesis models separately two types of farmers’ heterogeneity: one dedicated to 
such characteristics of the farmers as management skills, experience, and land type and 
the other one dedicated to the timing of sequestration. When considering the last 
mentioned heterogeneity type, the analysis is performed under the two-part tariff pricing 
strategy. 
1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter two examines the offsets option 
and the role of agriculture in offsetting net GHG emissions. Chapter three reviews the 
economics of climate change and non-compliance, and outlines the contribution of this 
thesis. Chapter four develops a model of the farmer’s choice of whether to participate in 
the carbon-offset market or not. The paper then investigates the impact of introducing 
non-compliance on the carbon offset market. The paper also examines the role of policy 
instruments such as audit probabilities and penalties in promoting compliance. The fifth 
chapter of the thesis investigates the pricing and output decisions of the traders involved 
in the market to facilitate carbon offset trading. The analysis examines the extent to 
which different organizational structures undertake monitoring, and the impact of this 
monitoring on the pricing behaviour. Chapter six considers the heterogeneity attributed 
to the timing of sequestration by different farmers. This chapter focuses on the carbon 
offsets pooling by considering two structures for the aggregator: a for-profit aggregator 
and a producers’ association. The analysis considers two alternatives for the coefficients 
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that might be used to decide on the amount of carbon offsets to which each farmer will 
be entitled. The last chapter summarizes the findings and concludes the thesis. 
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CHAPTER II 
OFFSETS AND THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN OFFSETTING NET GHG 
EMISSIONS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Addressing global climate change is one of the biggest challenges of the 21st century. 
GHGs are largely being accumulated in the atmosphere due to human activities such as 
industrial, agricultural and household activities. This accumulation is mainly ascribed to 
activities that involve fossil fuel use, although deforestation is also a contributor. As 
pointed out by Baumert et. al. (2002), the change in the composition of the atmosphere 
has increased the average global surface temperature by about 0.6°C (1°F) over the last 
century. According to the assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC, 2007), temperatures are expected to rise between 1.8 and 4°C (3 to 7°F) 
by the end of 21st century if the trends in GHG accumulation are not amended. Such 
temperature changes might affect agricultural production, water supply, forests and 
overall human development. Regional effects such as more frequent and severe 
droughts or storms, sea level increase, more forest fires, changes in agricultural 
productivity and water supplies, and damage to vulnerable ecosystems such as coral 
reefs (WRI, 2006) have already begun to be experienced.   
 
Meeting the climate change challenge requires designing solutions that include 
developed and developing countries, many sectors of the economy of a country, and 
options that range from well-known to the novel. The use of the biosphere is becoming 
increasingly important for countries that are attempting to manage their GHG 
emissions. According to an FAO (2004) report, the biosphere is considered to be a 
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carbon sink absorbing about 2.8 gigatonnes of C a year, which represents 30 percent of 
fossil fuel emissions. This sink capacity creates an opportunity for the agricultural and 
forestry sectors to contribute to GHG reduction in the atmosphere. In particular, the 
contribution of the agricultural sector in the reduction or removal of GHGs can come 
from three potential avenues (Weersink et. al.., 2005). Agriculture can be a source of 
GHGs, mainly in the form of nitrous oxide and methane. The emission of these two 
gases accounts for 97% of emissions coming from agricultural activities; thus one 
avenue can be a direct reduction in the emission of these gases. A second alternative 
would be the production of biofuels and biomass energy which could be used instead of 
the fossil fuel based energy. This would be one of the novel options that would lower 
GHG emission levels. The third avenue, which is associated with the role of the 
agriculture as a sink, would be carbon sequestration by using beneficial management 
practices such as reduced tillage, reduced summer fallow, crop rotation, increased 
perennial forages and pasture, and planting shelterbelts. In Canada, it has been 
estimated that the agriculture sector can generate 10 Mt of CO2 equivalents per year of 
offset credits beyond its business-as-usual reductions at a CO2 equivalent price of $Cdn 
10-15/tonne (Gov. of Canada, 2003). The extent to which agriculture can embrace each 
of these options depends on the incentives that would be created for each of them. 
 
2.2 THE ROLE OF BMPS IN CARBON SEQUESTRATION. SOME POTENTIAL CO-
BENEFITS RELATED TO THESE PRACTICES 
The idea of transferable emission permits was first introduced by Crocker (1966) and 
Dales (1968). The idea was further developed by Montgomery, 1972; Atkinson & 
Lewis, 1974, Tietenberg, 1980; Seskin et. al., 1983, and Krupnick, 1986. However, it 
was the U.S. domestic experience with reducing acid rain that initiated the popularity of 
emissions trading regimes as mechanisms for environmental pollution control. The 
success of this U.S. national program in meeting environmental goals in a cost effective 
manner (USEPA, 2002) encouraged the idea of carbon emissions trading. Still, the 
inclusion of carbon offsets trading in the emission trading system would be a novelty.  
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The response to global climate change through the sequestration of carbon in the 
agricultural sector has varied across countries. The EU ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 
2002; however it has chosen not to use soil carbon sequestration in its strategy to reduce 
GHGs. The EU, Japan and other developing countries have opposed the inclusion of 
sinks in the Kyoto Protocol by arguing that the uncertainties surrounding the 
measurement and maintenance of carbon sequestered in the soil would undermine 
achieving real emission reductions. The choice by the EU not to include sinks in their 
emissions trading scheme may have been mostly due to the strength of environmental 
groups who did not want to compromise the achievement of emission reductions 
(Young et. al., 2006).  
 
Other countries like Canada, United States, and Australia have supported the inclusion 
of sinks even though the United States has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol. In 2002, the 
Bush administration announced the Climate Action Plan as an alternative to U.S. 
ratification of Kyoto. The United States is encouraging the agricultural sequestration of 
carbon. A modest level of incentives and institutions to support soil carbon 
sequestration have already emerged. The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) was 
established in 2003 with the goal of building the skills and institutions needed to 
facilitate the trade in GHG credits. CCX is the world’s first global marketplace for 
integrating voluntary legally binding emissions reductions with emissions trading and 
offsets for all six GHGs. However, the rules and regulations governing all aspects of 
sinks are still being developed by the UNFCC.  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, part of the net emission target can be met by 
increasing the carbon sequestration into agricultural soils through applying management 
practices that enhance the sink potential of the soil. The quantity of carbon stored in 
soils is highly significant, with many of the factors influencing the flow of carbon into 
and out the soil affected by the management practices applied to the land. Because of 
the direct benefits that might be associated with beneficial management practices, some 
farmers are likely to voluntarily adopt them regardless of whether they create carbon 
offsets that could be sold. In addition to this, increases in education and awareness, 
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technical support, training sessions and demonstration could further increase rates of 
adoption. Some of the principal land management practices by which agriculture is 
likely to sequester carbon are discussed below.   
 
Conservation tillage systems, which include reduced or zero tillage, reduce the amount 
and intensity of tillage. Pretty et. al. (2002) consider tillage to be one of the main factors 
responsible for decreasing carbon stocks in agriculture soils; thus a conservation tillage 
system would be one of the main land management practices that would increase soil 
carbon retention. In a zero tillage system, planting is the only process that disturbs the 
soil. In a reduced tillage system, the tillage equipment that is used helps to maintain a 
good residue cover (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2004). Conservation tillage 
offers several benefits over conventional tillage. A reduced or zero tillage practice 
increases the accumulation of soil organic matter which gathers as a result of a greater 
rate of return of plant residues compared to the rate of decomposition of plant residues. 
The increase of soil organic matter means more carbon is stored in the soil. Other 
benefits of soil organic matter accumulation include improvements in yield potential, 
prevention of soil erosion and conservation of soil moisture. In addition, conservation 
tillage system reduces the time spent on farm operations as well as the fuel requirements 
since fewer passes are needed under this tillage system.  
 
Reducing summer fallow is another land management practice suggested to increase the 
soil carbon retention. Summer fallowing can be defined as leaving a field without crop 
growth for a growing season. Fields may be left fallow in order to conserve soil 
moisture, control weed problems and/or increase the nutrient availability in the soil. But 
summer fallow decreases the organic matter level in the soil since fewer residues are 
returned to the soil. Less soil organic matter means less carbon sequestered in the soil. 
In addition, the lack of plant residue cover leaves the soil exposed to erosion, which in 
turn can increase the salinity of the soil, reduce wildlife habitat and lower water quality. 
Hence, reducing summer fallow can result in improved water quality and in a reduced 
risk of erosion. Under this scenario, weeds are controlled by using herbicides and soil 
moisture can be conserved by reducing tillage. 
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 The other extreme to summer fallow practice would be continuous cropping in which 
crops are grown every year with no fallow years in between. The result would be an 
enhancement in the soil organic matter and in carbon storage. A crop rotation would 
provide additional benefits. A crop rotation would help not only to build organic matter 
but also to reduce diseases by breaking their cycle, to vary herbicide types in order to 
reduce the risk of developing herbicide resistance, and diversify the operation in order 
to lower the production risk. However, a more diverse crop rotation necessitates 
increased management skills. 
 
Permanent cover is a land management practice that is particularly recommended for 
areas that are at high risk for such problems as erosion or soil salinity. Permanent cover 
refers to such practices as perennial forages that help to build up soil organic matter, 
increase carbon storage, prevent erosion and reduce pest problems in subsequent crops.  
 
Planting shelterbelts is another management practice that contributes in storing carbon. 
Co-benefits related to this practice would be a reduction in the risk of wind erosion and 
a decrease in the evaporation of the soil moisture. 
 
The processes of plant productivity, soil degradation and carbon sequestration are 
closely linked. Beneficial management practices that increase the organic matter content 
of the soils typically have a positive impact on air, soil and water quality, as well as 
improving wildlife habitat. However, shifting from one management practice to another 
is likely to involve some significant costs. The new practice might require changes in 
equipment, revising the management of the crop residues and weeds, and modifying the 
crop rotation in order to prevent pest problems. These factors, as well as the lack of 
experience or the lack of the initiative for change, might explain why some farmers 
have not adopted such practices as reduced tillage. Farmers with different 
characteristics will likely have different incentives to adopt certain land management 
practice since they incur different transition costs and must incur different costs 
associated with the new operation. As a result, they might need an extra incentive to 
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switch from one land management practice to another. Such an additional inducement 
for adoption of these practices might be the involvement in the carbon offset market by 
supplying carbon credits through sequestration activities. This farmer heterogeneity is a 
key factor of the model developed in this thesis.    
 
2.3 SOME IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CARBON MARKET 
For farmers to participate in the carbon market they must find it economical to both 
adopt the BMPs and sign a sequestration contract. Signing a sequestration contract 
means a farmer is now required to complying with the provisions of the contract. The 
cost of this compliance must be considered when determining which farmers will 
participate in the carbon offset market.   
 
As Young (2003) indicates in her paper, the amount of carbon that will be sequestered 
by a farmer depends on the soil type, the history of the land and the particular land 
management practice that will be applied. This range of factors affecting carbon 
sequestration makes it difficult to design a standardized contract. The designing and 
signing of the specialized contracts will add important transaction costs to carbon 
sequestration contracts. To minimize these costs, it is expected that the government will 
set out suggested formats for contracts, thus saving the actors some legal costs of full 
contract creation (Allan & Baylis, 2005). Another alternative that could reduce 
contracting costs would be a pooling system which is able to spread the additional costs 
associated with individual contracts. The pooling option is considered in two chapters 
of this thesis.   
 
The design of the sequestration contracts is complicated by the issue of permanence. 
The carbon stored in the soil can be released back into the atmosphere if the agricultural 
practice is changed. The release of carbon can be from natural hazards or from a 
deliberate change in the practice. If the contract assumes the carbon is sequestered on a 
permanent basis than a responsibility exists for someone to repurchase the carbon units 
that are released in the atmosphere. Since the trajectory of the price for carbon offsets is 
13
uncertain at the time of signing the contract, the buyers and the sellers face a risk. If the 
price of carbon offsets is high at the time the replacement of carbon credits is needed, 
then replacing might become very costly.  
 
Since the carbon sequestered in soil is expected to be left there indefinitely, the decision 
to sequester carbon is effectively irreversible; this irreversibility reduces the farmers’ 
ability to adjust to a new policy or to withdraw for a better alternative. As a 
consequence, the option to defer the signing decision has an option value (Vercammen, 
2002). Farmers would need to be provided with an option value in order to make the 
contract profitable. In addition to this option value they might require a premium today 
in order to cover the extra risk they undertake when they participate in a carbon 
sequestration scheme. 
 
The replacement of the carbon credits can be done through buying other permanent 
credits, purchasing insurance (if available) or purchasing temporary credits. The 
temporary credits are committed only for a specified length of time and after this they 
expire and need to be replaced. The liability for replacement might be issued to the 
seller of carbon, the buyer, an independent broker, an insurer, or an aggregator. Several 
alternatives to address the risk associated with offset reversal have been suggested. 
These include the insured credits, temporary credits, partial crediting or time delayed 
crediting, carbon banks, and renting or leasing of carbon offsets. The option chosen to 
cope with the permanence issue will influence the transaction costs as well as impact 
the distribution of the costs to the players in the market. 
 
Transaction costs will play a key role in the success or failure of the offsets system. 
Resources will be needed to encourage farmers to participate in the market as well as to 
evaluate and certify the carbon credits (Fulton, Çule and Weersink, 2005). Taking into 
account the cost of these resources is an important consideration. One way of lowering 
transaction costs is offsets aggregation. This option can offer both lower risk and lower 
transaction costs.  
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It has been proposed that the carbon credits created from sequestration as well as the 
trading of carbon offsets will be counted in the national inventory which has a 
subcomponent focused on agriculture. The GHG emissions and the soil carbon stock 
changes will be estimated by the National Carbon and Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Accounting and Verification System (NCGAVS). As Weersink et. al. (2005) point out, 
this system will use a variety of information sources such as the Census of Agriculture, 
industry association data, and satellite imagery. This information will consist of the type 
of farm activities, the land area allocated to these activities, the level of fertilizer 
application, and local conditions. The NCGAVS estimations will be based on emission 
coefficients and conversion coefficients which link the management practices to GHG 
reductions or carbon sequestrations. These coefficients will be established by using 
scientific experiments and computer simulation models. Computer models such as the 
Model Farm Program which takes into account the management practice, the type of 
soil and the type of crop will be used to determine the level of emissions and carbon 
sequestration.   
 
The reliability of such models will be evaluated further by undertaking measurements at 
representative farms and research sites across the country (Agriculture and Agri-food 
Canada, 2003b). Still, a level of uncertainty exists over the coefficients that will be used 
to convert particular practices into carbon sequestration amounts (Weersink et. al., 
2003). The amount of carbon sequestration will be different in different stages of 
sequestration. The terrestrial sinks are limited by the ecosystem capability in interaction 
with the land management system (Lee., H.C. et al., 2003). When applying a 
sequestering activity, the soil sequestration potential increases in the early stage of 
sequestration until it reaches a peak in a latter stage and then decreases until the soil 
becomes saturated. Thus, the stage of sequestration takes on a particular importance in 
determining the converting coefficients. Farmers may sequester different quantities of 
carbon at the same point in time for the same land size depending on which 
sequestration phase they are. The analysis in Chapter VI addresses two types of 
coefficients that could be used in an offset pool to link the management practice to the 
carbon sequestration.  
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 Another important consideration for developing a carbon offset trading system is the 
establishment of the baselines. The baseline refers to the level of GHG emissions or 
carbon sequestration that occurs in a business as usual (BAU) scenario, which means in 
the absence of climate change action. The baseline establishes the standards against 
which the changes can be measured. The actual emission reduction is equal to the 
difference between the actual emissions and those that occur under the BAU scenario. 
Offset credits will be issued only for these additional tons of sequestered carbon and 
only these carbon offsets will be eligible to be traded in the carbon offset market. 
Establishing the baselines requires information about the economic trends that affect the 
output of the sequestering activities, historical knowledge of land management practices 
in certain areas as well as other regional-specific information. A number of methods 
have been proposed for establishing the baselines such as a case-by-case basis, a generic 
approach based on regional averages, a dynamic approach which accounts for future 
changes or trends, and an approach that uses comparison to similar project benchmarks 
(Government of Canada, 2005b).  Each of these approaches will be associated with 
some costs which will add to the transaction costs of the carbon trading system. The 
more complicated is the approach, the higher are the associated costs. These higher 
costs will result in higher transaction costs and a decrease in the attractiveness of the 
carbon offset trading option.  
 
Lack of additionality has been one of the main sources of criticism of carbon offsets 
supplied by agriculture through no tillage. For instance, the CCX has been criticized on 
these groups. As stated from Kollmus et. al. (2008), “there were several documented 
instances where farmers received carbon offset revenue for practicing no-till agriculture 
despite the fact that these farmers had been practicing no till for many years already” 
(Page 70). Rewarding farmers who have been practicing no-till with carbon offsets 
undermines the integrity of carbon offsets since the buyer of carbon offsets will 
continue to emit while no further emission reduction is achieved from those farmers. 
CCX argues that it would be unfair if the farmers who have been engaged in no-tillage 
practice for many years cannot sell their carbon credits. Addressing this fairness issue 
16
would require other measures such as tax/subsidy treatment and discounting of credits 
(Kollmus et. al. 2008). 
 
The carbon trading system will require some form of monitoring and verification. An 
offset credit will be granted only for the units of reduction or removal that are genuine. 
This necessitates the need for a verification of the baselines and the changes in the 
carbon stock. Because of the value assigned to the carbon offsets in the offsets market, 
the farmers will have incentive to over report the carbon offsets created from their 
sequestering activities; thus monitoring and verification is crucial in ensuring farmers’ 
compliance. As long as monitoring is not perfect, non-compliance will be an issue. The 
non-compliance issue is one of the main issues addressed in this thesis.  
 
The cost of monitoring and verifying the amount of carbon that has been sequestered 
will be an important component of the transaction costs. One option for minimizing 
these costs will be a pooling option which makes cost sharing possible. This alternative 
involves sharing of the fixed costs and enables farmers to benefit from economies of 
scale present in supplying carbon offsets. A pool can handle large volumes so that per 
unit monitoring costs can be kept low. This solution, however, leaves open questions 
about the willingness of farmers with large sequestration potential to participate since 
they might benefit more from participating in the carbon offset market as independent 
individuals rather than as part of a pool comprised of other farmers with different 
sequestration potential.   
 
The free riding issue is one of the main issues explored for the pooling option. In such a 
setting, farmers have an incentive to shirk on their contribution and free ride on the 
contribution of others (Harris et. al., 1998). Farmers who free ride attempt to benefit 
from gains created by the pool without sharing in its costs. This would negatively affect 
the benefits that farmers who do not shirk can obtain from using the pool option. Hence, 
the free riding problem is an important consideration that should be taken into account 
by the pool when making its pricing and monitoring decisions. The last part of Chapter 
V explores further this case.    
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 2.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The global community has recognized the challenge of climate change. Countries are 
searching for solutions and are taking actions to combat the problem. Agriculture is 
considered as a potential contributor to the reduction of GHGs. Part of this contribution 
could come through soil carbon sequestration. This chapter explores the main land 
management practices that are likely to play a significant role in enhancing soil carbon 
retention. The adoption of these practices should be supported by policy designs that 
provide economic benefits to the farmers as well as encourage environmental benefits.  
 
Policy design for agricultural soil carbon sequestration is complicated by such issues as 
contract design, non-permanence, baseline establishment, and monitoring and 
verification issues. Each of these issues will have an effect on the incentives required to 
encourage producers’ participation in the offset market and on the success of the offsets 
system in reducing GHG emission in the most efficient way. These issues are addressed 
by the research in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND NON-COMPLIANCE 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION                
The problem of climate change has been widely treated by various economists in their 
research work. This chapter examines how the environmental regulation literature in 
general and the climate change literature in particular have evolved through the years. 
Section two focuses on the efficiency properties of market based instruments. Section 
three examines how this efficiency property is affected when different assumptions are 
relaxed. Section four concentrates on agri-environmental policies and the farmers’ 
behaviour under these policies. The carbon offsets option and compliance monitoring is 
the focus of the fifth section. The chapter concludes with an examination of the 
contribution of this thesis. 
 
3.2 EVOLUTION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LITERATURE   
Since the recognition of environmental problems such as pollution, environmental 
economics has become an important subject within economics. In an economic context, 
society’s welfare is maximized when social marginal benefit equals social marginal 
cost. An environmental problem arises when a market failure prevents the equalization 
of the social marginal benefit with the social marginal cost. Such a situation can occur 
as a result of an environmental externality such as GHG emissions. In the case of an 
externality, the private and social costs will diverge. Environmental economics 
recognizes this divergence between private and social costs. As van Kooten (2004) 
states, “environmental economics is all about measuring non-market values, 
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determining the deviation between private and social costs, and designing economic 
incentives (instruments) and institutions to correct the externality” (p. 17).  
 
Common economic instruments used to address a market failure due to an externality 
are the uniform standards and market incentives.   
 
Uniform standards, also referred as the command and control approach, were the most 
common approach to environmental policies in the 1970s. Basically, the approach 
consists of setting emission standards and monitoring and enforcing these standards. 
The emission standards can be performance based standards that specify the level of 
permissible pollution for each firm or technology based standards that specify the 
particular pollution control technology that must be used. This conventional approach is 
a widely understood form of environmental policy but it has some disadvantages. The 
main drawback of the uniform standards approach is that it gives companies little 
flexibility in how they can meet the emission targets without being able to respond to 
differences in local environmental conditions or in their marginal abatement costs 
(O’Ryan, 2007). The standards are uniformly applied to all firms, requiring the firms 
with high cost of abatements to meet the same requirements as the firms with low cost 
of abatement. This requires more resources being used than in the case of having more 
abatement undertaken by the low cost abaters. Another limitation of this approach is 
that it discourages the development of innovative technologies to improve the 
environment. Because of these disadvantages, economists began to explore other 
possible instruments for addressing environmental problems.    
 
Market based instruments have received wide attention in the literature. This approach 
allows emitters greater flexibility in the choice of how to satisfy the emission control 
responsibilities than is possible under the uniform standards approach. The main 
attractiveness of this alternative is the large potential cost savings that market based 
instruments promise. Emissions’ trading is considered as a major market incentive 
instrument available to mitigate climate change. Emissions trading can take either the 
form of permit trading or credit trading and can significantly increase the flexibility 
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with which companies can meet their pollution reduction requirements. In the credit 
trading case, the government requires each emitter to reduce emissions by a certain 
amount. Firms that reduce their emission below the required level get credits which can 
be sold to the other (presumably higher cost abating) firms. By making these credits 
transferable, the regulator gives emitters the possibility to use the cheapest way of 
meeting their obligations, even if the cheapest way is managed by another firm. As we 
will see latter in this thesis, credits can also be created by sequestering carbon in the 
soil.   
 
Permit trading requires the establishment of an aggregate emissions quota followed by 
allocation of the rights to pollute which can be traded in the permits market; thus the 
right to pollute is turned into a traded commodity. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the idea of transferable emission permits to distribute the pollution control 
burden among firms was first developed by Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968). 
Montgomery (1972) shows that the tradable permits system (TPS) could be a cost 
effective policy for controlling air pollution. Since then, a significant literature on TPS 
has emerged. A number of studies (Atkinson & Lewis, 1974; Tietenberg, 1980; Seskin 
et. al., 1983; Krupnick, 1986) have compared the costs under a uniform standards 
approach with those under an economic incentives system; the results of these studies 
indicate that the costs under the command and control approach are several times those 
under a market based system. A comprehensive survey of related literature is provided 
by Tietenberg (1985).    
 
The estimated cost savings in the studies cited above result from the ability to take 
advantage of the large differentials in abatement costs across polluters. A market 
incentive system makes it possible to coordinate more efficiently the abatement activity 
across firms with heterogeneous abatement costs. The market incentive instruments 
enjoy little advantage if all emitters face similar abatement costs. The cost efficiency of 
a market incentive instrument versus the uniform standard approach can be illustrated 
by using Figure 3.1, where the simplest case is considered. Suppose that the two 
polluters  and i j , which are required to reduce their emission, have different marginal 
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abatement costs i jMAC MAC .<  The total emission reduction target is given by 0t  
which is determined by the intersection of the marginal benefit curve with the marginal 
social cost of abatement i jMAC MAC MAC .= +  Under the uniform standards approach, 
both firms will be required to reduce emission by the same amount 0t0h .
2
=  The cost to 
the society in this case will be represented by the area 0a  plus the area   zh 0bdh.
 
Suppose instead that a tradable permit market is employed where the same emission 
right  is allocated to each firm. The permits can be traded in the permits market. At 
the permits trading price  the low abatement cost firm i  is willing to undertake more 
abatement than is required and to sell the excess emission rights (  to the high 
abatement cost firm 
0h
P,
)0i 0h−
j.  The high cost abater finds it more beneficial to undertake 
abatement only for the amount 0 j  and to buy the permits for the difference ( )0h 0 j−  
from the low cost abaters. As we notice, the permit trading continues until the marginal 
cost of pollution reduction is the same for both emitters. The cost to the society in this 
case is represented by area  plus the area  and is smaller than the cost under a 
standard. Indeed, the saving to society is given by area  plus area 
0bgj 0aki
gde .zek  Since the 
marketable permits system offers a lower cost to the society, this approach is more cost 
effective than the command and control approach at achieving a given emission 
reduction.  
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Figure 3.1.  Uniform standards versus TPS to reduce emission 
Source: Van Kooten, 2004 
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As Milliman and Prince (1989) point out in their paper, another advantage of the 
economic incentive instruments is the potential to encourage the development of more 
efficient abatement technologies to improve the environment. The ability to sell permits 
provides an incentive for firms to invest in pollution abatement technologies. The 
tradable permit system makes allowance for industrial development as well. New 
emitters can enter the industry and take care of their pollution in the most efficient way 
with one of the means being the purchase of permits from the established firms.   
 
The literature supporting the efficiency property of market-based instruments depends 
on assumptions such as perfect competition in the permit and/or product market, full 
compliance and enforcement, and zero transaction costs or full information on the part 
of the firms with respect to abatement costs and permit prices (Fowlie & Perloff, 2004). 
These are suspect assumptions and raise the issue of robustness of the results obtained 
when those assumptions are relaxed. Subsequent literature in the environmental 
economics field has addressed the issues of market power, non-compliance, monitoring, 
property rights and information problems.  
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3.3 ROBUSTNESS OF THE EFFICIENCY PROPERTY IN THE TRADABLE PERMITS 
MARKET  
The cost efficiency of the TPS in a perfect competition setting is well recognized. 
However, it is known that the major polluters are typically large firms in highly 
concentrated industries; thus the product market, as well as the permit market, may not 
be perfectly competitive. Work by Hahn (1984) explores the issue of market power in 
the context of markets in transferable property rights. He assumes that only one firm has 
market power and all the firms are complying. The author shows that the initial permit 
endowment can influence the price strategy of a firm with market power as well as the 
equilibrium allocation of permits leading as a result to inefficiencies. He reveals that the 
degree of inefficiency increases as the permit endowment allocated to the firm with 
market power increases. These results obtained by Hahn challenge the result obtained 
earlier by Montgomery (1972) about the cost efficiency of the TPS; these results also 
indicate that initial distribution of permits is not a pure equity issue.  
 
The theoretical models supporting tradable emission permits have also been challenged 
by the presence of non-compliance. Malik (1990) appears to be the first to address the 
issue of imperfect compliance in a TPS. His analysis examines the performance of the 
tradable permit markets in the presence of non-compliance. He shows how non-
compliance affects the equilibrium permit price; he also derives some rather stringent 
conditions under which the TPS still satisfies the cost efficiency property. However, 
Malik obtains these results by examining a competitive permit market.   
 
Van Egtern and Weber (1996) extend the works by Hahn and Malik by incorporating 
both non-compliance and market power in their model. They show how non-compliance 
is connected to the initial permit endowment. Their main finding is that the initial 
permit endowment of the firm with market power is crucial in determining the levels of 
compliance, the permit price and the abatement costs. As in Hahn, it is shown that the 
initial allocation of permits can be used as a policy instrument to vary the market power 
in the permits market. The paper shows as well that moving away from perfect 
competition in the permits market with non-compliance can distort the equilibrium 
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outcomes. This distortion in the efficiency of the permit market was not accounted for 
in the previous literature. 
 
The relative efficiency of tradable emission permits can also be affected by the presence 
of transaction costs. Stavin (1995) explores the performance of the tradable emission 
permit system in the presence of transaction costs. He identifies three potential sources 
of transaction costs in tradable permit markets: (1) search and information; (2) 
bargaining and decision; and (3) monitoring and enforcement. The paper provides a 
body of evidence indicating the prevalence of significant transaction costs in these 
markets. This evidence includes a lower permit trading level than anticipated by a 
theoretical model that does not take the related transaction costs into account, the 
existence of consultants who assist in the search process as well as the existence of 
commercial brokers that charge considerable fees to facilitate transactions. The main 
finding of this paper is that the transaction costs increase the cost of controlling 
pollution by either reducing the trading levels or by adding to the abatement costs, thus 
reducing the advantage of the tradable permit systems over the uniform standard 
approach. Another implication of the analysis performed by Stavins is that when 
marginal transaction costs are nonconstant the equilibrium permit distribution is 
sensitive to the initial allocation of permits. The suggestion of this analysis is that there 
is no simple answer in evaluating and choosing the most proper instrument; therefore a 
case by case comparison of these instruments might be required. 
 
Since Malik (1990) introduced noncompliance in the analysis of tradable permit 
markets, a sizeable literature on monitoring and enforcement of environmental policies 
has followed. The literature considers both the monitoring level and the penalty level as 
the main instruments that might affect compliance behaviour. Increasing monitoring 
activities as well as raising the penalty may significantly enhance non-compliance 
deterrence. Keeler (1991) highlights the importance of the penalty structure that firms 
face as a chief determinant of outcomes in the tradable permit market. His paper 
considers how a marketable permit system performs relative to a uniform standards 
system under different shapes of the penalty function facing the firms. He finds that in 
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some circumstances the tradable permits system may result in higher pollution than a 
uniform standards system.  
 
With perfect monitoring, the tradable permit system is superior to the uniform standards 
system in providing cost savings (Tietenberg, 1985). It is uncertain whether this least-
cost advantage remains when emissions are not perfectly monitored. The performance 
of tradable permit system under imperfect monitoring is the subject of Montero’s work 
in 2003. The author finds situations in which the uniform standards system can be 
welfare superior to the tradable permit system. Such situations are ones where the 
production and abatement costs are negatively correlated or the output and abatement 
activity interact negatively. In this case, the superiority of the permits policy is no 
longer clear.    
 
In a more recent paper, Montero (2005) finds that “permits sometimes can provide firms 
with incentives to choose combinations of output and abatement technologies that may 
lead to higher aggregate emissions than under standards, something that would not 
occur if emissions were accurately measured” (p. 657). In this work he also explores the 
advantages of a hybrid policy that would combine permits and standards. The result of 
this analysis is that in many cases the hybrid policy will converge to the permits-alone 
policy but never to the standards-alone policy.   
 
The literature argues that social norms and community pressure might play a significant 
role in yielding compliance rates. These forms of informal sanctions have been the 
subject of work by Pargal and Wheeler (1996), Pargal et. al. (1997), and Brooks and 
Sethi (1997). The findings of these papers support the role that informal regulation can 
play in inducing compliance. However, the extent to which these forms of informal 
sanctions can play this role depends on the community income and education level.  
 
Economists suggest self-reporting as one of the innovations that might be used to 
reduce the need for expensive monitoring. Harford (1987) introduces self-reporting in 
his study and examines the optimal level of a firm’s emission under such a scenario. He 
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finds that imposing stricter self-reporting requirements usually has the effect of 
reducing pollution, but this is not always the case. The author performs his analysis 
under different penalty structures and finds it possible that, in some cases, increasing 
the penalty for failure to report may cause an increase in the emission level.   
 
Malik (1993) studies how self-reporting can affect enforcement costs. Self-reporting 
does not remove the enforcement costs completely since the regulator will undertake the 
auditing of self-reports. High enforcement costs make policies less effective than 
desired. The main finding in Malik’s paper is that “self-reporting reduces costs when (1) 
the cost of auditing is high, (2) the maximum feasible fine is low, or (3) the desired 
effort level is high” (p. 253). Malik shows that in other cases self-reporting will be 
likely to increase costs. It is worthwhile sometimes to lower the penalty for non-
compliance, thus trading off some compliance for more reliable self-reporting.  
 
Other papers focusing on enforcement issues related to self-reporting are those by Innes 
(1999a and 1999b). A broad survey of the economics literature on monitoring and 
enforcement is provided by Cohen (1999).  
 
The main focus of the literature discussed so far has been on the environmental 
enforcement policies applied to the industry sector. The next section will be 
concentrated on the development of the literature on agri-environmental policies and 
particularly on the compliance monitoring issue. 
 
3.4 DESIGNING AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES WITH LIMITED INFORMATION 
Agri-environmental policies have been in place since the mid-1980s. They are typically 
voluntary in nature and are used to encourage desirable environmental outcomes in the 
countryside. A sizeable literature has focused on agri-environmental policies and 
especially on the economic incentives used to implement these policies. Whitby and 
Saunders (1996) compare two of the instruments that have been developed in the UK to 
secure conservation goods described as Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) and 
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Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESAs). These instruments are management 
agreements between the farmers and the conservation agency that modify production 
activities to benefit the environment. Modifications imply a decrease in the production 
intensity; therefore the producers should receive enough compensation for the loss they 
incur in order to forego production options. The authors underline that both instruments 
involve transaction costs for the producers and the conservation agency which are 
related to examining the relevant areas of land, negotiating agreements and monitoring 
compliance. The paper shows that the ESA instrument is more expensive per hectare 
protected than SSSI.   
 
While the previous work deals with the incentives needed to adopt certain agri-
environmental schemes, a further consideration is the examination of the farmers’ 
behaviour once they have joined those schemes. To judge the effectiveness of a policy, 
we need to be able to determine whether the participating farmers are complying with 
the provisions of the policy (Russell, 1994). Work by Latacz-Lohmann in 1998 and by 
Choe and Fraser in 1998 and 1999 have addressed the topic of compliance monitoring 
in agri-environmental schemes by applying the principal-agent theory. Latacz-Lohmann 
assumes farmer are risk neutral, while Choe and Fraser allow for risk aversion in their 
analysis. The policy instruments available to the environmental agency in Choe and 
Fraser’s paper (1999) are the monitoring accuracy and the incentive payment for 
compliance. They focus their analysis specifically on the relationship between the 
monitoring accuracy and the costs incurred by the agency during the implementation of 
the policy when the farmer is risk-neutral and risk-averse. The authors show that the 
environmental agency faces a trade-off between the monitoring costs and the rewards 
on delivery of the desired outcomes from farmers.  
 
Ozanne et. al. (2001) further develops the work of Latacz-Lohmann and Choe and 
Fraser and analyses the economic inefficiencies arising from moral hazard in agri-
environmental schemes. Their model recognizes the trade-off between increased 
environmental benefits and the increased cost of monitoring compliance. The solution 
of the problem determines the optimal compensation payment, monitoring level and the 
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input abatement. Numerical simulations undertaken in their work support the idea of a 
decrease in the optimal monitoring with an increase in the farmers risk aversion. 
 
Hart and Latacz-Lohmann (2005) extend the literature by developing a model that 
accounts for the variation in farmers’ compliance costs. The regulator does not have 
information about the compliance costs of each farmer but it does know the distribution 
of these costs. The available instruments to the regulator through which he can 
influence compliance are the compensation payment and the monitoring probability. 
The authors find that increasing the total compliance target results in an increase in the 
optimal monitoring probability and payment level. The regulator characterizes farmers 
as honest or dishonest and this distinction has a significant effect on the policy.  
Paradoxically, an increase in the proportion of the honest farmers leads to an increase in 
the total number of cheats. The explanation is that the regulator reduces monitoring if 
there are more honest farmers; therefore the dishonest farmers are more inclined to 
cheat.   
 
Farmers’ cheating and misrepresentation has been incorporated in the theoretical 
analysis of agricultural policy performed by Giannakas and Fulton in 2000. They 
explore the economic effects of misrepresentation and cheating for three stylized policy 
instruments – output quotas, output subsidies, and a combination of an output quota and 
a subsidy. The results show that cheating alters the welfare effects of the policy 
instruments and their efficiency in redistributing income to producers. When cheating 
and/or misrepresentation occur, output subsidies are a more efficient means of income 
redistribution than are output quotas. A combination of policy instruments, however, 
can usually result in a more efficient transfer than any of the policy instruments alone.   
 
In a more recent work, Giannakas and Kaplan (2005) investigate the economic 
determinants of producer non-compliance with the conservation provisions of the highly 
erodible lands policy. Producers are considered as heterogeneous and the available 
policy tools are audits, penalties and farm program payments. They investigate the role 
of these policy tools in promoting compliance as well as evaluate the effectiveness of 
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the current policy design in inducing adoption of the conservation activity and in 
deterring producer non-compliance. In particular, they show that an increase in the 
income transfers to agriculture through commodity and conservation payments will 
increase the adoption of conservation practices as well as reduce the extent of producer 
non-compliance. 
 
The focus of next section will be on the literature related to the carbon offsets option 
and compliance monitoring.   
 
3.5 CARBON OFFSET OPTION AND COMPLIANCE MONITORING  
Air quality and pollution issues have been widely treated in the literature. A great 
volume of literature in the past decade has been focused on the sulphur dioxide scheme 
which is generally acknowledged as being highly successful (Kete, 1992, 1994; 
Schmalensee et. al., 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; Stavins, 1998; Ellerman et. al., 1997, 2000). 
Economists have tried to use the benefits of this experience in schemes intended to 
mitigate climate change. Since endorsement of the Kyoto Protocol, the climate change 
literature has been addressing the issue of GHG emissions. Part of this literature has 
been focused on the use of carbon sinks as a promising option in offsetting emissions.    
 
Work by Mascher (2004) provides an overview of an emission trading scheme (ETS) 
and the position of offset credits within such a scheme. She talks about the Canadian 
proposal of establishing an offset trading system and, in parallel, provides an overview 
of other offset systems throughout the world even though experience with these systems 
is quite limited.     
 
The opportunity to create offset credits by sequestering carbon in the forests has been 
addressed in a number of studies. Van Kooten et al (2002) examine the economic 
aspects of the incentives and institutions needed to motivate landowners to convert their 
land to plantation forests. Even though tree planting is considered as a cost-effective 
means for achieving carbon offsets, the results show that there may be some 
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unaccounted transaction costs that increase the costs of afforestation considerably. The 
survey undertaken in this research provides some insights concerning transaction costs 
and suggests that transaction costs of getting farmers to adopt tree planting may be 
substantial and became a significant barrier to afforestation. 
 
Studies by Moulton and Richards (1990), and McCarl and Callaway (1993) have 
included in their analysis the opportunity costs of foregone agricultural uses and have 
constructed cost schedules which will help them in identifying promising regions for 
establishing forests. Parks and Hardie (1995) underline that, in order to be effective in 
converting agricultural land to forest, a program should take into consideration the 
discounted opportunity costs of foregone agricultural profits as well as the forest 
establishment costs. Parks and Hardie’s results suggest that the carbon sequestering 
policies should select marginal agricultural lands based on minimizing costs per ton 
sequestered. If the selection criterion is the minimum cost per acre, the amount of land 
enrolled would increase but the amount of carbon sequestered would decrease; thus 
basing the selection on this criterion would result in less effectiveness in sequestering 
carbon.  
 
The efficiency of the per-tonne versus per-acre payment schemes is examined by 
Pautsch et al (2001) for the case of sequestering carbon in the soil by adopting different 
tillage practices. They reach a similar conclusion with Parks and Hardie in the favor of 
the per-tonne based payments.  
 
Antle et al (2003) investigate the efficiency of alternative contracts for carbon 
sequestration in cropland soil. Their research takes into account the spatial 
heterogeneity of agricultural production systems as well as the costs of implementing 
efficient contracts which consist of the measurement costs and the on-farm opportunity 
cost. The analysis shows that the per-hectare contracts are as much as five times more 
costly than the per-tonne contracts. The results indicate that both the measurement costs 
and the relative inefficiency of per-hectare contract increase with the degree of spatial 
heterogeneity. The measurement costs of implementing per-tonne contract are found “to 
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be at least an order of magnitude smaller than the efficiency losses of the per-hectare 
contract for sampling errors in the range expected to be used in the contracts” (pg 248). 
The analysis suggests that the contracting parties can achieve a lower total cost with the 
per-tonne contract than with the per-hectare contract. 
 
To ensure that the GHG reductions are taking place in the quantity claimed, monitoring 
and verification will be required for the offset projects. The efficiency of the 
sequestration contract will depend to a significant degree on the costs of monitoring and 
verification since those activities can be very costly. Monitoring carbon requires 
specialized equipment, methods and trained personnel which can be expensive to obtain 
and maintain. Monitoring will be performed for the baselines which serve as a 
benchmark, as well as for the changes in the carbon stored in the soil or in the forest 
(MacDicken, 1997). Establishing the right baselines is very important for the credibility 
of the offset system. Chomitz (1998) points out that the baseline determination depends 
not only on “the methodology used but also on the set of institutions that keep the 
application of the methodology honest and reasonable” (p. i).    
 
Work by Brown (1999) is focused on the forest-based projects and more specifically 
considers how carbon is inventoried and monitored over the length of project. He takes 
into consideration the relation between the precision of estimates and the cost to achieve 
given levels of precision. Remote sensing, as well as models followed by field 
measurements for verification, are the potential tools for monitoring. To illustrate the 
inventorying and monitoring methods, the author presents an example of a pilot carbon-
offset project.  
  
With regard to monitoring there is also the issue of who is actually undertaking the 
compliance monitoring. The middlemen are often seen as guarantors of quality of a 
good or a service (Biglaiser (1993), and Chu and Chu (1994)). They are an information 
source to consumers and may help to alleviate the producer moral hazard problem 
(Biglaiser and Friedman 1994). Middleman may be involved in monitoring compliance 
in the carbon offset market. Moura-Costa and Stuart (1999) describe the steps required 
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for verification of forestry-based carbon offset projects and argue that independent 
compliance monitoring can add a layer of credibility and transparency to the system. 
They particularly discuss the importance of standardization of methods and procedures 
used for monitoring and verification of projects.  
 
The literature also deals with the issues of risk and uncertainty which can affect the 
expected GHG flows of the project. Diversification of activities within a project, 
dispersing project sites as well as the establishment of insurance are proposed as ways 
to deal with risk. A substantial body of literature has developed with reference to 
insurance and warranties in general (Heal 1997, Lutz and Padmanabhan 1998, 
Soberman 2003); however the literature regarding insurance in the carbon offset 
markets is still being established.  
 
Several economists have examined the liability issue. Zhang (1999) considers the 
assigning of liability as essential for the success of an emission trading scheme. The 
literature related to this issue tends to focus on seller non-compliance. As different 
economists argue, the choice for buyer or seller liability depends on a number of 
factors. Tientenberg et al. (1999) argue that seller liability is preferred if the quality of 
enforcement is high. High quality enforcement would provide an incentive for the seller 
that the emission reductions are real, thereby reducing the incentive for cheating. They 
also argue that under seller liability, buyers are more likely to become active in the 
market because they do not bear the risk.   
 
Klaassen and Nentjes (2002) argue that the choice of buyer or seller liability depends on 
the parties’ willingness to comply. They show that, compared to a seller liability, a 
buyer liability improves effectiveness if buyers have a stronger willingness to comply 
than sellers and if the enforcement system is weak. The advantage of adding buyer 
liability is that it strengthens compliance incentives by discouraging buyers from 
purchasing emission reductions from sellers or countries that appear to be heading 
towards non-compliance. But this would increase the transaction costs by creating price 
uncertainty until the moment that compliance is checked. Since each option has 
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advantages and disadvantages, some authors have proposed creating hybrid seller/buyer 
liability arrangements (Zhang 1999, 2001). 
 
The climate change literature expresses a desire for more research on such things as: 
compliance issues and the consequences of non-compliance on the performance of the 
carbon-offset market; the way in which monitoring and verification can be done, the 
extent to which different monitoring agencies undertake monitoring and the impact of 
this monitoring on the pricing behaviour; the farmers’ pooling option while considering 
different types of aggregators; and the impact of farmers heterogeneity. In this thesis we 
take steps to address these questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE BASIC MODEL 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter develops a model of heterogeneous farmers to examine the consequences 
of non-compliance on the performance of the carbon-offset market. The analysis begins 
with the derivation of the carbon offsets’ supply curve in a perfect compliance scenario. 
The analysis then introduces non-compliance in the economic analysis of the carbon 
offset market and considers the impact of non-compliance by farmers on the supply of 
carbon offsets. The chapter examines the economic determinants of farmers’ non-
compliance and performs some comparative statics analysis. 
 
4.2 MODELING THE FARMERS’ PROBLEM1
                                                
Each farmer cultivates product  under a certain land management practice, which can 
be either a BMP or a conventional land management practice. As mentioned in Chapter 
two, BMPs can be of many types such as: reducing tillage, planting permanent cover 
crops, reducing summerfallow, and planting shelterbelts (Agriculture and Agri-food 
Canada, 2003a). Each practice gives rise to different rates of carbon accumulation and 
to different streams of net profits. Due to the economic benefits related to the BMPs 
many farmers have already adopted these practices. However, a number of farmers still 
produce under the conventional land management practices because of the new 
investment required, part of which is sunk, and a lack of experience to undertake change 
in their practices. In addition to the direct economic benefits, farmers may have an 
q
 
1 The thesis will be concentrated on farmers’ behaviour, but for the sake of completeness we also present 
the emitters problem in Appendix 4. 
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incentive to adopt BMPs in order to participate in the carbon-offset market. However, 
there are some important considerations for the farmer when he comes to signing the 
carbon offset contract.  
 
Farmers adopt BMPs to a greater or a lesser degree. They may capture carbon in their 
soil, but none of this sequestered carbon is available for trading if they don’t sign a 
carbon-offset contract. Farmers are reluctant to sign the contract for such reasons as 
transaction costs, uncertainty, inflexibility and the risk associated with signing the 
contract. Examples of transaction costs would be: administrative costs of keeping 
records and reporting carbon offsets, the costs of undertaking the transaction to sell the 
carbon offsets, and costs associated with the signing process. These transaction costs 
can reduce the attractiveness of participating in the carbon-offset market. In a study 
performed by Marbeck Resource Consultants (2004), the transaction costs for GHG 
offset system were estimated to range between $0.4 and $2 per tonne of CO2. 
 
Another issue for farmers considering participating in the carbon-offset market is 
uncertainty. Farmers have to sign the contract under the condition of an uncertain rate 
of soil carbon accumulation and market price of sequestered carbon. The rate of carbon 
sequestration can be affected by adverse weather conditions as well as by the market 
price for the carbon offsets created from carbon sequestration. The carbon price can be 
affected by changes in demand and supply conditions which are not known at the time 
of signing. In addition to these aspects, farmers should also take into account that 
signing the sequestration contract is a highly irreversible decision. Uncertainty, 
combined with the irreversibility of the decision, implies that delaying the signing 
decision has an option value. Farmers will enter to a contract relation only if the net 
present value of their investment exceeds this option value (Vercammen, 2002).  
 
Apart from this, farmers incur additional risk if they decide to sequester carbon under a 
contract and to sell carbon credits in an emission market. This higher risk might result 
for a number of different reasons. Eliminating such activities as conventional tillage 
might generally increase risk. On top of this, adopting BMPs might require investing in 
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a new technology which entails a learning period, a period of a higher risk. Investing in 
a particular technology might, as well, increase the financial risk. Since farmers are 
believed to be risk averse, they will require a risk premium in order to participate in a 
carbon sequestration scheme. The option value, the risk premium, as well as the 
transaction costs associated with signing the contract constitute the contract costs. 
Under the above considerations, each farmer will sign the contract only if the benefit 
from participating in the carbon-offset market exceeds the cost of signing the contract.  
 
Farmers are postulated to differ in the returns they get from their activities as a result of 
differences in such things as soil type, contract costs, experience, location, education 
and management skills. The basic model will be a location model that captures the 
farmers’ heterogeneity. For tractability, the farmers are assumed to be uniformly 
distributed with respect to their differentiating attribute and each farmer is assumed to 
produce one unit of carbon offsets.  
 
The following analysis will first examine farmers’ decision in a full compliance 
scenario and then will be followed by the analysis of the farmers’ choice when non-
compliance is introduced in the model. The supply curves will be derived and some 
comparative statics will be performed for each particular case.   
  
4.2.1 Farmers’ Decision on Carbon Offsets Production  
Before investigating the farmers’ compliance decision, it is helpful to analyze their 
economic behaviour under a perfect enforcement scenario. This assumption is relaxed 
with the intention that the more realistic situation, where farmers have the potential to 
over-report their carbon offsets, be explored.  
 
Farmers have the choice of: (1) signing the carbon sequestration contract; or (2) not 
signing the contract. Let α  denote the attribute that differentiates them. Farmer 
heterogeneity is critical in generating the supply of carbon offsets. 
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The per unit profit for a farmer with differentiating attribute [ ]0,1α ∈  is given as 
follows: 
 
ncπ = Pq                                   if he does not sign the sequestration contract 2
                      if he does sign the sequestration contract c q eP Pπ λα= + −  
where  and  are the prices for carbon offset and product  respectively.  eP
qP ,q
 
The parameter λ  is a non-negative cost enhancement factor that is constant across all 
farmers. The term λα  presents the cost incurred by farmer with 0α > . This term 
embodies the sequestration contract cost which includes the transaction costs associated 
with signing the contract, the risk premium that farmers require to take on the risk of 
signing the contract, and the option value that farmers attach to the potential to wait to 
sign the contract at a latter date (see Weersink et al., 2005, Fulton et. al., 2005). 
Whether or not a farmer participates in carbon sequestration under a contract depends 
on the profitability of such involvement. Each farmer makes his choice based on which 
alternative generates the highest per unit profit.  
 
The horizontal curve ncπ  drawn in Figure 4.1 represents the net returns associated with 
the production of product  for different values of q α  (i.e., for different farmers) where 
the contract is not signed. The curve  shows the net returns associated with signing 
the contract for different values of the differentiating attribute. The intersection of 
π c
 and nc cπ π determines the level of the differentiating characteristic corresponding to 
the farmer that is indifferent between signing the sequestration contract and not signing 
it. This farmer has attribute cα given by:  
(4.1)  : .c nc c c ePα π π α λ= ⇒ =  
                                                 
,2 More realistically, the farmer’s profit would be expressed by: nc qPπ μα= −  where parameter μ  
would be a non-negative cost enhancement factor that is constant across all farmers. The term μα  would 
represent the cost incurred by farmer with 0α > . Without loss of generality, it is assumed that 0.μ =  
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 To the left of cα  (i.e., for , c0α α⎡ ⎤∈⎣ ⎦ ) all farmers elect to sign a contract, while to the 
right of   (i.e., for ) all farmers choose not to sign the contract, no matter 
what land management practice they are applying. Some of the farmers located between 
α c ( ,c 1α α ⎤∈ ⎦
cα  and 1 might be applying BMPs in their land, but they are not entitled to sell the 
carbon offsets they create as long as they do not sign a sequestration contract. Given 
that α  is uniformly distributed between zero and one, cα  represents the portion of 
farmers that produce carbon offsets under a contract, while (nc c1 )α α= −  is the 
fraction of farmers that do not choose to sign the carbon offset contract.  By 
normalizing the mass of farmers at unity, the fraction of farmers that sign the contract 
gives the supply of carbon offsets in the market, which is written as follows: 
(4.2)  .c ePx λ=  
The inverse supply function ( )0S  is represented by the equation .ceP xλ=  
cα
λ  
qP  
0 
q
eP P+  
1 
Net 
Returns ($) 
cx  
cπ
ncπ
Figure 4.1  Farmers’ decision under perfect compliance.  
Differentiating 
Characteristic α
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Comparative static results can be obtained from Figure 4.1. The price of carbon offsets 
is a key factor in determining how many farmers sign the contract. An increase in the 
price of carbon offsets results in an increase of the benefits from signing the contract, 
ceteris paribus. More specifically, an increase in  leads to an upward shift in the eP
cπ  
line. This upward shift results in a larger portion of farmers signing the sequestration 
contract (i.e., 
c
e
x 0
P
∂ >∂ ). Decreasing the cost enhancement factor λ  causes a rightward 
rotation of the cπ curve through the intercept at  thus increasing the number of 
contracts signed by farmers (i.e., 
,q eP P+
cx 0λ
∂ <∂ ).      
 
4.2.2 Extending the Basic Model: Introducing Non-Compliance on the Farmers’ 
Side  
The previous analysis was performed under the assumption of perfect compliance. But 
in the real world, the monitoring and enforcement activities required to ensure 
compliance with a contract are costly. Farmers need to be monitored in order to ensure 
that the carbon offsets that are claimed represent an actual reduction of carbon. 
However, the resource costs of monitoring and enforcement might result in insufficient 
enforcement activity. The lack of enforcement creates economic incentives for farmers 
to over-report the amount of carbon offsets they are supplying under a contract. Each 
farmer now has a choice of: (1) signing a carbon offset contract and honouring it; (2) 
signing the contract but not complying with its terms (i.e., cheating); and (3) not signing 
the contract.  
 
Suppose farmers are audited with a probability [ ],0 1θ ∈  which is known to them and 
they face a per unit penalty γ  if they are caught cheating on the contract. If a farmer 
cheats, his expected net return depends on the likelihood of his being audited, the 
penalty paid if he is caught cheating, as well as his individualized costs. If he does not 
get detected he can enjoy the benefit ,q eP P σα+ −  where σ  is a cost enhancement 
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factor that is constant across all farmers. The term σα  represents the costs incurred by 
a farmer in the case when he signs the sequestration contract but does not comply with 
its terms; thus this term embodies the sequestration contract cost as well the costs 
associated with cheating. Following Cule and Fulton (2005), the cheating cost is 
associated with activities such as double bookkeeping. The cheating cost moves in the 
same direction with the sequestration cost since the higher the sequestration cost, the 
higher the cost of masquerading cheating. 
 
In order to have a range of cheaters, it is assumed that ;0λ σ> >  the difference 
between λ  and σ  is denoted as .ϕ λ σ= −  If the farmer is caught cheating, he gets the 
benefit .q eP P γ σα+ − −  As a result, the expected return from cheating for a farmer 
with characteristic α  will be given as follows:   
(4.3)  ch q eP Pπ θγ σα= + − −  
 
Note that, since farmers differ with respect to α , and as a result of their individualized 
costs σα , the expected profits from cheating differ across farmers. The farmer’s 
decision of whether to participate in the carbon-offset market and, if so, whether to 
comply with the provisions of the sequestration contract depends on the profits received 
or expected to be received from these alternatives. A graphical illustration of the 
farmer’s decision is given in Figure 4.2.  The intersection of curves cπ  and chπ  
determines the level of the differentiating attribute 1α  corresponding to the farmer who 
signs the carbon offset contract but is indifferent between complying with the terms of 
the contract and cheating: 
(4.4)  : .c ch1 1
θγα π π α ϕ= ⇒ =   
 
In a similar way, the intersection of curves chπ  and ncπ  determines the level of the 
differentiating attribute 2α  corresponding to the farmer who is indifferent between not 
participating in the carbon-offset market (i.e., not signing the contract) and signing the 
sequestration contract but not satisfying its terms:  
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(4.5)  : .ch nc e2 2
P θγα π π α σ
−= ⇒ =  
Farmers located to the left of 1α  (i.e., farmers with differentiating attribute [ ], 10α α∈ ) 
choose to participate in the carbon-offset market; farmers located between 1α  and 2α  
(i.e., farmers with characteristic ( ),1 2α α α∈ ) choose to sign the contract but not to 
comply with all the provisions; and farmers positioned to the right of 2α  (i.e., those 
with attribute [ ],2 1α α∈ ) choose not to sign the sequestration contract no matter what 
land management practice they are applying.  
 
cα
λ  
qP  
0 
q
eP P+  
1 
Net 
Returns ($) 
cπ
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Figure 4.2.  Farmers’ decision under non-compliance 
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Since farmers are uniformly distributed with respect to differentiating characteristic ,α  
2α  determines the portion of farmers that sign the sequestration contract; 1α  gives the 
portion of farmers who sign the carbon contract and honour its provisions; ( )2 1α α−  
gives the portion of farmers that sign the contract but do not comply with its terms; and 
42
( 21 )α−  determines the portion of farmers that do not sign the contract. Formally 
( )2 1α−  can be written as follows: α
.e2 1
Pϕ θγλα α σϕ
−− =  
 
The portion of farmers who sign the contract, but do not comply with the provisions, 
( 2 1),α α−  will equal zero when all three curves ,  and c ch ncπ π π  meet at the same 
point. This happens when the carbon offset price equals .eP
λθγ
ϕ=   
 
By normalizing the mass of farmers at unity, the portion of farmers that choose to sign 
the contract gives the total supply of carbon offsets in the market, ,sc 2x α=  which can 
be written as follows:    
(4.6)  .s ec
Px θγσ
−=  
 
Having introduced cheating in the model, the supply of total contracts signed by farmers 
is given by the following equation:  
(4.7)  : .s2 e cS P xθγ σ= +  
When cheating is not considered, aggregate farmers’ welfare is given by the area 
 while, when cheating is introduced into the analysis, the aggregate farmers’ 
welfare is increased by the area   
,0JAB1
.HAG
 
The carbon offsets offered in the market can come from farmers who actually undertake 
sequestration or from those who engage in cheating activity. Put in a simple way, 
carbon offsets supplied in the market can be genuine or bogus. Only farmers positioned 
to the left of 1α  contribute genuine carbon offsets. As a result, the supply of genuine 
carbon offsets in the market ,sr 1x α=  is given as follows: 
(4.8)  ,srx
θγ
ϕ=  
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while the amount of bogus carbon offsets in the market, ,s sc r 2 1x x α α− = −  is given by: 
(4.9)  ,s s ec r
Px x ϕ θγλσϕ
−− =  
 
The number of farmers that choose not to sign the sequestration contract, ,s snc cx 1 x= −  is 
given by: 
(4.10)  .s enc
Px σ θγσ
− +=   
 
The analysis shows that the number of total contracts signed, the amount of genuine 
carbon offsets and the amount of bogus carbon offsets offered in the market depends on 
the audit probability as well as the penalty applied per unit of non-compliance. In 
addition to these factors, the total number of contracts signed is influenced by the price 
of carbon offsets and ;σ  the amount of genuine carbon offsets is impacted by ;ϕ  and 
the amount of bogus carbon offsets is influenced by the price of carbon offsets as well 
as by the three parameters ,   and .ϕ λ σ   
 
This model analyses the farmer’s decision when all three choices are available. The 
relation q qe eP P P P θγ+ > + −  guarantees that a positive number of farmers, ,srx 0>  
select to sign the carbon offset contract and to comply with its terms. Assume we have 
an interior solution so that all three variables ,  , and ( )s s sr nc c r
sx x x − x  are positive. This 
assumption needs the following conditions to hold: in order to have ,sncx 0>  
ePσ θγ> −  should hold (see equation 4.10); and in order to have ( ) ,s sc rx x 0− >  
ePϕ θγλ>  should hold (see equation 4.9). From equation 4.9, we can derive the critical 
audit probability value cr ePϕθ γλ=  for which full compliance holds (i.e., ( )
s s
c rx x 0− = ). 
For audit probabilities ,crθ θ≥  non-compliance (i.e., overreporting) will be completely 
deterred. Each farmer chooses either to sign the carbon offset contract and honour it or 
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to decline the sequestration contract. He does not find overreporting profitable since the 
probability of being detected is too high.   
Figure 4.3 illustrates three supply curves  where:  represents the 
supply curve under a full-compliance scenario;  represents the supply of genuine 
carbon offsets; and  represents the total supply of carbon offsets after we have 
introduced cheating in the model. For prices 
,  and ,0 1 2S S S 0S
1S
2S
eP
λθγ
ϕ<  they converge on segment  .0T
 
θγ  
0  
σ
T
0S
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eP  
λθγ
ϕ  
θγ
ϕ
λ
Figure 4.3. Supply curves under both scenarios 
  
4.2.3 Comparative Static Results in the Basic Model 
Comparative statics results can be derived diagrammatically from Figure 4.2. An 
increase in the per unit penalty causes a downward shift in the chπ  curve, which in turn 
results in a decrease in the number of contracts signed as well as in the non-compliance 
level (i.e., 
( )
,
s ss c rc
x xx 0γ γ
∂ −∂ <∂ ∂ 0< ), ceteris paribus. In a similar way, a higher audit 
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probability causes an increase in the expected penalty and shifts the chπ  curve 
downwards, thus decreasing the amount of bogus carbon offsets as well as the total 
amount of carbon offsets offered in the market from farmers (i.e., 
( )
,
s ss c rc
x xx 0θ θ
∂ −∂ <∂ ∂ 0< ), ceteris paribus.  
 
The results from the comparative statics analysis with respect to the auditing probability 
θ  or the penalty variable γ  are illustrated in Figure 4.4. The total number of contracts 
signed by farmers falls from Tx  to Tx ',  the amount of genuine carbon offsets supplied 
in the market increases from srx  to 
s
rx '  and the amount of bogus carbon offsets 
decreases from ( )2 1α α−  to ( )' '2 1 .α α−   
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Figure 4.4 Comparative static with respect to the auditing 
                   probability θ  or the penalty variable γ  
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An increase in the carbon offset price  causes an upward parallel shift of the curves eP
cπ  and chπ by the same amount. These shifts result in a higher number of contracts 
signed (i.e., 
s
c
e
x 0
P
∂ >∂ ); the amount of carbon sequestered under contract remains 
constant however.  
 
By examining the supply curves in Figure 4.5 we can draw some implications. An 
increase in the price of carbon offsets from zero to λθγϕ  increases the number of 
farmers who sign contracts with full compliance, since nobody who signs a 
sequestration contract finds it profitable to cheat along section  of the supply curve.  0T
 
For a given auditing probability ,θ  the supply of genuine carbon offsets is fixed at 31S . 
An increase in the per unit penalty or in the auditing probability causes a rightward 
parallel shift in the  as well as an upward shift in the curve, thus extending the 
section where the three supply curves converge from  to 0T  As a result, the 
amount of genuine carbon offsets supplied in the market increases from 
1S 2S
0T ' .
r
sx  to 
r
sx ' .  
 
                                                 
3 The vertical supply curve is a result of the linear cost function. A more general case would be where 
supply is upward slopping. An earlier version of the model attempted to incorporate a more general 
cost function, but the analysis become too complicated and the results were not tractable. The assumption 
of a vertical supply curve, however, does not change the qualitative nature of the results. Note also that in 
the more general case an increase in price  would result in an increase in the number of contracts 
signed as well as in the amount of genuine carbon offsets supplied.  
1S
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4.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter develops a model of heterogeneous farmers to examine the consequences 
of non-compliance on the performance of the carbon-offset market. The analysis begins 
with the derivation of the supply of carbon offsets in a perfect compliance situation. The 
study then considers the impact of non-compliance by farmers on the supply of carbon 
offsets.  
 
The analysis suggests that the extent of farmers’ participation in the carbon market and 
the share of farmers in non-compliance depend on the price of carbon offsets and the 
enforcement policy of the government. More specifically the extent of non-compliance 
is shown to decrease with an increase in the audit probability and /or an increase in the 
penalty per unit of non-compliance.  
 
In addition, the number of farmers participating in the carbon-offset market is shown to 
increase with an increase in the carbon-offset price. The total number of farmers under 
contract decreases with an increase in the per unit penalty and/or an increase in the audit 
probability.  
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CHAPTER V 
TRADING AND AUDITING CHOICES UNDER DIFFERENT STRUCTURES FOR 
THE TRADING SECTOR AND THE MONITORING GROUP 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION
                                                
  
Carbon offsets trading will be undertaken by traders (or aggregators) that buy carbon 
offsets from farmers and sell verified carbon offsets to LFEs. This chapter of the thesis 
considers two organizational structures for the trading sector: the investor owned-firm 
(IOF) structure and a collectively owned and managed producers’ association (PA) 
structure. Within the IOF, this chapter considers two market structures – monopoly and 
oligopoly. We expect a monopolistic or oligopolistic structure to emerge because of the 
fixed costs involved in running a trading scheme. 
 
For each of these cases, we consider monitoring undertaken by a monitoring group 
which can be either a governmental agency or a monitoring group operating on behalf 
of the for-profit traders or on behalf of the producers’ association trader. Assume the 
monitoring agents do not cheat.4 The objective of the governmental agency is assumed 
to be the efficiency of meeting the environmental targets; thus the targets are assumed 
to be set by another unit. Even though other structures can be used for the trading sector 
or the monitoring group, we concentrate the work of this chapter on the ones mentioned.    
 
 
4 Monitoring agents will be monitored by Environment Canada. If the third party verifier has confirmed 
the Greenhouse Gas Assertion, Environmental Canada will then do a final check to confirm that all 
program requirements have been met. The honesty of enforcers as well as some ways to improve 
incentives given to enforcers are discussed by Becker and Stigler (1974) in their paper.  
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The amount of monitoring performed by the monitoring agency defines the total supply 
of carbon offsets as well as the supply of genuine carbon offsets in the market. This 
chapter examines the trader’s price and output decision as well as the monitoring 
agency’s decision of the choice of ;θ  the consideration of the last element means the 
audit probability is endogenized. The optimal amount of enforcement is likely to 
depend on the nature of the organization that undertakes the enforcement since they 
might have different objective functions. The chapter examines the extent to which 
these different monitoring agencies undertake monitoring, and the impact of this 
monitoring on pricing behaviour. 
 
The supply and the demand equations for the carbon offset market are determined from 
the farmers’ and the LFEs’ problem, respectively. LFEs are aware that farmers will be 
monitored and that carbon offsets traded by third parties will represent actual 
sequestration5. The carbon offsets demand emerging from LFEs will be represented by 
a demand curve  (see Appendix A4 for the derivation of the demand curve). Given 
this demand and the supply, the amount of carbon offsets trading and the endogenous 
auditing probability are determined in a two stage game. In the first stage of the game, 
the monitoring agency chooses the level of auditing that it will undertake, knowing the 
farmers’ response to this choice of auditing as well as the impact of the chosen 
D
θ  on the 
pricing decisions. In the second stage of the game, traders make their decision on how 
much carbon offsets to buy from farmers and how much to sell to LFEs based on the 
degree of auditing that has been undertaken. To avoid the non-credible outcomes, the 
game is solved using backward induction (Kreps, 1990).   
 
                                                 
5 This is true if intermediaries trade only the genuine carbon offsets. If emitters would know that only a 
portion ψ  of carbon offsets offered in the market were genuine, the total amount of carbon offsets they 
would need to buy to meet their requirements would be 1ψ  times the emission reduction that is required 
to be addresses through carbon offset purchases. Since the LFEs will only pay for that portion that is 
genuine, the aggregator will want to exclude all cheaters since the final emitters will not be prepared to 
pay full price for any offsets that cannot be deemed genuine.     
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5.2 PRICING AND TRADING DECISION IN THE MONOPOLY AND OLIGOPOLY CASES 
Monopoly case 
First we consider the case when the trader is a profit maximizing monopolist-
monopsonist. The firm is thus the sole buyer of carbon from farmers and the exclusive 
provider of verified carbon offsets to LFEs.  
 
Denote by Y  the amount of genuine carbon offsets and by X  the amount of bogus 
carbon offsets. The trader buys the amount ( )Y X+  of carbon of offsets at price  and 
sells only the verified units at price  The price  is given by the linear inverse 
demand curve 
eP
.P eP
eP Yη τ= − . 
 
 
The profit maximization problem for the trader is: 
 
, ( )
                   
Y X eMax PY P Y X
st Y Y
− +
≤  
(5.1) 
where Y  is defined from the auditing probability θ  determined by the monitoring 
group (i.e., Y θγϕ= ). The solution to this problem is presented in Appendix A5.1. The 
analysis shows that .X 0=  This means that, when buying carbon offsets, the 
monopolist chooses to operate only in the component 0T  of the farmers’ supply curve. 
 
The output for the monopolist is the lesser of  and mY ,Y  where  is determined where mY
,m mMR MO=  and marginal revenue and marginal outlay are derived from the demand 
curve  and the supply curve  respectively. An explanation for this would be as 
follows: 
D ,0S
If ,mY Y<  the monopolist would choose Y  since this is the maximum amount of 
genuine carbon offsets supplied in the market. After this point he will be buying bogus 
units and no profit comes from these units. The solution for the trader in this case is:  
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(5.2)  ;   ;   ( )Y X 0 2θγ θκ η τ λ γϕ ϕ= = = − +    
where k is the Lagrangean multiplier from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (see Appendix 
A5.1). 
 If ,mY Y<  the monopolist would choose  since this output gives him the highest 
profit. The solution in this case is: 
mY
(5.3)  ;    ;   =0.
( )m
Y X 0
2
η κτ λ= =+  
 
With knowledge of the behaviour of the trading firm, the decision of the monitoring 
group can be considered. If the monitoring group operates on behalf of the firm, it 
chooses the audit probability θ  that maximizes the profit of the firm minus the 
monitoring cost. Formally, the maximization problem of the monitoring group can be 
written as: 
(5.4)   2e
1Max P P
2θ
θγ θγ ξθϕ ϕ− −  
where monitoring cost, ,2m
1C
2
ξθ=  is assumed to be an increasing and convex 
function of the auditing intensity ,θ  and ξ  is a positive scalar that depends on factors 
such as the total number of farmers and the effort required to perform monitoring. 
 
The problem in equation (5.4) uses the quantity Y  rather than Y . The use of m Y  
reflects the knowledge that since the monopolistic trading firm will never trade more 
than  the monitoring group will always find it optimal to make ,mY Y  no larger than . 
If 
mY
Y  were larger than  then the monitoring group could cut back on monitoring, thus 
saving the associated costs without affecting the monopolist’s output. 
.mY
 
In Y-space, the first order condition equalizes the marginal revenue with the sum of the 
marginal outlay and the marginal cost of monitoring 'm m mMR MO C= +  (see Appendix 
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A5.1). This condition provides the optimal amount of monitoring which will be given 
by the formula shown below which is derived in Appendix A5.1:  
(5.5)   
( ) 2 22
ηϕγθ τ λ γ ξϕ
∗ = + +  
This optimal auditing probability, in turn, defines the position of the genuine carbon 
offsets supply curve  thus determining the amount of carbon offsets traded by the 
monopolist in the market, where 
,1S
Y ∗  is given by: 
 
 (5.6)  .
( )
2
2 2Y 2
ηγ
τ λ γ ξϕ
∗ = + +   
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0S
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$  
Figure 5.1. Monitoring group decision (monopoly or oligopoly case)  
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Oligopoly case 
Now consider the case when oligopolistic-oligopsonistic firms undertake the carbon 
offset trading. Representatives from these firms form the monitoring group. The profit 
maximization problem for each oligopolistic trader is: 
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,
 ( ) ( ) (
                                                            
i i
i i i i e i i i i iy x
Z
i i
)iMax P y y y P y x y x y x
st y y Y
π − − −
−
= + − + + + +
+ ≤
	

 
(5.7)   
 
here is the output of genuine carbon offsets purchased and  is the amount of w yi xi
bogus carbon offsets purchased. The analysis in Appendix A5.2 shows that ix 0=  per 
each firm, which means that firms trade only genuine carbon offsets.  
 
As with the monopoly, the output will be the lesser of o  and :o oY MR MO= ,Y  where 
oMR  and oMO  are the indusry’s marginal revenue and y curv  in the 
poly/o psony case.
 marginal outla es
oligo ligo 6 The explanation for the above is as follows. 
 
 ,oY Y<  the choice of the output would be YIf  since this is the maximum amount of 
genuine carbon offsets supplied in the market. For output greater than Y , the units are 
bogus and no profit is derived from these. The total amount of carbon offsets traded in 
the market in this case is .Y θγϕ=    
 
 ,oY Y<If  the choice of the output would be  since this output gives the highest profit oY
in the oligopoly/oligopsony case. The total amount of carbon offsets traded would be: 
( )(o )N 1
NY ητ λ+ +
 
ince traders will never trade more than  the monitoring group will always find it 
optimal to make 
=  (the formula is derived in Appendix A5.2). 
,oY
Y
S
 no larger than  in order to save monitoring costs.  
                                                
oY
 
6 The marginal revenue curve oMR  in the oligopoly case lies somewhere between the mMR  curve and the 
demand curve the higher the number of emitters, the closer the ;D oMR  curve gets to   .D
The marginal outlay curve oMO  lies somewhere between the mMO  curve and the supply curve  the 
higher the number of farmers participating in the offsets market, the closer the 
;0S
oMO  curve gets to  .0S
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 From the monitoring group perspective, the group acts on behalf of all oligopolistic 
s. The monitoring group thus chooses the audit probability firm θ  that maximizes the 
profit of all traders minus the monitoring cost. The monitoring group essentially 
considers all the firms as one firm, whose profit minus monitoring cost should be 
maximized. Since this objective function is the same as the one corresponding to the 
monopoly case, the optimal amount of monitoring will be given by equation (5.5) where 
'
m m mMR MO C= + . This optimal monitoring probability defines the supply of the 
genuine carbon offsets, which in this case is the same as in the monopoly case .Y ∗  
Since Y ∗  is established where ' ,m m mMR MO C= +  the monitoring group reduces Y  to 
.oY Y
∗ <  Knowing that the output of the oligopoly is the lesser of oY  and ,Y Y ∗=  the 
total am unt of carbon offsets tr  given by: o aded by all firms is
(5.8)  
( )
2
2
ηγ
2 2Y τ λ γ ξϕ
∗ = + +  
 
he amount of carbon o sets traded by each oligopolistic firm is:  
.9) 
while t ff
(5  
( )N 2
2
i 2 2
y ηγτ λ γ ξϕ⎡ ⎤
∗ = + +  
 
he monopoly and oligopo  scenarios lead to the same solution because of the 
onitoring group. Even though the traders have the potential to trade 
⎣ ⎦
Both t ly
behaviour of the m
more, they do not do so because they are limited in the supply of genuine carbon offsets 
because of the monitoring activities of the monitoring group. 
 
5.3 CHOICE OF AUDITING BY A GOVERNMENTAL-RUN AGENCY  
his section examines the cases where carbon offsets trading is performed by for-profit 
firms with monitoring services undertaken by a governmental agency. The analysis 
considers first the monopolistic structure for the trader followed by the case of an 
oligopolistic structure.   
T
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 Monopoly trader/ governmental agency monitoring group 
The profit-maximization problem of the monopolist determines : .m m mY MR MO=  The 
monopolistic firm will .
( )m
Y
2
η
τ λ= +  A governmental agency not trade more than 
chooses the audit probability θ   so as to maximize the total welfare, which is the sum of 
s the monitoring costs.  
account the behaviour of the monopoly. The objective function for the governmental 
the farmers’ surplus, consumer surplus, and trader’s profit minu
Consider first the case where the government maximizes welfare without taking into 
agency in this case is: 
[ ]( . )   
                
2Y Y
m
0 0
1 Y5 10 W CS PS C Y dY YdY
2
ϕπ η τ λ ξ
22 2Y Y 1 YY
2 2 2
γ
where 
ϕη τ λ ξ γ
⎛ ⎞= − − − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
⎛ ⎞= + + − = − − − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ∫  
 
Y = θγϕ . Making this substitution, the maximization problem for the monitoring 
agency can be written as follows: 
 
.11)  ( ) ( )  
2 2
2
2 2
1Max W Max
22 2θ θ
θγ θγ θγη τ λϕ ϕ ϕ= − − −   (5 ξθ
 
carbon offsets, ,ucY
∗The optimal level of the genuine  is given by the expression (see 
ppendix A5.3):   A
( )
2
uc 2 2Y
ηγ
τ λ γ ξϕ
∗ = + +   (5.12)  
 
This level of output, which is determined by ,0 mS C D
'+ =  is depicted in Figure 5.2.  
56
However, since the monopoly firm will never trade more than  the governmental 
agency will find it optimal to make the output no greater than  in order to save 
monitoring agency reduces the output from
,mY
mY
 to .=g mY Y   ucY ∗monitoring costs. Thus, 
The supply  of genuine carbon offsets will be 1S located as illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
y 
Recall from the previous analysis that the monitoring agency that was operating on 
behalf of the monopoly undertakes monitoring to position the suppl of genuine carbon 
offsets at .Y ∗  Even though government agency is constrained in its oice  
monopolist’s selection of the trading level, the amount of genuine carbon offsets 
supplied in this case, 
ch from the
,g mY Y=  is higher than .Y ∗  Positioning the supply of genuine 
carbon offsets at gY  requires a higher level of monitoring by the governmental agency. 
The price received by farmers increases from eP  to 'eP  while the price that LFEs are 
paying for verified carbon offsets decreases from mP  to .gP  The LFEs are better off 
when the monitoring is undertaken by the gove ental agency than by a monitoring 
agency that operates on behalf of the monopoly because more genuine carbon offsets 
are supplied in the market and at a lower price. Thus, a governmental monitoring 
agency has the potential to increase the level of monitoring undertaken and the level of 
traded output as well as to lower the price paid by LFEs.  
 
rnm
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Figure 5.2. Governmental agency monitoring (Case of a monopoly trader) 
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Oligopoly traders/ governmental agency monitoring group 
The total amount of carbon offsets that oligopolistic traders find optimal to trade is 
determined by equating marginal revenue with the marginal outlay (i.e., o oMR MO= ). 
Given the supply and demand parameters of our case, this total amount  is given by:  oY
(5.13)  
( )( )o m
NY Y
N 1
η
τ λ= >+ +  
 
Since the oligopolistic firms will never trade more than  the monitoring agency will 
find it optimal to make 
,oY
'gY  equal to  otherwise it will waste resources with extra 
monitoring. The supply of genuine carbon offsets,  will be located as illustrated in 
Figure 5.3.  
,oY
,1S
 
From the previous analysis, the monitoring agency that was operating on behalf of the 
oligopoly chose as optimal the level of monitoring that positions the supply of genuine 
carbon offsets at .Y ∗  In contrast, a government agency selects the optimal audit 
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probability so that 'gY  of genuine carbon offsets are supplied, where 
 Y g ' = Y o > Y g = Y m > Y ∗ . Thus, the amount of monitoring undertaken by the 
governmental agency in this case is higher than in the previously considered cases. The 
price received by farmers increases from  to  while the price that LFEs 
are paying decreases from  to 
eP '' ' ,e e eP P P> >
oP '' '.g gP P<  In summary, a governmental monitoring 
agency can potentially increase the level of monitoring undertaken as well as the 
amount of traded carbon offsets, and lower the price LFEs are paying for the verified 
carbon offsets.  
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Figure 5.3. Governmental agency monitoring (Case of oligopoly traders) 
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While there is enough monitoring in each case to deter cheating, the optimal level of 
auditing probability is different for different structures of the monitoring group. A 
governmental agency will undertake more monitoring than a monitoring group owned 
by the firms. The more monitoring is undertaken by the monitoring group, the greater is 
the amount of genuine carbon offsets in the market; hence the greater is the amount 
traded by the aggregator/aggregators in the carbon-offset market.  
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 5.4 PRODUCERS’ ASSOCIATION CASE AND THE FREE RIDER PROBLEM   
The next organizational form considered in this chapter is a producers’ association (PA) 
established to undertake trading of carbon offsets in the market. By forming a PA, the 
farmers make an investment that can provide benefits to them. The investment would be 
a monitoring system that would supply monitoring service to the members of the PA. 
With a PA, farmers produce carbon offsets which are traded through a collectively 
owned and managed producers association and monitored by a monitoring group that 
operates on behalf of the PA. Rather than each farmer developing individual contracts, 
the PA contracts on behalf of the members. Trading carbon offsets through the PA 
reduces the number of transactions and contracts, thus reducing the time and resources 
that would be spent otherwise. Forming a PA enables the farmers to benefit from 
economies of scale as well. The economies of scale may be associated with the fixed 
costs which will be shared among the members. The PA can handle large volumes so 
that per unit monitoring costs can be kept low.  
 
Price pooling has an important impact on the PA’s ability to market farmers’ carbon 
offsets. Assuming that PA had the necessary information about the costs for each 
member it would offer different contracts by paying each member the respective cost of 
sequestering carbon. Given that this information is not available to the PA, the same 
average price is offered for the product supplied to all the members. Since members are 
paid the same price per unit of carbon offsets delivered to the pool, each member would 
prefer to let the others collaborate while he himself defects. In other words, each farmer 
has the incentive to behave strategically by free riding on the contribution of the others. 
Farmers who free ride attempt to benefit from price gains created by the pool without 
sharing in its costs. The result of this strategic behaviour would be to lower the 
production of genuine carbon offsets, which in turn would reduce the benefits that 
farmers who do not free ride can obtain from using the PA.  
 
The model of choice most often used to analyze this problem is the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
(PD) in which the dominant strategy is always to free ride (Mueller 1979). Successive 
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work by Axelrod (1984) formalizes the problem as an iterated PD and emphasizes the 
role of expectations in this process. Runge (1984) illustrates that defection is the 
dominant choice and some form of coercion is necessary to ensure collective action.  
 
If monitoring was costless, the PA could deal with free riding. But since monitoring the 
performance of the participants is a costly undertaking, incentives exist for the 
individuals to shirk on their contribution and free ride on the contribution of the others 
(Harris et. al., 1998). Under these circumstances, the PA should make its decision about 
the amount of monitoring to be undertaken and the pooling price it will offer to farmers. 
The purpose of this section is to examine the manner in which the PA determines the 
poling price and the probability of auditing and to compare these results to those of the 
for-profit firms.  
 
5.4.1 Choice of Trading by the Producers’ Association 
In supplying the verified carbon offsets, the producers’ association is concerned with 
the profitability of the PA as well as the producer surplus, which will be affected by the 
price  paid by the PA to its members per unit of carbon offsets. The PA generates 
revenue from the sale of verified carbon offsets. The revenue obtained from the sale of 
these carbon offsets is used to cover the investment costs, the monitoring costs, and the 
payments to the farmers for the carbon offsets they provided. The cost of the investment 
is fixed at  while the monitoring cost 
eP
,F 2m
1C
2
ξθ=  is given by the same expression as 
in the cases considered previously. Out of the total amount of carbon offsets Yˆ Y X= +  
claimed by farmers, only Y  are the units for which the sequestration is actually 
undertaken. This amount of carbon offsets will be sold in the market at price ( ),P Y  thus 
creating revenues ( ) ( )R Y P Y Y=  for the PA. The fixed costs and the monitoring costs 
will be covered from the spread between the buying and selling prices. After covering 
the fixed and the monitoring costs, the PA has to pay farmers for the carbon offsets they 
provided to the PA. In the case where ˆ( ) ,m eR Y F C P Y− − >  farmers perceive a 
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dividend payment which attracts them to claim more carbon offsets. They continue to 
produce until quantity  and price  are such that all the dividends are exhausted, 
which is when the following relation holds. 
Yˆ ˆ( )eP Y
 
(5.14)  ˆ( ) m eR Y F C P Y− − =  
 
The analysis in the monopoly or oligopoly case showed that only genuine carbon offsets 
will be supplied in the market. Traders will not trade more than the amount Y ∗  which is 
defined by the supply of genuine carbon offsets  The situation is different in the PA 
case. Provided that the farmer’s break even point is not reached, the PA will supply 
bogus carbon offsets. The reason is that the PA has to give any profit back to the 
farmers. This payment will expand the supply of carbon offsets. As a result of the free 
rider behaviour, part of the offsets supplied will be bogus.  
1S .
 
Equation 5.14 represents the behavioural equation for the farmers cooperating under a 
carbon offsets pool. For a given ,θ  this equation provides the amount of carbon offsets 
 claimed by farmers which in turn determines the price per unit  that PA 
should pay to farmers. This price is obtained by the supply of total carbon offsets  for 
the value of 
Yˆ ∗ ˆ( )e eP P Y
∗ = ∗
2S
ˆ .Y ∗   
 
 
( ) ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )
m
2
m
R Y F C Y
Y
Y Y R Y F C
θγ σ
σ θγ
∗
∗
∗ ∗
− − = +
⎡ ⎤+ − − −⎣ ⎦ 0=
  
 
The solving of this quadratic equation in terms of Yˆ ∗  provides the total amount of 
carbon offsets claimed by farmers as follows: 
(5.15)  
( )ˆ
2 2
m4 R Y F CY
2
θγ θ γ σ
σ
∗ ⎡ ⎤− ± + − −⎣ ⎦=  
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We accept only the positive solution  
( )ˆ .
2 2
m4 R Y F CY
2
θγ θ γ σ
σ
∗ ⎡ ⎤− + + − −⎣ ⎦=   For 
this amount of carbon offsets claimed, farmers will be paid the price 
(5.16)  
( )ˆ( )
2 2
m
e
4 R Y F C
P Y
2
θγ θ γ σθγ σ∗ ∗ .⎡ ⎤+ + − −⎣ ⎦= + =   
 
This will be a pooled price since the PA offers one contract for all farmers. Both types 
of carbon offsets offered (genuine and bogus) will be paid at this price as a result of the 
asymmetric information. Each farmer knows if he is complying or not with the 
provisions of the contract he has signed, therefore he knows if the carbon offset claimed 
by him is genuine or bogus, but the PA does not have this information. The PA bases its 
pricing decision on the auditing probability announced by the monitoring group that 
operates on behalf of the PA. If ( )P P Y=  is the price that LFEs pay for the certified 
carbon offsets the gross revenues are expressed by the area .PAYO   
 
Assuming the fixed cost and the monitoring cost mF C+  are given by area  the 
maximum price that PA can offer to farmers is determined by point  which is the 
case when farmers do not cheat (i.e. 
,PABH
,H
ˆY Y= ). An increasing volume of bogus carbon 
offsets claimed by farmers reduces the average price that can be paid to farmers; 
therefore the curve depicting the pooled price for different volumes will be a downward 
sloping curve as shown in Fig. 5.4. This pooled price curve corresponds to a given θ  
and hence a given revenue – thus it can be considered as an isorevenue curve. There is a 
set of isorevenue curves, each curve corresponding to a different θ . 
 
For a given ,θ  the PA will buy from farmers the amount Yˆ ∗  of carbon offsets at price 
 and will sell the amount eP
∗ Y θγϕ=  of genuine carbon offsets to LFEs at price 
( ) .P Y Y θγη τ η τ ϕ= − = −         
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Figure 5.4. Defining the pooled price in a Producers’ Association 
case.
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5.4.2 Choice of the Auditing Level and Some Efficiency Considerations 
With knowledge of the trading and pricing behaviour of the PA, the decision of the 
monitoring group can be considered. Since the monitoring group operates on behalf of 
the PA, it chooses the audit probability θ  that maximizes the welfare of the farmers, 
which is given by producer surplus, subject to the behaviour equation. Producer surplus 
is given by area  ˆ( )eP Y JGO
∗ .
 
The maximization problem for the monitoring group is: 
 
ˆ
ˆ
  
ˆ   . .   ( )
ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) ( )
 ( ) ( ) ( )
m e
Y Y
e 0 e
0 Y
Y Y
m 0 e
0 Y
Max W Max PS
s t R Y F C PY
Max P Y Y P Y dY P Y dY
Max P Y Y F C P Y dY P Y dY
θ θ
θ
θ
=
− − =
= − −
= − − − −
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
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where  and  are obtained from supply  and  respectively. To take the 
derivative of the welfare with respect to the auditing probability 
( )0P Y ( )eP Y 0S ,2S
,θ  Leibnitz’s Rule7 is 
applied for the differentiation of the integrals. The FOC condition for the welfare 
maximization is as follows:  
 
ˆ
' ˆ ( )( ) ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Y
e
m 0 e e
Y
P YW Y P Y Y Y Y YP Y Y C P Y P Y P Y dY 0
Yθ θ θ θ θ θ θ
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + − − − + −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∫ =  
 
From figure 5.4 we notice that the two supply curves  and  cross at the carbon 
offset level  
0S 2S
Y ; thus ( ) ( )0 eP Y P Y=  and the terms ( )0Y P Yθ
∂
∂  and ( )e
Y P Yθ
∂
∂  will cancel. 
From the first order condition we thus obtain the following condition:  
 
(5.17)  
ˆ
' ˆ ( )ˆ( )
Y
e
m e
Y
P YY YMR C P Y dYθ θ θ
∂∂ ∂− − − =∂ ∂ ∂∫ 0  
The derivative of  with respect to the monitoring probability Yˆ θ  can be obtained by 
totally differentiating the behavioural equation (5.14): 
 
'
ˆ( ) ˆ ˆe
m 2
P YYMR C Y d MO dYθθ θ
⎛ ⎞∂∂ − − + =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
0  
' ˆ( ) ˆˆ em
2
P YYMR CY
MO
θ θ
θ
∂∂ − −∂ ∂ ∂=∂
Y
 
 From the supply equation ˆ,  2 eS P Yθγ σ= +  and thus 
ˆ( ) .eP Y γθ
∂ =∂  Substituting these 
two findings in equation (5.17) and making the following transformations results in 
condition (5.18): 
                                                 
dy7 If    then   
( )
( )
( , )
g x
h x
z f x y= ∫
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( , )( , ) ( , )
g x
g x h x
h x
z g x h x f x yf x y f x y dy
x x x x
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= − +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∫  
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(5.18)  
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Recalling the equivalent condition from the for-profit firms’ case we have: 
 
(5.18’)  'm 0
Y YMR C MOθ θ
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂− =⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠  
 
Since it is impossible to analytically compare (5.18) with (5.18’), a set of numerical 
simulations are undertaken to determine the conditions under which PA undertakes 
more monitoring than the FPF. The starting values for the exogenous variables in the 
simulation are as follows: the intercept η  of the demand curve equals 10; the slope τ  of 
the demand curve equals 1.2; the slope of the supply curve under a full compliance 
scenario is given by  λ = 1.2 < σ = 0.3, where σ  is the slope of the supply curve ; 
the penalty 
S2
γ  equals 0.2, the positive scalar ξ  equals 0.6, and the fixed costs  equal 
0.5. With these values, the optimal value of 
F
θ  is the same for both the FPF and the PA 
case ( ) – i.e., both (5.18) and (5.18’) hold. θPA = θFPA = 1.94
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For each exogenous variable, values above and below the starting values were chosen 
and the corresponding optimal monitoring levels PAθ  and  were calculated. 
Although extensive simulations were performed, only a portion of the many simulations 
that were carried out is presented in Table 5.1. The relationships presented hold over a 
wide variety of values of the exogenous variables being examined. The base solution is 
highlighted in the table for each simulation performed for a particular exogenous 
variable. The last two columns in the table show the values of the arc elasticity of 
θFPF
θ  
with respect to each of the exogenous variables. The arc elasticity is defined as the ratio 
of the percentage change in θ  (ceteris paribus) to the percentage change in the selected 
exogenous variable. 
 
The simulation results show that the larger are ,γ  ,σ  and  or the smaller are ,F η  and 
,ξ  the larger is the monitoring level for the PA relative to the FPF. The monitoring 
level defines the position of the supply  and, as a result, the amount of the genuine 
carbon offsets traded in the market. Since the level of the real carbon offsets increases 
proportionally with 
1S
,θ  the PA will supply more genuine carbon offsets in the market 
when the parameters ,γ  ,σ  and  are relatively large and when the parameters F η  and 
ξ  are relatively small. Under these conditions, farmers sequester more carbon in their 
soil when the monitoring of carbon offsets is performed via a PA than by for-profit 
firms and they are paid a higher price for their product (Figure 5.5). The LEFs are also 
better off since they pay a lower price for the genuine carbon offsets.   
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Table 5.1. Optimal θ   in the PA and FPF cases. Numerical simulation results for different values 
 of the exogenous variables  
Optimal θ  Arc Elasticity Exogenous 
variables ↓ 
Changing 
variable ↓ FPF PA FPF PA 
0.110γ =  1.81958535 1.81243705 0.76913350 0.80609354 
0.115γ =  1.88359904 1.87822761 0.76005585 0.81023092 
0.120γ =  1.94552529 1.94412438   
0.125γ =  2.00534759 2.00924186 0.74188916 0.80705949 
0.30
1.20
0.60
10.00
1.20
F 0.50
σ =λ =ξ =η =τ ==
 
0.130γ =  2.06305543 2.07431962 0.73280995 0.80983663 
0.20σ =  1.79340028 1.75192442 0.20080296 0.25673437 
0.25σ =  1.86695489 1.84369957 0.22610220 0.29090085 
0.30σ =  1.94552529 1.94412438   
0.35σ =  2.02936612 2.05394948 0.27370281 0.35648775 
0.120
1.20
0.60
10.00
1.20
F 0.50
γ =λ =ξ =η =τ ==
 
0.40σ =  2.11864406 2.17467123 0.29631418 0.38954741 
1.00λ =  2.3505708 2.39296724 -1.03732221 -1.13931910 
1.10λ =  2.13219616 2.14419638 -1.0529714 -1.12575104 
1.20λ =  1.94552529 1.94412438   
1.30λ =  1.78571428 1.78238231 -1.07084731 -1.08518121 
0.120
0.30
0.60
10.00
1.20
F 0.50
γ =σ =ξ =η =τ ==
 
1.40λ =  1.64818699 1.64964405 -1.07593506 -1.06552983 
0.40ξ =  2.74725274 2.80716187 -0.85104585 -0.90602684 
0.50ξ =  2.27790432 2.29291693 -0.86508614 -0.90506624 
0.60ξ =  1.94552529 1.94412438   
0.70ξ =  1.69779286 1.69115596 -0.88357001 -0.90430604 
0.120
0.30
1.20
10.00
1.20
F 0.50
γ =σ =λ =η =τ ==
 
0.80ξ =  1.506024096 1.499806185 -0.89007591 -0.90217206 
9.00η =  1.75097276 1.77328987 0.99999999 0.87295683 
9.50η =  1.84824902 1.85749515 0.99999999 0.88866976 
10.00η =  1.94552529 1.94412438   
10.50η =  2.04280155 2.03091312 1.00000000 0.89513566 
0.120
0.30
1.20
0.60
1.20
F 0.50
γ =σ =λ =ξ =τ ==
 
11.00η =  2.13937315 2.11819124 0.99654468 0.89970291 
1.00τ =  1.96592398 1.96523717 -0.05720849 -0.05924285 
1.10τ =  1.95567144 1.95462620 -0.05978036 -0.06191474 
1.20τ =  1.94552529 1.94412438   
1.30τ =  1.93548387 1.93378959 -0.06464868 -0.06659061 
0.120
0.30
1.20
0.60
10.00
F 0.50
γ =σ =λ =ξ =η ==
 
1.40τ =  1.92554557 1.92356322 -0.06696481 -0.06897393 
F 0.30=  1.94552529 1.90345597 0.000000000 0.04138500 
F 0.40=  1.94552529 1.92318232 0.000000000 0.04853564 
F 0.50=  1.94552529 1.94412438   
F 0.60=  1.94552529 1.96498054 0.000000000 0.05852656 
0.120
0.30
1.20
0.60
10.00
1.20
γ =σ =λ =ξ =η =τ =
 
F 0.70=  1.94552529 1.99126091 0.000000000 0.07119867 
 
 
 
68
$  
D
PFY PAY
PFP  
PAP  
PF
1S PA1S
0  Y
0S
mF C+
*Yˆ
FPeP  
*ˆ( )eP Y  
Figure 5.5.  Comparing prices and supplies of genuine carbon 
offset in case of monitoring undertaken by for-profit firms or PA 
PAeP  
 
5.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter examines what impact the involvement of traders in the carbon-offset 
market has on non-compliance, as well as how the structure of the monitoring group 
affects non-compliance, the amount of carbon offsets traded in the market as well as 
pricing.  
 
Based on the supply and demand curves, the analysis considers the price and the 
quantity traded that are established by intermediaries that are engaged in carbon offset 
trading. The key role of the traders is to guarantee, based on the amount of monitoring 
that is undertaken, that the LFEs purchase only carbon offsets that correspond to actual 
sequestration. Two organizational structures are considered for the trading sector: the 
IOF (investor owned-firm) structure and the PA (producers’ association) structure. 
Within the IOF, the analysis focuses on the monopoly and oligopoly structures. 
 
The analysis then examines three cases for the group that monitors farmer compliance – 
a group owned by for-profit traders, a government-run agency and a group owned by 
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the PA trader. The results of the analysis show that both for-profit firms and the 
governmental agency undertake sufficient monitoring to ensure that full compliance is 
achieved – thus, while non-compliance is possible, it does not occur in equilibrium. 
Since the level of monitoring effectively determines the amount of carbon that is 
sequestered and that can be traded, a monitoring group owned by for-profit traders can 
achieve monopoly profits for the sector, even when it is oligopolistic.  
 
A governmental agency would undertake more monitoring than a monitoring group 
owned by for-profit firms. This would result in more trading activity as well as more 
genuine carbon offsets supplied in the market. Emitters would be paying a lower price 
for carbon offsets and farmers would be paid a higher price per unit of carbon offset 
supplied in the market. However, all these changes are likely to be small, particularly 
when the trading sector is monopolistic.  
 
The analysis also shows that under certain conditions, the PA undertakes more 
monitoring and supplies more genuine carbon offsets in the market than does a for-
profit trading company. Farmers sequester more carbon in their soil and are being paid a 
higher price for their product when the monitoring and trading of carbon offsets is 
performed via the PA itself than by for-profit firms. The LFEs on the other side pay a 
lower price for carbon offsets when the units are supplied by a PA than by for-profit 
firms. Thus, from society’s perspective, it is more efficient that trading and monitoring 
in the carbon offset market be undertaken by a PA.  
 
The analysis in this chapter shows that the optimal amount of enforcement, and as a 
result the cost effectiveness of a carbon-offset market, depends on the nature of the 
organization that undertakes the enforcement.    
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CHAPTER VI 
CAPTURING THE HETEROGENEITY ATTRIBUTED TO THE SEQUESTRATION 
PHASE   COMPARING ALTERNATIVES WHEN CARBON OFFSETS ARE 
AGGREGATED IN A POOL   
 
6.1    INTRODUCTION
                                                
 
The type of farmers’ heterogeneity captured in Chapters IV and V was attributed to the 
cost differences among different farmers. For simplicity we assumed that each farmer 
produced one unit of carbon offsets, which means that, along this dimension, the 
farmers were identical. This assumption will be relaxed for the work presented in this 
chapter. More specifically, this chapter focuses on another category of heterogeneity, 
namely the magnitude of sequestration that farmers can undertake.   
 
Changes in land management practices can substantially improve (or worsen) the 
accumulation rate of carbon in the soil. However, in accumulating carbon, terrestrial 
sinks are limited by the ecosystem capability in interaction with the land management 
system (Lee., H.C. et al., 2003). Sequestration accumulates carbon until the absorptive 
capacity is used and a new equilibrium is reached under the management system. West 
and Post (2002) examined 67 long-term tillage experiments8 and found that, with a 
change from conventional tillage (CT) to no tillage (NT), “the carbon sequestration 
rates … can be expected to peak in 5 to 10 years … reaching a new equilibrium in 15 to 
20 years” (page 1930) (see figure 6.1). This means that over time the rate of soil carbon 
 
8 This study was conducted by using a global data base of 67 long-term agricultural experiments from the 
published literature that recorded the response of SOC (soil organic carbon) to changes in tillage and that 
were greater than 5 yr in duration. 
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accumulation increases until it reaches a peak and then decreases over time until the soil 
becomes saturated.  
 
 
Source: West and Post (2002).         Solid line represents data using a nonlinear regression. 
Figure 6.1.  The percentage change in annual soil organic C sequestration rates 
under NT, relative to CT 
 
 
 
Farmers store different amounts of carbon in their soil depending on which phase of 
sequestration they are experiencing. Figure 6.2 shows the time path of carbon 
sequestration in the soil in response to a change in the management practice. Under the 
existing land management practice (say conventional tillage), the accumulated soil 
carbon is  at time t 0CTY .=  After the farmer switches his land to a new land 
management practice (say no-tillage), the soil starts to absorb more carbon. The rate of 
absorption increases until it reaches the peak at time t 1T=  and starts to decrease after 
that until the sequestration ceases at the saturation point  The maximum amount of 
carbon that can be stored in the land under that particular management regime is 
and a new steady-state is reached. There would be no additional net change in the 
soil carbon if land use and land management practice remain the same.  
S.
NTY
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Source: Adopted from Antle and McCarl (2001). 
 
Figure 6.2. Soil carbon accumulation in response to a change in the 
land management practice 
 
 
As a result of this carbon sequestration time path, farmers may sequester different 
quantities of carbon at the same point in time for the same land size depending on which 
sequestration phase they are. This is the type of heterogeneity that the model of this 
chapter will capture. A farmer that just started to apply the no tillage practice will not 
accumulate the same soil carbon as a farmer that has been using this practice for 5 years 
or as a farmer that has been using no tillage for 15 years. 
 
Farmers continue to switch from conventional tillage to no-till or low till techniques. 
Boame (2005) points out in his paper that the no-till area increased from 29.7% of the 
area tilled in 2001 to 46.4% in 2006. Thus farmers will form a heterogeneous 
population based on previous rates of adoption of low tillage or no tillage. By the time a 
carbon trading system is set up, some farmers might be very close or have already 
reached the saturation point in their land. At this point, a question might be raised 
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regarding the farmers’ incentive to release their carbon stock and start over. But those 
farmers have adopted no tillage techniques because of other economic benefits related 
to soil organic matter. If farmers release the carbon stock back to the atmosphere they 
will lose all the benefits they created over the years. In short, the opportunity cost of 
getting rid of the stock can be quite high (and likely increases over time), which in turn 
reduces the incentive for farmers to release their carbon back and start over. 
 
As was discussed in chapter V, farmers might consider joining an offsets pool.  The 
pool would be an organized group who agree under a contract to apply a specified set of 
BMPs to produce credits in aggregate (Marbeck Resource Consultants. 2004). The pool 
will undertake the monitoring as well as the trading of carbon offsets. This chapter 
considers the case of a pool owned and managed by the farmers and compares this to 
the case of an aggregator who runs the business on a for-profit basis. These two 
structures are the ones examined because they are the organizational forms emerging in 
the carbon-offset market. The objective functions for these two cases, as well as the 
accessible information sets, are different. In addition, in the for-profit aggregator case, 
the aggregator chooses the farmers’ type while in the producers’ association case, the 
farmers choose the type of pool they will form. 
 
There are several advantages associated with offsets pooling. One advantage of pooling 
option would be the risk reduction. The amount of carbon sequestered in the soil 
depends in part on weather conditions, with less carbon being sequestered in a dry year. 
By pooling the carbon produced by a large number of farmers, particularly if they are 
located over a wide geographic area, an aggregator – whether operated on a for-profit or 
break-even basis – can reduce the risk of weather fluctuations.  
 
A second advantage of aggregating the offsets from different farmers is the ability to 
capture the economies of scale present in supplying carbon credits. By aggregating 
carbon offsets, the aggregator is able to spread the fixed costs associated with the 
provisions of carbon credits over a larger volume, thus lowering average costs. The 
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fixed costs include such things as administrative costs, the developing of monitoring 
and inventory systems, and the cost of establishing a marketing effort. 
 
Since different farmers supply different amounts of carbon to the pool, the aggregator 
may decide to vary the payment to different producers based on the quantity supplied. 
The pricing strategy used in this chapter is a two-part tariff which comprises a fixed fee 
plus a uniform price per each unit purchased. Based on the timing of sequestration, 
farmers can be categorized as being in an early stage, a medium stage or the late stage 
of sequestration. The information that PA would need to classify farmers in these 
categories is relatively easy to obtain, so pricing based on quantity is possible.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 describes the framework 
developed to examine the monitoring and pricing decision for the pool. Subsection 6.2.1 
explores the default coefficient case while the next subsection delves into the custom 
coefficients’ case. Both subsections look at two different types of aggregators – a for-
profit aggregator (FPA) and a producers’ association (PA). The chapter considers both a 
heterogeneous pool and a homogeneous pool in order to answer the question: what is 
the likelihood that a for-profit structure or a break-even structure of the pool will lead to 
a homogeneous or a heterogeneous pool? The chapter also compares the alternatives of 
custom coefficients versus default coefficient for each aggregator type. The last section 
concludes the chapter.  
 
6.2 THE MODEL  
This model assumes a fixed number N of farmers with carbon sequestering potential 
who are considering participation in the carbon offset market by joining in a pool. As 
mentioned in chapter IV, some farmers may have already adopted beneficial land 
management practices, others are in the process of switching their land management 
practices to BMP and another fraction of farmers is considering the change in the near 
future. Thus, they are sequestering different amounts of carbon based on the 
sequestration phase in which they are. Assume the size of the land on which each 
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farmer is considering to apply BMP under a contract is the same. We categorize farmers 
in two broad groups. One group includes the farmers who are in the early stage or the 
late stage of sequestration and sequester relatively small amounts of carbon in their soil, 
while the other group contains those farmers that are in the middle stage of 
sequestration and sequester large amounts of soil carbon9. We use the index  to 
identify the first group and the index l  to identify the second group, thus 
s
{ }i s;l∈ .   
 
The situation will be modeled as a principal-agent problem10 where the principal (also 
referred to as the aggregator) can be either a for-profit firm or a producers’ association 
while the agents are the farmers. The principal undertakes monitoring as well as the 
trading of carbon offsets in the market. The pricing schedule used by the aggregator is a 
two-part tariff. A two part tariff is administratively simple and is the simplest form of a 
more general nonlinear tariff. The two-part tariff is used as a way of providing an 
incentive for the farmers sequestering large amounts of carbon to participate in the pool. 
Under the two-part tariff, each farmer pays a lump sum fee of M  (if M  is negative, the 
farmer receives a payment from the aggregator to sign a carbon contract) to the 
principal for the service offered and receives back a payment of  for each unit of 
carbon offsets supplied. The monitoring undertaken by the aggregator ensures emitters 
that they are buying genuine carbon offsets. The price emitters pay for the certified 
carbon offsets is determined in the carbon offset market and is assumed to be constant 
at  This assumption is consistent with a situation where the aggregator covers a 
specific geographical area in buying and monitoring carbon offsets but sells the certified 
product in a larger market in which the aggregator is a price taker. The revenues 
eP
P .∗
                                                 
9 This analysis categorizes farmers by the stage of sequestration with large sequesters and small 
sequesters. Another categorization would be by the stock of CO2 already sequestered: low, medium, and 
high stocks. This categorization would further differentiate the small sequesters group since some will 
have a large stock of CO2 in the soil and some a small stock. The risk of releasing the stocks back in the 
atmosphere is higher for the large stock group.  
We will continue our analysis based on the previous categorization (small sequesters and large 
sequesters) – thus, the farmers in the early stage of sequestration and in the late stage of sequestration are 
grouped together. This approach is predicated on the assumption that farmers with large stocks will not 
intentionally release their CO2 stock back in the atmosphere. The justification for this assumption is that, 
by releasing their stock back in the atmosphere, faremrs lose all the benefits associated to the soil carbon 
matter accumulated through the years. 
10 The same approach is used by Choe and Fraser (1999), and Latacz-Lohmann (1998) in their work. 
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available for covering the monitoring expenses can be collected from either the lump 
sum fee or from the difference ( )eP P∗ − .  Regarding the objective functions, the FPA 
chooses M  and  in order to maximize profit, while the PA maximizes members’ 
welfare by breaking even. Note that the lump sum fee may be negative, implying that 
the aggregator pays the producer a lump sum to participate; in this case the revenue 
obtained from selling the carbon credits must be large enough to cover both 
eP
M  and the 
per unit payment   eP .
 
The aggregator uses sequestration coefficients to determine the amount of carbon 
offsets for which each farmer is eligible for payment. This model considers two types of 
coefficients that could be used: default coefficients and custom coefficients. Under the 
default coefficient case, the aggregator uses the same coefficient for all farmers when 
deciding the amount of carbon offsets for which the farmer will be entitled to receive 
payment. This means that all the farmers will receive the same payment regardless of 
the sequestration stage in which they are in. Since the aggregator doesn’t need specific 
information about the sequestration stage for the farmers, the cost of administering the 
pool may be lower.  
 
Under the custom coefficients case, the coefficients used will be linked to the stage of 
sequestration; thus farmers from different stages of sequestration will get payments for 
different amounts of carbon offsets. In order to do this, the aggregator needs 
information about the stage of sequestration a farmer is in. A farmer who is in the early 
or late stage of sequestration produces sx  of carbon offsets which is smaller than the 
amount lx  of carbon offsets that a farmer in the middle stage of sequestration produces. 
The aggregator not only needs specific information about the sequestration stage for 
each farmer, but also needs to monitor the sequestration stage through time. As a result, 
the aggregator incurs higher information and monitoring costs in the custom 
coefficients case than in the default coefficient case.  
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The following sections will deal first with the default coefficient case which will be 
followed by the custom coefficients case.  
 
6.2.1 Default Coefficient Case 
This section deals with the default coefficient case. As mentioned in chapter II, a farmer 
might have an incentive to adopt a BMP due to the direct economic benefits related to 
this practice as well as the potential benefits from participating in the carbon offset 
market. The farmer will be eligible to get the benefits of trading the carbon offsets only 
if he signs the sequestration contract. In the default coefficient case, the aggregator 
introduces a sequestration contract that farmers may choose to sign. The farmer who 
signs the contract agrees to apply a certain BMP to his land and to supply the carbon 
offsets to the aggregator for trading. The same default coefficient will be used for all the 
farmers involved in the pool; thus the same amount of carbon offsets, dx , will be 
associated with a payment for each pool’s member regardless of the sequestration phase 
that he is experiencing. The aggregator pays each contract signer the price  for the 
default quantity 
eP
dx .   
 
A farmer produces a product  under a certain land management practice, which can be 
either a BMP or a conventional land management practice. He gets the revenue 
q
R  from 
this production activity. If the farmer does not sign the carbon sequestration contract, 
his profit 0iπ  is:  
(6.1)  ( )o oi iR C xπ = −  
where  stands for the costs faced by the farmer.  ( )o iC x
 
The profit dhiπ  of a farmer from group i who signs the contract with the pool and 
honours it is given by:  
(6.2)  ( )d dh hi e d iR P x C x M .π = + − −  
78
The term  represents the cost incurred to the farmer when the contract is 
honoured and includes the transaction cost of signing the contract and the sequestration 
cost. The farmer does not need to keep records and report the amount of carbon 
sequestered since he is paid only for the given default quantity 
( )dh iC x
dx  no matter how much 
sequestration he undertakes. Hence, the term ( )dh iC x  does not include any reporting or 
record-keeping cost.   
 
Each farmer signs the sequestration contract with the aggregator only if he can obtain a 
profit after signing which is at least as large as the profit before signing the contract. 
Farmers participate in the carbon market if the following individual rationality 
constraint is satisfied: 
d
iIR :     0d
h o
i iπ π≥ ≥
This relationship can be rewritten as: 
d
iIR :    ( ) ( )
( )
d
a
i
h o
e d i i
Cost  of  adopting  C x
P x M C x C x 0Δ⎡ ⎤− − − = ≥⎣ ⎦	

where the term  represents the cost of adopting the BMP 
and 
( ) ( ) ( )dha i iC x C x C x= − o i
Δ  is the benefit of the contract.  
 
The participation constraint diIR  can also be interpreted as an isobenefit line since it 
shows the combination of  and eP M  that provide the same level of contract benefits .Δ   
The equation of the isobenefit line diIR  in  ( )eM ,P  space takes the form: 
(6.3)  ( )
N
1a i
e
d d
SlopeIntercept
C x
P M
x x
Δ+= +
	

 
Recall that there are two groups of farmers – those that sequester a small amount of 
carbon and those that sequester a large amount of carbon. The constraint lines for both 
groups in the default coefficient case have the same slope – 1d dl s
d
slope IR slope IR
x
= =   
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– therefore the diIR  lines are parallel. The location of the 
dIR  curves relative to each 
other depends on the respective intercepts which in turn depends on the magnitude of 
the cost of adopting the BMP. Assuming the cost of adopting the BMP for the farmer in 
group  is not higher than the cost of adopting for the farmer in group  the intercept 
of the 
l s,
d
lIR curve will be smaller than or equal to the intercept of the 
d
sIR  curve (i.e., 
( ) ( )a al
d d
C x C x
x x
Δ Δ+ +≤ s )11. The feasible region, alternatively called the coalition 
region, is represented by the dashed area in Figure 6.3.  
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d
sIR
d
lIR  
$
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Figure 6.3 The coalition area in the default coefficient case 
 
Suppose farmers are audited with a probability [ ],0 1θ ∈  and they face a per unit 
penalty γ  if they are caught cheating on the contract. If a farmer cheats, his expected 
benefit depends on both the auditing probability as well as the penalty paid if he is 
                                                 
i  Sin
.
11 The cost of adopting is given by the difference ce the land size is the 
same, we suppose the cost  that farmer from each group incurs in case he does not sign the 
sequestration contract is the same.  As a result, the following relation holds:  
( ) ( ) ( )dha oi iC x C x C x .= −
( )o iC x
( ) ( )d dh hl sC x C x≤
80
caught cheating. If he is not detected, he can enjoy the benefit ( )dnhe d iR P x C x M+ − −  
where  is the cost incurred when the contract is not honoured. This term 
includes the transaction costs of signing the contract as well as the cheating cost (such 
as masquerading costs). If the farmer is caught cheating, he gets the benefit 
( )dnh iC x
( )dnhe d i dR P x C x M x .γ+ − − −  As a result, the farmer’s expected profit dnhiπ  from 
cheating (i.e. when he signs the contract but does not honour it) is given by: 
(6.4)  ( )d dnh nhi e d i dR P x C x M xπ θγ= + − − −  
 
The aggregator provides an incentive to farmers who sign the contract to comply with 
its terms only if the monitoring intensity θ  is chosen such that the incentive 
compatibility constraint is satisfied.  A farmer from group  who has already signed the 
contract will comply with its terms only if the profit from complying is higher than the 
expected profit from non-complying, i.e., if: 
i
d dh nd
i i iIC :   
hπ π>   or 
( ) ( )d dh nhe d i e d i dR P x C x M R P x C x M xθγ+ − − > + − − −  
After making transformations, the following result is reached: 
(6.5)  ( ) ( ) ( )d dh nh dd i i ix C x C x CHC xθγ > − =  
The term  on the right side represents the cost of honouring the contract (i.e., 
the compliance cost, assuming the farmer has already signed the contract). Recalling 
from footnote (5) that 
( )iCHC x
( ) [ ]d dh hlC x C xs≤ , we presume that CHCd xl( )≤ CHCd xs( ), 
which means that the cost of honouring the contract for the farmers in group l  is no 
higher than the cost of honouring the contract for the farmers in group  The non-
compliance penalty 
s.
dxγ  multiplied by the monitoring probability provides the expected 
non-compliance penalty. The result in equation 6.5 shows that the farmer complies with 
the contract if the expected penalty of non-compliance is greater than the cost of 
honouring the contract. The minimum inspection probability that ensures compliance of 
group i  can be derived from ( )
d
min d
i d ix CHC xθ γ =  and is equal to:  
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(6.6)  ( )
d
d
imin
i
d
CHC x
.
x
θ γ=  
This formula presents the well-known result in the enforcement literature that the 
probability of auditing is inversely proportional to the non-compliance penalty. The 
optimal inspection likelihood is proportional to the cost of honouring the contract; 
therefore  If the incidence of being inspected is different for farmers from 
different groups, a targeted monitoring will be required. The minimum inspection 
probability for each group will be such that there is just enough monitoring to that 
group to comply with the terms of the contract. If targeted monitoring is not possible, 
then compliance will be incomplete or excess resources will be used in monitoring.  
d d
min min
l s .θ θ≤
d
min
iθ
 
6.2.1.1 Aggregator’s Problem 
Having explored the problem from the farmer’s point of view, we now consider it from 
the aggregator’s perspective. The number of the farmers in group  is denoted by s sN  
while the number of farmers in group  is denoted by  The revenue l lN . pR  that the 
aggregator collects from the lump sum fee is equal to:  
p s lR N M N M NM .= + =  
The aggregator’s profit is given by the following expression:  
(6.7)  ( )( ) ( ) ( )d d
d
m
d m
p e s d l d l
C
NM P P N x N x C Cπ θ∗ in minsθ⎡ ⎤= + − + − +⎣ ⎦	
  
where  denotes the monitoring cost in the default coefficient case. We have 
incorporated the incentive compatibility constraints in the profit function by substituting 
d
mC
iθ  with  For each particular profit value mini .θ dpπ , an isoprofit curve can be obtained. 
The isoprofit equation in ( )eM ,P  space is given by: 
(6.8)  
N
dd
pd m
p e
d d d
SlopeIntercept
C 1:   P P M
Nx Nx x
ππ ∗= − − +
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Note that the isoprofit lines for the aggregator have the same slope as the isobenefit (or 
participation) lines for the farmers, so the lines are parallel to each other.  
 
At this point we need to differentiate between the two types of aggregators.  
 
 
6.2.1.1.1 For-Profit Aggregator 
If the aggregator operates on a for-profit basis, her objective function is to maximize 
profit. A rightward parallel shift of the isoprofit line causes an increase in the profit, 
thus the aggregator will try to locate the isoprofit line as far rightward as she can while 
still remaining in the feasible region.  
 
The individual rationality constraint diIR  in this case will be binding; if it is not then the 
aggregator can increase profits by either decreasing the payment  or increasing the 
membership fee 
eP
M .  Thus, 0Δ =  and the equation 6.3 representing the participation 
line 
0d
iIR   will be written as follows: 
(6.9)  ( )0 a idi e
d d
C x 1IR :   P M
x x
= + .  
 
The situation is represented in Figure 6.4. The aggregator shifts the isoprofit line until it 
reaches the 
0d
sIR  curve. For each point of the segment  both groups participate in 
the pool and the profit is maximized at 
ab,
maxd
pπ .  Each point along the line segment  
represents a possible solution to the aggregator’s pricing problem.   
ab
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Figure 6.4 The default coefficient case when the pool is run on a for-profit basis.
                   The case of a heterogeneous pool 
M  
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d
pπ maxd
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So far this work has considered the case of a heterogeneous pool run on a for-profit 
basis. What would happen if the pool were created by assembling only farmers 
belonging to the same group? 
 
Consider first the case of a pool formed only with farmers from group  The 
monitoring cost in this homogeneous case,  will differ from the monitoring cost in 
the heterogeneous case,  The higher the monitoring probability, the higher is the 
cost of monitoring; thus the monitoring cost is an increasing function of the monitoring 
probability. Given that probability of monitoring farmers from group  is higher than 
the probability of monitoring farmers from group l  (i.e, 
s.
1
d
mC ,
d
mC .
s
d d
min min
s lθ θ> ), the monitoring 
cost   The isoprofit equation will be rewritten as follows:   
1
d d
m mC C> .
N
1
1
d d
m pd
p e
d d d
SlopeIntercept
C 1:   P P M .
Nx Nx x
ππ ∗= − − +
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Note that the intercept of the isoprofit line has decreased but the slope has not changed; 
thus the isoprofit lines still remain parallel to the isobenefit lines. Provided that the pool 
is formed solely with farmers from group  only the participation line s,
0d
sIR should be 
considered in the diagram (see Figure 6.5). The isoprofit line 
1
d
pπ  will shift in until it 
reaches the 
0d
sIR  curve. Any point in the line segment  can be a solution. For the 
same profit value, the isoprofit line 
ab
1
d
pπ  is located to the right of the isoprofit line dp .π  
Hence, the maximum profit value for the homogeneous pool case, 
max
1
d
pπ  is smaller then 
the maximum profit value for the heterogeneous pool case, 
maxd
p .π  We conclude that the 
FPA would not select to do the monitoring for a homogeneous group that includes only 
farmers from group  since it can get higher benefits by offering the monitoring service 
to a heterogeneous group.    
s
 
Now suppose the pool is formed only with farmers from group l.  The monitoring cost, 
 will be lower in this case and the isoprofit equation will be given by: 
2
d
mC ,
N
2
2
d d
m pd
p e
d d d
SlopeIntercept
C 1:   P P M .
Nx Nx x
ππ ∗= − − +
	

 
Notice that the intercept of the isoprofit line 
2
d
pπ  is higher than the intercept of the 
isoprofit line dp ,π  but the slopes are the same. For the same profit value, the isoprofit 
line 
2
d
pπ  will be located to the left of the isoprofit line dp .π  In this case only the 
individual rationality constraint 
0d
lIR  applies and the isoprofit line can be shifted out 
until it reaches this participation line. Each point from the segment fg  can be a solution 
to the aggregator’s problem. Since points along the line segment fg  provide a higher 
profit level than the profit level in the case of a heterogeneous pool, the for-profit 
structure of the pool is likely to lead to a homogenous pool being formed with farmers 
that sequester large amounts of carbon.  
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Figure 6.5 The default coefficient case when the pool is run on a for-profit basis.
                  The case of a homogeneous pool 
 
6.2.1.1.2 Producers’ Association 
The role of the aggregator can also be played by a PA formed by the farmers 
themselves. This type of aggregator differs from the former one in a number of aspects. 
Members of the PA can observe the contribution of the others and make this 
information available to the aggregator. It is in the interest of the members to make this 
information available to the aggregator since they are the users and the owners of the 
pool. In the previous case of the FPA, it was the aggregator who owned the business 
and the farmers were only using it; therefore the farmers would not supply the same 
type of information to the aggregator. More specifically, the information set for a pool 
owned and run by the farmers is superior to the one accessible to the FPA. The fact that 
the information sets are different has an impact on the monitoring costs. Because of this 
cross monitoring among members, the moral hazard is reduced and the PA can save on 
the monitoring costs. The difference in the monitoring costs due to the different 
information sets will be captured in the cost structure. The monitoring cost  for the 
PA which is expressed as follows: 
' d
mC
( ) ( )d d' d ' min ' min dm l sC C C Cθ θ= + < m  
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will be substituted for the  in the isoprofit equation.  dmC
 
In the profit function for the PA case we incorporate an additional cost component,  
which is the cost of organizing the pool. This cost includes the cost of such things as 
organizing meetings, discussing the idea of forming a PA, debating the activities that 
the pool might undertake, and developing the initial idea to a stage where it can be 
decided upon. These costs relate to the collective nature of the PA and are typically not 
incurred by a for-profit firm (Fulton, 2005). The PA can only be expected to form if: 
F ,
( )( )d 'p e s d l d mNM P P N x N x C F 0.π ∗= + − + − − ≥d  
The PA will typically run on a break even basis. The FPA cannot charge the farmers 
more than the PA because it is a competition that FPA needs to meet. If the FPA were 
to do so, the farmers would form a PA. However, the presence of the cost  might 
allow the FPA to earn some profit while the PA breaks even.  
F
 
Assuming PA operates on to break even, the aggregator will choose M  and  so that 
the profit value 
eP
d
p 0.π =  Under this assumption, the equation of the isoprofit curve 0dpπ  
simplifies to the following: 
(6.10)  
o ' dd m
p e
d d
C F 1:   P P M .
Nx x
π ∗⎛ ⎞+= − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
This isoprofit line shows the combination of price and lump sum fee (or the 
membership fee) that generates sufficient revenue to allow the pool to just break even.  
 
As mentioned before, in the FPA case, the aggregator chooses the farmers’ type while 
in the PA case, the farmers choose the type of the pool they form; thus the analysis for 
each of these cases is performed differently. The FPA chooses the alternative that 
provides her with the highest profit, whereas in the PA case the farmers choose the 
alternative that provides them the highest benefit. 
 
87
M  
v
$
P∗
0eP
0d
pπ d
sIR
d
lIR  
0 1M 2M0Mn  
Figure 6.6 The default coefficient case when the structure of the pool is a PA. 
      The heterogeneous pool case 
 
In the case of a heterogeneous pool, each point on the segment  can be a solution to 
the problem faced by the PA aggregator. This means that all the combinations of 
payments and membership fees along this segment provide a zero profit for the pool and 
meet all the criteria to be solutions to the problem; thus both individual rationality and 
incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied. Let us select one point from this 
segment which represents the solution 
nv
( )0e 0P ,M .  Each farmer pays a membership fee 
of 0M  and gets paid a price of  per unit of carbon offset. But for this price, a farmer 
from group  would be willing to pay a membership of 
0eP
s 1 0M M>  and still participate in 
the pool, while a farmer from group l  would have paid a membership 2 1 0M M M> >  
and still participated in the pool. By paying a lower membership fee, both groups 
benefit from participating in the PA, but the farmers from group  which are the 
farmers in the middle stage of sequestration, benefit the most. Thus, even if the 
aggregator is paying all the farmers for the same amount of carbon offsets 
l ,
dx , it is the 
farmers from group l  that benefit the most when participating in a heterogeneous pool. 
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 What would happen if the pool was a homogeneous one? 
Suppose the pool is formed solely with farmers from group  The line l.
0d
lIR  will be the 
only participation line that applies to this case. Following the same logic as in the FPA 
option, we come to the result that the monitoring cost,  in this homogeneous pool 
case is smaller than the monitoring cost in the heterogeneous pool case, i.e., . 
As a result, when the homogeneous pool breaks even, the isoprofit line: 
2
' d
mC ,
<
2
' d ' d
m mC C
0
2
2
' d
md
p e
d d
C F 1:   P P M
Nx x
π ∗⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟= − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
lies to the left of the isoprofit line 
0d
p .π  This means that the formation of a 
homogeneous pool with farmers from group  provides to the members a higher benefit 
than the formation of a heterogeneous pool.  
l
 
What are the farmers from group s  going to do now that the farmers from group  are 
grouped in a homogeneous pool? They might consider forming a PA on their own since 
they are left with no other option. The previous analysis showed that the FPA will not 
choose to offer the monitoring service to a homogeneous group with farmers from 
group  The monitoring cost  applied to this homogeneous pool case is higher than 
the monitoring cost  applied to the heterogeneous pool case. For a zero profit value 
of the PA, the isoprofit line: 
l
s.
1
' d
mC
' d
mC
0
1
1
' d
md
p e
d d
C F 1:   P P M
Nx x
π ∗⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟= − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
will be positioned to the right of the isoprofit line 
0d
p .π  As long as the isoprofit line 
0
1
d
pπ  is still in the coalition region, the farmers from group  will form a PA of their 
own since they benefit from the formation. From the pool formation they can capture 
benefits that result from the economies of scale and from the grouping of resources.  
s
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Figure 6.7 The default coefficient case when the structure is a PA. 
                  The homogeneous PA case 
v2v 1v
 
 
We conclude that the break-even structure of the PA pool has potential to lead to the 
formation of a homogeneous pool assembling only farmers that are in the middle stage 
of sequestration and a homogeneous pool including only farmers from the other group 
 The results obtained for the FPA and for the PA structures under the default 
coefficient case are summarized in Table 1. 
s.
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 Table 6.1. Summarizing the results obtained for each alternative in the default coefficient case 
Alternative Solution Coordinates of the solution Profit 
Heterogeneous Segment ab (Fig. 6.4) 
a: ( )( )a sC x ;0− ;    
b: ( )( )ad sP x C x ;P∗ ∗−  
maxd
pπ  
Homogeneous l Segment fg (Fig. 6.5) 
f: ( )( )a lC x ;0− ;      
g: ( )( )ad lP x C x ;P∗ ∗−  
max max
2
d d
p pπ π>
 F
PA
 
Homogeneous s Segment ab (Fig. 6.5) 
a: ( )( )a sC x ;0− ;  
 b: ( )( )ad sP x C x ;P∗ ∗−  
max max
1
d d
p pπ π<
 
Heterogeneous Segment nv (Fig. 6.6) 
n: 
' d
m
d
C F
P x ;0
N
∗⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
  
v: 
' d
mC F ;P
N
∗⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
od
p 0π =  
Homogeneous l Segment n2v2(Fig. 6.7) 
n2: 2
' d
m
d
C F
P x ;0
N
∗⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
v2: 2
' d
mC F ;P
N
∗⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
o
2
d
p 0π =  
D
ef
au
lt 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 
PA
 
Homogeneous s Segment n1v1(Fig. 6.7) 
n1: 1
' d
m
d
C F
P x ;0
N
∗⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
v1: 1
' d
mC F ;P
N
∗⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
o
1
d
p 0π =  
 
 
So far, the analysis of this chapter has been focused in the general case when the cost of 
adopting, and as a result, the cost of honouring the contract were considered as different 
for farmers belonging to different groups. A reasonable scenario would be one with 
equal cost of adopting for all farmers that undertake a BMP. The argument for this 
would be that what is really different is the sequestration phase that farmers are in, not 
the BMP they have undertaken; thus the costs of adopting the practice could be 
considered the same for all farmers – i.e., ( ) ( )a alC x C x= s .  In this case, the isobenefit 
lines for farmers from both groups will overlap and the probability of monitoring 
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farmers from group  will be the same as the probability of monitoring farmers from 
group  – i.e., 
l
s
d
min min
l sdθ θ= ; thus the isoprofit lines dp ,π  2dpπ  and 1dpπ  will overlap too. 
 
Figure 6.8 represents the heterogeneous and the homogeneous pool cases when the pool 
is run on a for-profit basis. The feasible region is the same for both these cases. The 
maximum profit will be attained along segment  since this is the farthest part in the 
feasible region where the aggregator can position the isoprofit line. Note that the same 
solution is obtained when considering the formation of a heterogeneous pool as it is 
when considering the founding of a homogeneous pool of each type. If the costs of 
adopting the BMP are the same for each farmer regardless of which group they belong 
to, a heterogeneous pool would be stable and neither a heterogeneous pool, nor a 
homogeneous pool, is strictly preferred to the other.            
a' b'
0d
sIR
0d
lIR
$
P∗
0 M  
1
d
pπ  
d
pπ  
2
d
pπ  
b'
a'  
maxd
pπ
Figure 6.8 The default coefficient case when the costs of adopting are the same.  
The homogeneous & heterogeneous pool cases when the pool is run on a FP basis 
 
Figure 6.9 represents the heterogeneous and the homogeneous pool cases when the pool 
is run on a break-even basis. Since the isobenefit lines dsIR  and 
d
lIR  overlap, the 
coalition area is the same for the heterogeneous and for the homogeneous cases. In the 
case of a heterogeneous pool, farmers from each of the two groups benefit the same 
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from participating in the pool and this is given by the difference between the isoprofit 
line 
0d
pπ  and the isobenefit lines dsIR  or dlIR .  Notice that this result has changed from 
the result we obtained in the general case.  
 
The incidence of being inspected is the same for both groups of farmers; therefore the 
isoprofit lines 
0d
p ,π  01dpπ  and 
0
2
d
pπ  overlap. In the case of a homogeneous pool formed 
with farmers from group  the benefit to the farmers (i.e., the difference between the 
isoprofit line 
l ,
0
2
d
pπ  and the isobenefit line dlIR ) is equal to the benefit they would get 
from the formation of a heterogeneous pool. In the case of a homogeneous pool formed 
with farmers from group  the benefit to the farmers (i.e., the difference between the 
isoprofit line 
s,
0
1
d
pπ  and the isobenefit line dsIR ) is the same as the benefit they would get 
from the formation of a heterogeneous pool. Hence, a heterogeneous pool would be 
stable under this scenario and neither a heterogeneous pool nor a homogeneous pool 
would be strictly preferred to the other.  
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Figure 6.9 The default coefficient case when the costs of adopting are the same. 
The homogeneous & heterogeneous pool cases under a PA structure 
v
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6.2.2 Custom Coefficient Case  
Consider now the custom coefficients case. The aggregator introduces two contracts. A 
farmer who is in the early or the late stage of sequestration produces a smaller amount 
of carbon offsets than does a farmer who is in middle stage of sequestration; therefore 
the pool assigns a smaller coefficient to the farmers from group s  than to the ones from 
group l.  Each farmer pays the lump sum fee M  and in return gets paid price  for the 
amount 
eP
sx  of carbon offsets if he belongs to group  or for the amount s l sx x>  of 
carbon offsets if he belongs to group l  of farmers.  
  
Under the custom coefficients case, the aggregator needs to collect information about 
the stage of sequestration for farmers belonging to each group. Farmers provide this 
information by submitting a historical plan of their soil management activity to the 
aggregator. As a result, the aggregator will know the type of each farmer and can thus 
undertake different levels of monitoring for the two groups. She can also pay different 
lump sum fees iM  or unit prices  for farmers from the different groups; however, 
the analysis is kept simple by continuing to consider the simple two part tariff described 
in the previous section.   
ieP
 
If the farmer does not sign the carbon sequestration contract, his profit is the same as in 
the default coefficient case (see equation 6.1).  The profit chiπ  that the farmer obtains if 
he signs the contract, participates in the pool and honours its terms is given as:  
(6.11)  ( )c ch hi e i iR P x C x Mπ = + − −  
where  is the cost incurred. This term includes the sequestration cost, the 
transaction cost of signing the contract as well as the costs of keeping records and 
reporting. The cost incurred to the farmer who signs the contract and honours its 
provisions is lower in the default coefficient case than in the custom coefficients case 
since the farmer was not incurring the cost of keeping records and reporting in the 
former case – i.e., 
( )ch iC x
( ) ( )c dh hi iC x C x> .  
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The profit cnhiπ  symbolizes the farmer’s expected profit if he signs the sequestration 
contract but does not comply with all its terms. As was discussed earlier, the pool 
undertakes monitoring in order to induce farmers’ compliance with the terms of the 
contract they sign with the pool. The probability of monitoring farmers is denoted by θ  
and the penalty per unit of cheating is .γ  The fixed per unit penalty is exogenous to the 
pool and the only enforcement tool that the pool can control is the monitoring 
frequency.  
The farmer’s expected profit cnhiπ  is: 
( ) ( ) ( )c c cnh nh nhi e i i i e i iR P x C x M x 1 R P x C x Mπ θ γ θ⎡ ⎤ ⎡= + − − − + − + − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎤⎦  
which implies that: 
(6.12)  ( )c cnh nhi e i i iR P x C x M xπ θγ= + − − −  
where  represents the cost that farmer experiences in this case. This term 
contains the transaction cost of signing the contract as well as the cost of cheating (e.g. 
double-bookkeeping).  
( )cnh iC x
 
Each farmer participates in the pool only if he obtains a profit from participation which 
is at least as large as the profit from non participation. Under the custom coefficients’ 
case, the individual rationality constraint for a farmer from group i  is: 
chc o
i i iIR :   0π π≥ ≥   or 
(6.13)  ( ) ( )
( )
c
a'
i
hc o
i e i i i
Cost  of  adopting   C x
IR :   P x M C x C x ' 0Δ⎡ ⎤− − − = ≥⎣ ⎦	
  
where the term ( ) ( ) ( )cha' oi iC x C x C x= − i  represents the cost of adopting the BMP.  
The participation constraints csIR  and 
c
lIR  define the feasible area in which the price  
and the membership 
eP
M  are such that the members of both groups prefer to participate 
in the pool. The equation of the participation line ciIR  in ( )eM ,P  space takes the form: 
(6.14)  ( )
N
1a' i
e
i i
SlopeIntercept
C x '
P M
x x
Δ+= +
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 The participation line for group  is steeper than the participation line for group  
because 
s l
1 1c c
s s
s l
slope IR slope IR .
x x
= > =   The feasible region is represented in figures 
6.10 and 6.11, which illustrate the two cases that can occur depending on the magnitude 
of the intercept term (case 2 illustrates the situation where the intercept of csIR  is 
relatively small).  
 
 
Figure 6.10 The coalition area in the custom coefficients’ option 
                  (Case 1) 
M  
c
sIR
c
lIR  
P∗  
0
$  
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Figure 6.11 The coalition area in the custom coefficients’ option 
                  (Case 2) 
 
The aggregator provides an incentive to a farmer who signs the contract to comply with 
its terms only if she chooses the monitoring probability such that the following 
incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied: 
c ch nc
i i iIC :  
hπ π>  
This inequality can be written as: 
(6.15)  ( ) ( )c ch nhe i i e i i iR P x C x M R P x C x M xθγ+ − − > + − − −  
Further simplification of this equation gives: 
(6.16)  ( ) ( ) ( )c ch nh ci i i ix C x C x CHC xθγ > − =  
Equation 6.16 allows us to derive the minimum inspection probability that ensures 
compliance of group i :  
(6.17)  ( )
c
c
imin
i
i
CHC x
.
x
θ γ=   
The optimal inspection likelihood is proportional to the per unit cost of honouring the 
contract. Given that l sx x ,>  the optimal monitoring probability is smaller for the 
farmers in group l ,  i.e., . 
c c
min min
l sθ θ<
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 6.2.2.1 Aggregator’s Problem 
Consider now the problem from the aggregator’s perspective. The profit of the 
aggregator, cp ,π  is given as: 
(6.18)  ( )( ) ( ) ( )c c
c
m
c m
p e s s l l l
C
NM P P N x N x C Cπ θ∗ in minsθ⎡ ⎤= + − + − +⎣ ⎦	
  
where  denotes the monitoring cost in the custom coefficients’ case. As we have 
argued earlier the monitoring cost in the custom coefficient case is higher than the 
monitoring cost in the default coefficient case, i.e.,   
c
mC
c d
m mC C> .
The isoprofit line equation in ( )eM ,P  space is given by: 
(6.19)  ( ) ( ) ( )  
cc
pc m
p e
s s l l s s l l s s l l
Intercept Slope
C N: P P M
N x N x N x N x N x N x
ππ ∗= − − ++ + +	
 	

 
The slope of the isoprofit lines compares to the slopes of the participation lines as 
follows: 
1 1c c cs l s l s l
l p s
l s l l l s s l l s s s l
N N N N N Nslope IR slope slope IR
sx N x N x N x N x x N x N x
π+ += = < = < = =+ +   
+
+  
The participation line for group  is the steepest, while the participation line for group 
 is the flattest.    
s
l
 
6.2.2.1.1 For-Profit Aggregator 
A rightward parallel shift of the isoprofit line cpπ  causes an increase in the profit of the 
aggregator. Since the aggregator is a profit maximizer, she will try to locate the isoprofit 
line as far rightward as is possible in the coalition area. The result is that the individual 
rationality constraint ciIR  is binding – i.e., ' 0.Δ =  With ' 0,Δ =  the equation of the 
participation line 
0c
iIR  can be simplified as: 
(6.20)  ( )  0 a' ici e
i i
C x 1IR : P M
x x
= +  
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In the first situation represented in Figure 6.12, the point ( )1M ,0−  is the solution to the 
aggregator’s profit problem. In this solution, the aggregator pays each farmer a lump 
sum fee of 1M  and, by this way of payment, he ensures the participation of farmers 
from both groups as well as maximizes profits at 
maxc
p.π  
 
In the case of a homogeneous pool formed with farmers from group  the only 
participation line applicable is the line 
l ,
0c
lIR . We denote by  the monitoring cost in 
this homogeneous pool case. Since the probability of monitoring farmers from group l  
is smaller than the probability of monitoring farmers from group  (i.e, 
2
c
mC
s
c c
min min
l sθ θ< ), 
the monitoring cost   The isoprofit equation will be rewritten as follows:   
2
c
mC C< cm .
( ) ( ) ( )  22
c c
m pc
p e
s s l l s s l l s s l l
Intercept Slope
C N: P P M
N x N x N x N x N x N x
ππ ∗= − − ++ + +	
 	

 
 
Note that only the slope of the isoprofit line has not changed. For the same profit value, 
the isoprofit line 
2
c
pπ  will lie to the left of the isoprofit line cpπ  and thus to the left of 
maxc
p .π  The solution of the homogeneous pool case under consideration is at point h.  
The isoprofit line 
2
c
pπ  shifts in until it reaches this point; thus increasing the profit level 
attained by the FPA. By receiving a lump sum fee of 2M  from each farmer and by 
paying them back a price of P∗  per unit of carbon offset, the aggregator maximizes its 
profit. This maximum profit level is higher than the maximum profit level in the case of 
a heterogeneous pool.     
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Figure 6.12 The solution for a FPA under the custom coefficients’ alternative 
                    (Case 1) 
0c
lIR
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1M−  
0c
sIR
maxc
pπ
$  
0
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If the pool were homogeneous with farmers from group  the only participation line to 
be considered would be the line 
s,
0c
sIR . The cost of monitoring  will be higher than 
the cost of monitoring,  in the heterogeneous case. As a result, for the same profit 
value, the isoprofit line: 
1
c
mC
c
mC ,
( ) ( ) ( )  11
c c
m pc
p e
s s l l s s l l s s l l
Intercept Slope
C N: P P M
N x N x N x N x N x N x
ππ ∗= − − ++ + +	
 	

 
will always be located to the right of the heterogeneous case isoprofit line cp .π  Given 
that the solution is located at point 1M−  for both cases, we conclude that the FPA 
attains a higher profit level in the case of a heterogeneous pool than in the case of a 
homogeneous pool formed with farmers from group  The FPA would not choose to 
offer the monitoring service to a pool that includes only farmers from group  since she 
can get a higher profit by offering the service to a heterogeneous pool and the highest 
profit by offering the service to a homogeneous pool formed with farmers that are in the 
middle stage of sequestration.  
s.
s
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 Figure 6.13 represents the second possibility that can arise in the custom coefficients’ 
case. The solution to the problem in this case is at point ( )33 eM ,P .−  The aggregator 
ensures full participation as well as maximizes her profit by paying each farmer a lump 
sum fee of 3M  and a price of  per each unit of carbon offsets supplied.  3eP
M  
Figure 6.13 The solution for a FPA under the custom coefficients’ alternative 
                    (Case 2) 
0c
sIR
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3M−  
$  
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0
maxc
pπ
 
In the case of a homogeneous pool composed of farmers from group l ,  the solution is at 
point  which means that the FPA maximizes her profit by charging each farmer a 
lump sum fee of 
h,
2M  and paying him a price P
∗  per each unit of carbon offsets. Since 
the isoprofit line for this homogeneous case is located to the left of the isoprofit line for 
the heterogeneous case, we conclude that the maximum profit level attained by the FPA 
is higher in the case of the homogeneous pool formed with farmers from group  Thus, 
the for-profit structure will most likely lead to a homogeneous pool formed with 
farmers from the middle stage of sequestration.    
l.
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6.2.2.1.2 Producers’ Association 
The PA chooses the membership M  and per unit price  so as to break even. With eP
d
p 0,π =  the equation of the isoprofit curve 0dpπ  can be simplified as follows:  
(6.21)  ( ) ( )  
0 ' cc m
p e
s s l l s s l l
C F N: P P M
N x N x N x N x
π ∗ += − ++ +  
 
The situation is represented in Figure 6.14. The aggregator can choose any combination 
of M  and  along the segment tj  since this ensures the participation of both groups 
and the fulfillment of the break even condition. If the aggregator chooses point  as a 
solution, he has to pay each farmer a lump sum fee equal to  A farmer from group  
would still participate in the PA even if he would be paid a lump sum fee equal to 0u  
thus this farmer receives a benefit equal to the difference 
eP
t
0t. s
;
( )0t 0u−  if point t  were to be 
chosen as the solution. Similarly, a farmer from group l  would benefit by an amount 
equal to the difference (  if point t  were selected by the aggregator. Both groups 
benefit from this choice, but a farmer from group l  benefits more than a farmer from 
group   
)0t 0z−
s.
 
If the aggregator were to choose point j  as a solution, he will collect from each farmer 
a lump sum fee of 4M  and will pay in return the price  for each unit of carbon 
offsets supplied. For this unit price, a farmer from group l  would have paid a 
membership fee of 
4eP
5M  and still joined the PA. The fact that he is paying only a 
membership fee of 4M  means that this farmer is benefiting by an amount equal to the 
difference ( 5 4 )M M−  when point j  is chosen as a solution by the aggregator. In 
contrast, a farmer from group  would just be indifferent between joining the PA and 
not joining it. Farmers from group  benefit the most if point  is selected, while 
farmers from group l  benefit the most if point 
s
s t
j  is chosen. Which of the points on 
segment  would be chosen as the solution depends on the bargaining and/or political 
power of the two groups.   
tj
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Figure 6.14 The solution for a PA under the custom coefficients’ alternative 
                    (Case 1)  
c
sIR 0c
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j4eP  
 4Mz  u  
 
If the pool were homogeneous with farmers from group  the only participation line 
applicable would be the line 
l ,
c
lIR . The probability of monitoring  in this 
homogeneous pool case is smaller than the monitoring probability,  in the 
heterogeneous pool case. For a break even situation, the isoprofit line: 
2
c
mC
c
mC ,
( ) ( )  
0
2
2
' c
mc
p e
s s l l s s l l
C F N: P P M
N x N x N x N x
π ∗ += − ++ +  
will be located to the left of the isoprofit line 
0c
p .π  As shown in Figure 6.15, the solution 
will be at point  thus farmers in group  benefit more from forming a homogeneous 
PA than a heterogeneous PA. Since the farmers from group  are left out of the pool, 
they might consider forming a PA of their own in order to get benefits from both 
grouping the resources and the associated economies of scale.   
r; l
s,
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Figure 6.15 The solution for a PA under the custom coefficients’ alternative.
                    The consideration of a homogeneous PA   (Case 1)  
 
The probability of monitoring  in this case will be higher than the monitoring 
probability  thus the isoprofit line: 
1
c
mC
c
mC ;
( ) ( )  
0
1
1
' c
mc
p e
s s l l s s l l
C F N: P P M
N x N x N x N x
π ∗ += − ++ +  
will be located to the right of the isoprofit line 
0c
p .π  The solution will be represented by 
point  This means that these farmers benefit less from the formation of a PA of their 
own than by the formation of a heterogeneous pool, yet they will consider forming the 
pool on their own since they have no other option.  
w.
 
We conclude that the PA structure most likely leads to a homogeneous pool that 
assembles farmers that are in the middle stage of sequestration and a homogeneous pool 
formed with farmers from group  s.
 
The interpretation in the second situation represented in Figure 6.16 is similar to the 
interpretations in the first situation. Farmers from group  would benefit the most if s
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point  would be selected as the solution while farmers from group l  would benefit the 
most if point 
t
j  would be chosen as the solution by the aggregator. Which point on the 
segment tj  would be chosen as the solution would depend on the bargaining or political 
power of the two groups of farmers.  
 
 
If farmers that are in the middle stage of sequestration form a PA of their own, only the 
participation line clIR  is applicable. The monitoring cost, , related to this 
homogeneous pool case is lower than the monitoring cost,  related to the 
heterogeneous pool case. As a result, the isoprofit 
2
' c
mC
' c
mC ,
0
2
c
pπ  for a break even situation of the 
homogeneous pool will lie to the left of the isoprofit line 
0c
pπ  (see Figure 6.17). The 
solution will be located at point  hence the farmers that are in the middle stage of 
sequestration benefit more from the formation of a homogeneous pool than a 
heterogeneous pool.  
r;
 
$
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 The solution for a PA under the custom coefficients’ alternative 
       (Case 2) 
0c
pπ
j
t  
Figure 6.16
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If the farmers from group  form a homogeneous pool, the farmers from group  will 
also consider forming a pool of their own. In this case, only the participation line 
l s
c
sIR  is 
applicable. The monitoring cost, which is denoted by  is higher than the 
monitoring cost  in the heterogeneous case; thus the isoprofit 
1
' c
mC ,
' c
mC
0
1
c
pπ  will be positioned 
to the right of the isoprofit line 
0c
p .π  The solution will be located at point  which 
means that the farmers in group  benefit less from the formation of a homogeneous 
group of their own than from the formation of a heterogeneous pool. Still, they will 
consider their homogeneous pool formation since they can get some benefits from it.   
w,
s
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Figure 6.17 The solution for a PA under the custom coefficients’ alternative.
                    The consideration of a homogeneous PA   (Case 2) 
 
 
Table 2 summarizes the results obtained from exploring the FP and the PA alternatives 
under the custom coefficient case.    
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Table 6.2. Summarizing the results obtained for each alternative in the custom coefficients’ case 
Alternative Solution Coordinates of the solution Profit 
Point -M1 -M1: ( )( )a' sC x ;0−  
Heterogen. ( )33 eM ;P−
 
( ) ( )a' a'l s s l
3
l s
C x x C x x
M
x x
−− = −  
( ) ( )
( )3
a' a'
l s s s
e
s l s
C x x C x x
P
x x x
−= −  
maxc
pπ  
Homogen. l Point h h: ( )( )a'l lP x C x ;P∗ ∗−  max max2c cp pπ π>
 
FP
A
 
Homogen. s Point -M1 -M1: ( )( )a' sC x ;0−  max max1d dp pπ π<
Heterogen. Segment tj (Fig. 6.14) 
( ) ' cs s l l mP N x N x C Ft : ;0
N N
∗⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+ +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
For point  j see Appendix 6 (long 
formula) 
oc
p 0π =  
Homogen. l Point r 2
' c
mC Fr : ;P
N
∗⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
o
2
c
p 0π =  
Cu
sto
m
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
PA
 
Homogen. s Point w 
( ) 1' cms s l l
w
C FP N x N x
M
N N
∗⎛ ⎞++⎜ ⎟= − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
o
1
c
p 0π =  
 
 
These findings resulted from analyzing the general case where the costs of adopting the 
BMP were considered to be different for farmers belonging to different groups. A 
reasonable scenario would be one that considers these costs of adopting as equal – i.e., 
( ) ( )a' a's lC x C x= .  The rationale for this consideration would be the same one used in 
the default coefficient case. The feasible region is illustrated as in Figure 6.10 and 
Figure 6.11. The incidence of being inspected is different for farmers belonging to 
different groups; therefore the isoprofit lines for the heterogeneous case and for the 
homogeneous cases will not overlap. The solutions for the FPA case will be located as 
represented in Figure 6.12 and Figure 6.13, while the solutions for the PA case will be 
positioned as presented in Figures 6.14, 6.15, 6.16 and 6.17. Once more we observe that 
the PA structure leads to the formation of a homogeneous pool of farmers who are in 
the middle stage of sequestration and a homogeneous pool with farmers from group  s.
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 6.3 COMPARING THE ALTERNATIVES 
So far we have considered two alternatives for the structure of the aggregator and two 
alternatives for the coefficients that might be used from the aggregator. The work that 
follows will focus on comparing those alternatives to each other in order to see which 
type of coefficient works better under different circumstances. The comparison will be 
performed under the supposition of equal costs of adopting for the farmers from both 
groups as a reasonable scenario.  
 
6.3.1 Default coefficient versus custom coefficients for the FPA case 
In the custom coefficients case, the FPA chooses to offer the monitoring service only to 
a homogeneous group with farmers that are in the middle stage of sequestration, while 
in the default coefficient case the FPA receives the same benefits providing the 
monitoring to a homogeneous pool or a heterogeneous pool. In assessing the two types 
of coefficients for the FPA structure, this section will compare only the cases of a 
homogeneous pool formed with farmers that are in the middle stage of sequestration 
when each type of coefficient is used.    
 
The solution in the default coefficient case can be any point in segment  (Figure 
6.8), while in the custom coefficient case the solution is point  (Figure 6.12). The 
comparison of the two alternatives will consist in comparing the abscissas of points b'  
and  to each other.  
a' b'
h
h
If ( ) ( )
    
a' a
l l d
absc. of h absc. of b'
P x C x P x C x ,∗ ∗− > −	
 	
l  the FPA will prefer the custom coefficient 
alternative to the default coefficient alternative, and vice versa.   
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6.3.2 Default coefficient versus custom coefficients for the PA case 
The analysis of the reasonable scenario performed for the PA case showed that, under 
the custom coefficients option, the tendency is for the formation of a homogeneous pool 
with farmers from group l  and a homogeneous pool with farmers from group  On the 
other hand, the analysis in the default coefficient option showed that the farmers benefit 
the same from the formation of a heterogeneous pool as they do from the formation of a 
homogeneous pool of their own. In comparing the two coefficient alternatives for the 
PA structure, this section will assess only the homogeneous pool cases for each type of 
coefficient. The following analysis will reveal which type of coefficient the farmers 
from group l  prefer to be used and which type of coefficient the farmers from group s  
wish to be used.  
s.
 
First we make the comparison of the two coefficient alternatives for a homogeneous PA 
with farmers from group l.  The solution in the custom coefficient case is located at 
point  while the solution in the default coefficient case can be any point in segment 
 The situation is presented in the left diagram in Figure 6.18. In order to assess the 
two coefficient alternatives, it is sufficient to compare the abscissas of points  and v. 
Since 
r,
nv.
r
  . of
C F

  
  2 2
2 2
' c ' d
m m' c ' d
m m
absc r absc. of v
C F
C C ,
N N
+ +> ⇒ >
	
 	

 
we conclude that farmers in group  who form a homogeneous PA benefit more under 
the default coefficient option than under the custom coefficients option.  
l
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Figure 6.18 Comparing the alternatives of custom coefficients versus default 
coefficient in the case of a homogeneous PA 
 
The right diagram in Figure 6.18 illustrates the case of a homogeneous PA formed with 
farmers from group  The solution in the default coefficient can be any point in 
segment  while the solution in the custom coefficient case is located at point  In 
order to assess the two coefficient alternatives, we compare the abscissas of points n  
and  If 
s.
nv, w.
w. ( ) ( )∗ ⎡ ⎤− + − > −⎣ ⎦ 1' c ' d1s s d l l d m mP N x x N x x C C  holds, the farmers will prefer the 
custom coefficients option, while if ( ) ( )∗ ⎡ ⎤− + − < −⎣ ⎦ 1' c ' d1s s d l l d m mP N x x N x x C C , the 
farmers will benefit more from the default coefficient alternative.   
 
6.3.3 The coexistence of an FPA and a PA 
As it is argued earlier in this chapter, the information costs and the monitoring costs will 
be much higher in the custom coefficients case compared to the default coefficient case. 
Monitoring activity can be very costly, especially when it needs to be performed in 
large and diverse areas. The aggregator might aggregate farmers that cover a large area 
in order to capture economies of scale. This might result in a large number of farmers 
aggregated under a pool, a variety of corresponding land types and a variation in the 
sequestration phase that farmers are in. The costs of undertaking monitoring for such an 
aggregation might become so costly and time consuming as to make the custom 
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coefficients case uneconomical/unprofitable. Under these considerations, the alternative 
that would be applied by the aggregators would be the default coefficient case. The 
analysis below is performed for the default coefficient case. 
 
Under the assumption of equal cost of adopting, let’s consider what happens when the 
FPA and the PA are both in the market. While the PA breaks even, the FPA matches the 
prices (  and eP M ) offered by the PA. If the FPA sets a lower M  or offers a higher , 
her profit will decrease, while if she sets a higher 
eP
M  or a lower , the farmers will 
prefer to perform monitoring through their own pool either than using the FPA 
monitoring services. But, can the FPA still make profit by offering the same prices as 
the PA? 
eP
 
Using the isoprofit formulas (6.8) and (6.10) derived for the FPA and the PA, 
respectively, and considering the argument that the same prices are used by both 
aggregators, we obtain the following relation: 
dd
d
m
d
d
p
d
d
m
Nx
F
Nx
C
NxNx
C −−=−−
'π
   
which can be rewritten as: 
( ) .FCC dpdmdm' π=+−  
 
The difference ( )dmdm CC −'  indicates the difference in the monitoring costs incurred by a 
producers’ association and a for-profit aggregator, respectively. The FPA can make a 
positive profit 0dp >π  only if ( ) .0FCC dmdm' >+−  More specifically, the FPA can price 
the same as the PA and still make a profit only if the saving in the monitoring cost in 
the case of a PA compared to the case of a FPA, ( )dm'dm CC − , is smaller than the cost of 
organizing the PA. If this saving in the monitoring cost is higher than the cost of 
organizing the pool,  then the FPA cannot survive by pricing as the PA does; thus it 
will leave the market and the monitoring service will be provided to the farmers only 
,F
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through a pool of their own. Thus, the possibility of the coexistence of both structures 
for the aggregator in the market exists, but it is not a certainty.   
 
6.4 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has focused on the carbon offsets pooling and the heterogeneity that exists 
among farmers as to the amount of carbon that they sequester. The analysis looks upon 
two structures for the aggregator – a FPA and a PA – and it considers two alternatives 
for the coefficients that might be used to decide on the amount of carbon offsets each 
farmer will be entitled to for a payment. The two alternatives examined in the chapter 
are the custom coefficient and the default coefficient.    
 
The analysis is first performed for the general case where the costs of adopting are 
considered as different for farmers belonging to different groups and is followed by the 
reasonable case where the cost of adopting are considered as equal.  
 
The general case 
The investigation begins by finding the coalition areas under each alternative as well as 
deriving the optimal inspection probabilities that ensure farmers’ compliance. The 
incidence of being inspected is different for farmers from different groups; therefore 
monitoring is a targeted one. 
 
After having explored the problem from the farmers’ point of view, the analysis 
continues from the aggregator’s perspective. The study considers two types of pools – 
heterogeneous and homogeneous – and examines which type of pool performs better 
under different alternatives. 
 
In the case of an FPA, the aggregator selects the group of farmer to whom she offers he 
monitoring service. The FPA chooses the grouping that provides her the highest profit. 
As it might be expected, under both coefficient alternatives, the FPA would not 
consider doing the monitoring for a homogeneous group including farmers from group 
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s.  The analysis shows that the for-profit structure will most likely lead to a 
homogeneous pool formed with farmers from the middle stage of sequestration.  
 
In the case of a PA, the farmers decide whether they will form a heterogeneous or a 
homogeneous pool. The farmers will select the type of pool that provides them higher 
benefits.  
In the default coefficient case, both groups of farmers benefit from the creation of a 
heterogeneous pool, but the farmers from group l  benefit more than the farmers from 
group  This is a result of the two-part tariff pricing which is the pricing strategy used 
in order to give incentives for participation to the farmers in the middle stage of 
sequestration. 
s.
In the custom coefficient case, both groups of farmers benefit from the formation of a 
heterogeneous pool, but which of the group benefits more depends on the bargaining 
and/or political power of the two groups.  
 
Under both coefficient alternatives, the farmers in group l  get the highest benefits from 
forming a homogeneous pool on their own. Under these circumstances, the farmers 
from group  will also consider forming a homogeneous pool of their own otherwise 
they can not sell their carbon offsets. Hence, the PA structure has potential to lead to the 
formation of a homogeneous pool assembling farmers in middle stage of sequestration 
and a homogeneous pool with farmers from group     
s
s.
 
The analysis then focuses on a reasonable scenario with equal cost of adapting for all 
farmers that undertake a BMP. The investigation shows that, in the default coefficient 
case, the FPA gets the same profit from offering the service to a homogeneous pool of 
either type as it gets from offering it to a heterogeneous pool. On the other hand, the 
analysis also indicates that the farmers benefit the same from the formation of a 
homogeneous pool of their own as they do from the establishment of a heterogeneous 
PA. Hence, the heterogeneous pool becomes stable under both the FP structure as well 
as the PA structure. It is also revealed that, under a PA structure, the farmers from each 
group benefit the same from the formation of a heterogeneous pool. In addition, the 
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equalization of the inspection probabilities for each group of farmers shows that the PA 
will not undertake a targeted monitoring in the default coefficient case.   
 
The results do not change when we perform the analysis for the reasonable scenario in 
the custom coefficients case.  
 
The last section performs a comparison of the default coefficient alternative versus the 
custom coefficient alternative. The analysis finds the conditions under which the default 
coefficient or the custom coefficients option is preferred for each aggregator type. None 
of the two coefficient alternatives is absolutely favoured relative to the other.   
 
The investigation in the last section is completed with the consideration of the 
coexistence of a FPA and a PA in the default coefficient case. The analysis show that 
both aggregators structures can exist together in the market at the same time only if the 
savings in the monitoring costs made possible by the PA are smaller than the cost of 
organizing the pool. If this condition is not satisfied the FPA cannot survive in the 
market and the structure that will dominate the market will be the producers’ 
association formed by the farmers themselves.   
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Climate change issue has been a growing concern in the last two decades. Many 
countries have been considering different policy options to address climate change. One 
of the mechanisms suggested for mitigating climate change is carbon sinks. Agricultural 
communities have been excited about the potential of farmers obtaining credits for the 
carbon stored in their soil. However, one of the practical issues impeding the potential 
carbon offsets sales is monitoring and verification. Farmers need to be monitored in 
order to ensure that the carbon offsets that are claimed represent an actual reduction of 
carbon. Investigation of individual farmers is costly however. The costs associated with 
monitoring and enforcement may result in imperfect enforcement. Incomplete 
enforcement generates economic incentives for farmers to over-report the amount of 
carbon offsets they are claiming in order to obtain carbon credits.  
 
This dissertation examines the cost effectiveness of the carbon-offset market when non-
compliance is introduced in the economic analysis. Chapter II examines the nature of 
the carbon offsets and the role of agriculture as a potential contributor to the reduction 
of GHGs. A particular focus on this chapter is the land management practices that play 
a role in enhancing soil carbon retention. The adoption of these practices should be 
supported by policy designs that provide economic benefits to the farmers as well as 
encourage environmental benefits. The discussion in this chapter addresses the main 
issues that might complicate the policy design for agricultural soil carbon sequestration. 
Issues such as property rights and contract design, non-permanence, baseline 
establishment, and monitoring and verification will influence the level of incentives 
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required to encourage producers’ participation in the offset market as well as the 
efficiency of this market in reducing GHG emission. Chapter III examines the evolution 
of the environmental regulation and climate change literature with a particular focus on 
the efficiency property of the market-based instruments. The chapter then concentrates 
on the literature related to the carbon offsets option and compliance monitoring.  
 
The thesis develops a number of theoretical models to examine the questions raised in 
the objectives of this thesis. The theoretical models examine the incentives for different 
farmers to participate in the carbon offsets market as well as incentives for engaging in 
cheating. Chapter IV examines the economic determinants of farmers’ non-compliance 
as well as the consequences of non-compliance on the performance of the carbon-offset 
market. Chapter V examines the impact the involvement of the traders in the carbon-
offset market has on non-compliance, as well as how the structure of the monitoring 
group affects non-compliance and the amount of carbon offsets traded in the market. 
Chapter VI examines the carbon offsets pooling option by considering two structures 
for the aggregator: a for-profit aggregator (FPA) and a producers’ association (PA) and 
compares the alternatives of custom coefficients versus default coefficient for each 
aggregator type. The chapter examines as well which type of pool – a heterogeneous or 
a homogeneous one – performs better under different alternatives. 
 
The models developed in Chapter IV and V recognize the heterogeneity of farmers with 
respect to cost differences as a result of differences in such things as soil type, 
experience, location, education and management skills. The individualized cost 
structure makes the analysis much richer, and provides valuable insights as to why some 
farmers sign a sequestration contract and others do not, and why some farmers engage 
in non-compliance activity and others do not. The model developed in Chapter VI 
captures another type of heterogeneity – the magnitude of sequestration that farmers can 
undertake – and examines how the aggregator will target the monitoring service for 
different group of farmers.   
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The theoretical models offer a number of insights with respect to non-compliance and 
carbon offsets trading. The results of the basic model replicate standard results in the 
cheating literature, which show that that the extent of farmers’ participation in the 
carbon market and the share of farmers in non-compliance depend on the price of 
carbon offsets and the enforcement policy of the government. More specifically, the 
extent of non-compliance is shown to decrease with an increase in the audit probability 
and/or an increase in the per unit penalty. In addition, the number of farmers 
participating in the carbon-offset market is shown to increase with an increase in the 
carbon-offset price.  
 
The total supply of carbon offsets as well as the supply of genuine carbon offsets is 
determined by the amount of monitoring performed by the monitoring agency. 
Endogenizing the monitoring probability allows us to make inferences about the 
efficiency of involving different traders and monitoring agencies in the intermediary 
role. The key role of the traders is to guarantee, based on the amount of monitoring 
undertaken by the monitoring group, that the LFEs purchase only carbon offsets that 
correspond to actual sequestration. The results produced in Chapter V show that the 
optimal amount of enforcement depends on the nature of the organization that 
undertakes the enforcement. The analysis investigates three cases for the monitoring 
group – a group owned by for-profit traders, a government-run agency, and a group 
owned by the PA trader. The results derived in the first two cases show that for-profit 
firms or the governmental agency undertake  sufficient monitoring to ensure that full 
compliance is achieved – thus, while non-compliance is possible, it does not occur in 
equilibrium. A governmental agency will undertake more monitoring than a monitoring 
group owned by the firms. The more monitoring is undertaken from the monitoring 
group, the greater is the amount of the genuine carbon offsets in the market; hence the 
greater is the amount traded by the aggregators in the carbon-offset market. The finding 
suggests that an undertaking of monitoring by a governmental agency results in more 
trading activity as well as more genuine carbon offsets supplied in the market. Farmers 
are being paid a higher price per unit of carbon offset and emitters are paying a lower 
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price for carbon offsets when the monitoring and trading of carbon offsets is performed 
via the governmental agency than by for-profit firms.   
 
In the case of a PA, farmers produce carbon offsets which are traded through a 
collectively owned and managed producers association and monitored by a monitoring 
group that operates on behalf of the PA. Forming a PA enables the farmers to benefit 
from economies of scale associated with the fixed costs which will be shared among 
them. The PA can handle large volumes so that per unit monitoring costs can be kept 
low. 
Because of the information asymmetry, the PA offers the same contract for all farmers, 
thus a pooled price applies in this model. As a result, farmers have incentive to behave 
strategically by free riding on the contribution of the others. More specifically, they try 
to benefit from price gains created by the pool without sharing in its costs.  
 
The last part of Chapter V examines the manner in which the PA determines the pooling 
price and the probability of auditing and compares the results to those of the for-profit 
firms. For a given auditing probability, the PA’s choice of the pooled price is made 
along an isorevenue curve which captures the tradeoff between a higher volume of 
bogus carbon offsets claimed by the farmers and a lower average price paid to them by 
the PA. The results show that under certain circumstances, the PA undertakes more 
monitoring and supplies more genuine carbon offsets in the market than does a for-
profit trading company. In this case farmers sequester more carbon in their soil and 
LFEs pay a lower price for carbon offsets. The results obtained from the analysis in this 
chapter show that different structures considered for the trading sector and the 
monitoring group result in different trading activity, different prices at which offsets are 
traded as well as different levels of auditing. These results derive from the difference in 
the objective functions attributed to the different organizational structures considered in 
this chapter of the thesis. 
 
Chapter VI focuses on the carbon offsets pooling and the heterogeneity that exists 
among farmers as to the amount of carbon that they sequester. Farmers may sequester 
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different quantities of carbon at the same point in time for the same land size depending 
on which sequestration phase they are. Based on the timing of sequestration, farmers are 
categorized into one of two groups – (1) farmers who are in the early stage or farmers 
who are in the late stage of sequestration and sequester relatively small amounts of 
carbon in their soil, and (2) farmers that are in the middle stage of sequestration and 
sequester large amounts of soil carbon. The chapter considers the case of a pool owned 
and managed by the farmers in parallel to the case of an aggregator who runs the 
business on a for-profit basis. The situation is modeled in a principal agent framework. 
The principal, which is the aggregator, undertakes monitoring as well as the trading of 
carbon offsets in the market. The pricing schedule used by the aggregator is a two-part 
tariff. The two-part tariff is used as a way of providing an incentive for the farmers 
sequestering large amounts of carbon to participate in the pool.  
 
The aggregator uses certain coefficients to determine the amount of carbon offsets for 
which each farmer is eligible for payment. This model considers two types of 
coefficients that could be used: a default coefficient under which all the farmers receive 
the same payment regardless of the sequestration stage in which they are, and custom 
coefficients under which the payment are linked to the stage of sequestration.  
 
The study considers two types of pools - heterogeneous and homogeneous – and 
examines which type of pool performs better under different alternatives. In the case of 
a FPA, it is the aggregator who selects the group of farmer to which she is going to 
offer the monitoring service. In the more general case where the costs of adopting the 
BMP are different for farmers belonging to different groups, the investigation shows 
that the for-profit structure will most likely lead to a homogeneous pool formed with 
farmers from the middle stage of sequestration. In the reasonable scenario where the 
costs of adopting the BMP are considered to be equal for farmers in both groups, the 
analysis shows that the FPA gets the same profit from offering the service to a 
homogeneous pool of either type as it gets from offering it to a heterogeneous pool; thus 
a heterogeneous pool is stable. 
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In the case of a PA, the farmers decide whether they will form a heterogeneous or a 
homogeneous pool. In the more general case, when the default coefficient is used, both 
groups of farmers benefit from the creation of a heterogeneous pool, but the farmers 
that are in the middle stage of sequestration benefit the most. This is a result of the two-
part tariff pricing used as a pricing schedule by the aggregator. For the reasonable case 
where the costs of adopting the BMP are considered to be equal for farmers in both 
groups, the analysis indicates that farmers from each group benefit the same from the 
formation of the heterogeneous pool.  
 
In the more general case, when the custom coefficients are used, both groups of farmers 
benefit from the formation of a heterogeneous pool, but which of the group benefits 
more depends on the bargaining and/or political power of the two groups. This result is 
not altered when the case with equal costs of adopting is considered.  
 
Farmers that are in the middle stage of sequestration will form a pool of their own in 
those cases where they were benefiting the most from a homogeneous pool. Under these 
circumstances, the farmers from the other group will also consider forming a 
homogeneous pool of their own otherwise they can not sell their carbon offsets. Hence, 
the PA structure may as well lead to the formation of a homogeneous pool assembling 
farmers in the middle stage of sequestration and a homogeneous pool with farmers from 
the other group.    
 
Another consideration of this thesis is the comparison of the alternatives of custom 
coefficients versus default coefficient. The analysis finds the conditions under which the 
default coefficient or the custom coefficients option is preferred for each aggregator 
type. None of the two coefficient alternatives is absolutely favored to the other. 
 
The last issue investigated in this dissertation is the coexistence of a FPA and a PA in 
the default coefficient case. The analysis show that both aggregator structures can exist 
together in the market in the same time if the savings in the monitoring costs made 
possible by the PA are smaller than the cost of organizing the pool. If this condition is 
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not satisfied the FPA cannot survive in the market and the producers’ association will 
dominate.   
 
The objective of this study was to introduce cheating and costly enforcement into the 
economic analysis of the carbon offsets market. The use of a differentiating-
characteristic model offered a number of insights. However, the model did not examine 
differences between farmers in their inclination to engage in cheating, even though it is 
a significant determinant of individual behaviour. The social norms and community 
pressure might also play a significant role in inducing compliance. Incorporating such 
attributes in the model could provide further valuable insights.  
 
A subject of future interest would be to consider the case of an emitters association that 
would undertake the monitoring of carbon offsets and compare the efficiency of the 
carbon offsets market in this particular case to the cases considered in this dissertation.   
 
Although the data on carbon offset market are still not available for an empirical work, 
a validation of the theoretical models developed in this thesis in the future would be of 
particular interest.  
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 APPENDIX A4 
 
MODELING LARGE FINAL EMITTERS’ PROBLEM 
The emitters’ problem can be modeled similarly to the way farmers’ problem was 
modeled. Large final emitters are required to take care of their emission released during 
the production activity. They can do this by the means of undertaking abatement or 
buying carbon offsets. We have opted out from trading among LFEs in order to 
concentrate on the carbon offsets alternative. LFEs are assumed to differ in such things 
as technology adopted, management abilities and experience and these differences 
affect their respective emission reduction costs. The basic model will be a location 
model that captures LFEs’ heterogeneity regarding the costs of undertaking abatement. 
The analysis assumes that LFEs are uniformly distributed with respect to their 
differentiating characteristic. It is also assumed that each LFE is required to reduce 
emission by one unit.   
 
Before investigating the LFEs’ compliance decision, it is useful to analyze the LFEs’ 
decision in a world where policy enforcement is perfect and LFEs take care of all their 
emissions. After exploring this case, the assumption of full-compliance will be released 
and the LFEs’ decision on abatement, offsets purchasing and violation level will be 
investigated. The derivation of the demand for carbon offsets and some comparative 
statics finalize the work presented in this appendix.    
 
A4.1 Large Final Emitters’ Decision on Abatement and Offset Purchasing 
This section is investigating the LFEs’ decision in a perfect enforcement scenario. 
Consider a group of LFEs who produce an industrial product with carbon emissions as a 
by-product. The model captures emission reduction required over and above permitted 
amounts. LFE has two choices to address her emission reduction requirements: 
undertaking abatement or buying carbon offsets. 
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 It is assumed that LFEs differ in their cost of undertaking the emission reduction. This 
cost difference gives rise to a demand for carbon offsets. Let [ ],e 0 1∈  be the attribute 
that differentiates the LFEs. A large final emitter with attribute e  has the following 
costs of emission reduction: 
0
AC C eβ= +            if the emission requirement is met by abatement 
o eC P=            if the emission requirement is met by the purchase of a carbon 
offset 
where AC  and are the costs associated with abating one unit of emission and buying 
one unit of carbon offset, respectively. The parameter  denotes the per unit 
abatement cost of the LFE with differentiating attribute 
oC
0C
e 0= . The parameter β  is a 
nonnegative cost enhancement factor that is constant across all LFEs, while the term 
eβ  represents the additional cost incurred by LFEs with  To ensure non-
negativity of the portion of LFEs that select the alternative of buying carbon offsets, it is 
assumed that  (see equation A4.2).  
.e 0>
0
eP Cβ ≥ −
 
A LFE’s choice of whether to undertake abatement or to buy carbon offset is 
determined by the relationship between the costs associated with each option. Figure 
A4.1 illustrates the options available to LFEs and the costs of these options. The 
horizontal axis depicts the differentiating attribute  The upward sloping curve .e AC  
graphs the cost associated with undertaking abatement for different values of the 
differentiating attribute (i.e., for different LFEs), while the horizontal line  shows the 
cost of buying carbon offsets in the market. The intersection of the two cost curves 
determines the level of the attribute corresponding to the LFE indifferent between the 
two options. Specifically, the LFE with differentiating attribute  given by:  
oC
oe
(A4.1)  :
0
e
o A o o
P Ce C C e β
−= ⇒ =  
is indifferent between undertaking abatement or buying carbon offsets since the cost 
associated with the two options are the same. LFEs located to the left of  (i.e., LFEs oe
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with [ ], oe 0 e∈ ) find it less costly to undertake abatement, while LFEs located to the 
right of  (i.e., LFEs with oe ( ],oe e 1∈ ) find it more profitable to buy carbon offsets.  
 
 
Recalling that LFEs are uniformly distributed with respect to their differentiating 
characteristic  the level of e  corresponding to the indifferent LFE,  also 
determines the fraction of LFEs that decide to undertake abatement. The portion of 
LFEs that choose to buy carbon offsets is given by 
,e ,oe
.o1 e−  By normalizing the mass of 
LFEs at unity, the proportion of LFEs that select to buy carbon offsets gives the demand 
for carbon offsets, dx , which is written as follows: 
(A4.2)  
( )0ed P Cx β β− −=  
The inverse demand curve can be written as ( ): .0 d0 eD P C xβ β= + −  
 
Comparative statics results can be easily derived from the graph. A reduction in  
shifts the  curve downwards, thus increasing the demand for carbon offsets (i.e., 
eP
0C
d
e
x 0
P
∂ <∂ ). A decrease in the cost enhancement factor β  causes a rightward rotation of 
the AC  curve through the intercept at  which in turn decreases the demand for 
carbon offsets (i.e., 
,0C
dx 0β
∂ >∂ ).  
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0C  
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oe 1 0 
 Differentiating  
Attribute ( e ) 
Figure A.4.1  LFEs’ decision under perfect compliance 
 
 
A4.2: Extending the Basic Model: Introducing Non-Compliance on the Large Final 
Emitters’ Side  
Implicit in the above analysis is the assumption that either (1) LFEs do not cheat when 
reporting their emission; or (2) enforcement is perfect and costless. Enforcement, 
however, requires resources. The consequence of the resource costs of monitoring and 
enforcement might be a lack of enforcement activity, which in turn creates economic 
incentives for LFEs to underreport their emission levels. Under these circumstances, 
each LFE can meet her emission reduction target by the choice of one of three options: 
undertaking abatement; reporting abatement that was not undertaken (i.e., cheating); 
and buying carbon offsets in the offset market.  
 
Assume that LFEs know the probability [ ],0 1δ ∈  that they will be investigated, 
detected and punished, as well as the per-unit penalty ρ  for detected non-compliance. 
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In case a LFE violates the emission level, her expected cost will depend on her 
probability of being investigated, the penalty in case she is caught cheating and her 
personalized cost of engaging in cheating. This cost, which is denoted by ,eτ  can be the 
result of trying to masquerade emission violation. The parameter τ  is a non-negative 
cost enhancement factor which is constant across all LFEs. Each LFE who cheats incurs 
this cost regardless of being detected or not. The cost of engaging in cheating follows 
the same pattern as the cost of emission reduction since the more expensive abatement 
is the more difficult masquerading emission violations becomes. If an LFE is not 
detected, she saves the abatement cost of reducing her emission by one unit or the cost 
of buying one unit of carbon offset. The expected cost of cheating for a LFE with 
attribute e  who reports abatement that is not undertaken (i.e., underreports emissions) is 
given as follows: 
(A4.3)  cC eδρ τ= +  
Note that since LFEs differ with respect to  and as a result in their personalized cost 
of cheating, the expected costs of cheating differ across LFEs. 
,e
 
The LFE’s decision of whether to undertake abatement, buy carbon offsets or cheat is 
determined by comparing the costs associated with each of the three options. A 
graphical illustration of the LFE’s decision is given in Figure A4.2. The intersection of 
curves AC  and determines the level of the differentiating characteristic  cC :1e
(A4.4)  :
0
1 A c 1
Ce C C e δρβ τ
−= ⇒ = −  
corresponding to the LFE who is indifferent between undertaking abatement and 
cheating. Similarly, the intersection of curves  and  determines the level of the 
differentiating characteristic   
oC cC
:2e
(A4.5)  : e2 c o 2
Pe C C e δρτ
−= ⇒ =  
corresponding to the LFE indifferent between buying carbon offset and cheating.  
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LFEs positioned to the left of  (i.e., LFEs with 1e [ ], 1e 0 e∈ ) choose to undertake 
abatement, while those positioned between  and  (i.e., LFEs with 1e 2e ( ),1 2e e e∈ ) 
underreport their emissions; LFEs located to the right of  (i.e., LFEs with 2e [ ],2e e 1∈ ) 
select to buy carbon offsets. 
 
Assuming that LFEs are uniformly distributed with respect to the differentiating 
attribute  the level of  determines the fraction of LFEs who abate,  gives 
the fraction of LFEs that engage in cheating, and 
,e 1e ( 2 1e e− )
( )21 e−  determines the portion of 
LFEs that buy carbon offsets.   
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Figure A4.2  LFEs’ decision under imperfect compliance 
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Since the mass of LFEs is normalized at unity, the fraction of LFEs that decide to buy 
carbon offsets gives the LFEs’ demand for carbon offsets, ,dc 2x 1 e= −  which can 
formally be written as follows: 
(A4.6)  ( ) .edc Px τ δρτ
− −=    
The inverse demand for carbon offsets can be written as ( ): .de cD P xτ δρ τ= + −  For 
simplicity of notation we denote the expression ( )τ δρ+  by η  and we use this in the 
main body of the thesis.    
The level of abatement undertaken is presented by ,a 1x e=  which can be written as:  
(A4.7)  
0
a
Cx δρβ τ
−= −   
and the amount of abatement violations is given by ,v 2 1x e e= −  where vx  is given by: 
(A4.8)  ( ) (
( )
00
e e
v
P P PCx )e Cδρ δρ βδρτ β τ τ β τ
− − −−= − =− −
τ−  
 
The model analyses the LFE’s decision when all three choices are available. Assume we 
have an interior solution so that all three variables , , da v cx x x  are positive. This 
assumption needs the following conditions to hold: in order to have ,ax 0>  0C δρ≤  
should hold (see equation A4.7); in order to have ,vx 0>  (( )
0
e
e
P C
P
)β τδρ
−> −  should hold 
(see equation A4.8); and in order to have ,dcx 0>  ( )ePτ δρ≥ −  should hold (see 
equation A4.6). From equation A4.8 we can derive the critical audit probability value 
( ) ,
0
cr e eP P Cβ τδ βρ
− −=  for which the full compliance holds (i.e., vx 0= ). For audit 
probabilities ,crδ δ≥  non-compliance will be completely deterred. Each LFE selects 
either to undertake abatement or to buy carbon offsets; she does not find underreporting 
profitable since the probability of being detected is too high.   
 
138
The inverse demand curves for a perfect compliance scenario as well as for the non-
compliance case are illustrated in Figure A4.3 as curves  respectively. 
Referring to Figure A4.2, we can derive the condition under which  (i.e. 
points  and 
 and ,0D D
( )2 1e e 0− =
N R  converge to ). This happens when carbon offset price is L
( ) .
0
e
CP δρ β τβ τ
−= −  Thus, both demand curves join for prices less than 
( ) .
0Cδρ β τ
β τ
−
−   
  
0C β+  
βτ
0D
D  
$  
,dc vx x( ) ( )0C β δρ τ
β τ
+ − +
−  
Figure A4.3 Demand curves under both scenarios 
η τ δρ= +  
( ) 0Cδρ β τ
β τ
−
−  
0  
  
 
Comparative static results can be derived from Figure A4.2. For instance, an increase in 
the price of carbon offsets will influence the number of LFEs that buy carbon offsets or 
engage in cheating behaviour. Specifically, the level of cheating will increase while, at 
the same time, the demand for carbon offsets will turn out to decrease (i.e., 
,
d
c v
e e
x x0 0
P P
∂ ∂< >∂ ∂ ). 
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An increase in the penalty per unit of violation causes an upward shift of the curve  
that decreases the violation level and increases the fraction of LFEs that purchase 
carbon offsets (i.e., 
cC
,
d
c vx x0ρ ρ
∂ ∂> <∂ ∂ 0 ). Similarly, an increase in the audit probability δ  
shifts the curve  upward, thus decreasing the violation level and increasing the 
demand for carbon offsets (i.e., 
cC
,
d
c vx x0 0δ δ
∂ ∂> <∂ ∂ ). 
 
A4.3 Conclusions 
This appendix develops a model of heterogeneous LFEs to derive the demand for 
carbon offsets as well as to examine the impact of non-compliance on the demand side. 
The investigation starts with a perfect compliance situation to continue after with the 
consideration of the demand side when non-compliance on LFEs’ side is introduced in 
the analysis.  
  
The comparative statics results show that the extend of LFEs non-compliance increases 
with an increase in the price of carbon offsets and decreases with an increase in the 
audit frequency and/or an increase in the penalty per unit of cheating.  
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 APPENDIXA5 
Appendix 5.1 Monopoly Case: 
 
Stage 2:  The maximization problem for the trader: 
 
The objective function:                         ,
( )
                  
Y X eMax PY P Y X
st Y Y
− +
≤  
 
where  is given by: P :D P Y θγη τ η τ ϕ= − = −   
and  is given by: eP : .0 eS P Y
θγλ λ ϕ= =  
 
Lagrangean function:                         ( ) (eL PY P Y X Y Yκ )= − + + −  
 
The first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions with respect to the choice variables  and 
the Lagrangean multiplier for this problem are: 
,Y X
κ
 
( A5.1.1 )   ( )         eY e
PL PL P Y P Y X 0 Y 0 L Y
Y Y Z
κ Y 0∂∂ ∂= = + − − + − ≤ ≥ → =∂ ∂ ∂  
( A5.1.2 )   X( )                           X 0 LeX e
PLL P Y X 0 X
X Z
0∂∂= = − − + ≤ ≥ → =∂ ∂  
( A5.1.3 )                                                   LL Y Y 0 0 Lκ κκ κκ
∂= = − ≥ ≥ → =∂ 0  
 
The second condition holds as a strict inequality, hence .X 0=  We can have two 
solutions:  
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(1)   if  then ,  ,  =0,Y 0 X 0 κ> =
         
m m
e e
Y e e
MR MO
P PP PL 0 P Y P Y 0 P Y P Y
Y Y Y Y
.∂ ∂∂ ∂= → + − − = → + = +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂	
 	

 
The solution is determined by m mMR MO=  and formally is written as follows: 
       ;    ;   =0.
( )m
Y X 0
2
η κτ λ= =+   
 
(2) if  the constraint is binding. The solution will be: ,  ,  0,Y 0 X 0 κ> = >
        ;   ;   ( ) .Y X 0 2θγ θκ η τ λ γϕ ϕ= = = − +  
 As shown in Chapter V, the output will be the lesser of  and mY .Y  
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 Stage 1: Maximization problem for the monitoring group owned by the monopolist 
 
 The objective function:                   2e
1Max P P
2θ
θγ θγ ξθϕ ϕ− −  
After substituting  and  from the demand and supply equations, the First Order 
Condition with respect to 
P eP
θ  can be written as follows: 
 
( ) 2 2mC 2 2π γ γ γη τ θ λ θ ξθθ ϕ ϕ ϕ
∂ − ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − − − =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ 0  
 
In Y -space, this condition would be written as: 
N
'
.
mm
m
2
2
MOMR
C
2 Y 2 Y Yϕη τ λ ξ γ− = +	
 	

  
Therefore, the optimal amount of monitoring is determined by: ' ,m m mMR MO C= +  
which formally is written as shown below:  
              
 
( ) 2 22
ηϕγθ τ λ γ ξϕ
∗ = + + . 
 
This optimal monitoring defines the position of the genuine carbon offsets, thus defines 
.Y  Substituting this expression instead of θ  into the formula for Y  we get:  
 
( )
2
2 2Y 2
ηγ
τ λ γ ξϕ
∗ = + +  
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 Appendix 5.2: Oligopoly Case 
 
Stage 2:  Maximization problem for each oligopolistic trader: 
 
{ }
,
 ( ) ( ) ( )
                                                             ,...,
i i
i i i i e i i i i i iy x
Z
i i
Max P y y y P y x y x y x
st y y Y i 1 N
π − − −
−
= + − + + + +
+ ≤ ∈
	

 
 
The Lagrangean function can be written as: 
( ) ( )( ) (i i i e i i i i i i i i iL P y y y P y x y x y x Y y yκ− − −= + − + + + + + − − )−  
 
The first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions with respect to the choice variables ,  i iy x  and 
the Lagrangean multiplier  for this problem are: iκ
 
( A5.2.1 )   
i i
e e
y i e i i i i
i
P PL PL P y P y x 0 y 0 L y
y Y Z Z
κ y i 0∂ ∂∂ ∂= = + − − − − ≤ ≥ → =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂             
( A5.2.2 )   
i i
e e
x e i i i x
i
P PLL P x y 0 x 0 L x
x Z Z i
0∂ ∂∂= = − − − ≤ ≥ → =∂ ∂ ∂                                       
( A5.2.3 )   
i ii i i i
i
LL Y y y 0 0 Lκ κκ κκ −
∂= = − − ≥ ≥ → =∂                                                  0  
 
Condition (A5.2.2) holds as a strict inequality therefore .ix 0=  We can have two 
solutions: 
(1) if  ,   ,   ,i iy 0 x 0 0κ> = =  we proceed as follows:  
        
i
e
y i e
PPL 0 P y P y
Y Z i
∂∂= → + = +∂ ∂  
By substituting  and  from the demand and supply equations, the solution can be 
written as follows:  
P eP
144
  ( ) ,  ,   .
( )
i
i i
yy x 0 0
2
η τ λ κτ λ
−− += =+ = ,  
After considering the symmetry of the firms, we get the amount traded by each firm 
given by the formula: 
  
( )(i
y
N 1)
η
τ λ= + +  
while the total amount of carbon offsets traded by all firms is given by: 
  
( )(o
NY
N 1)
η
τ λ= + +  
So, the solution in this case is: 
;   ;   .
( )( )o
NY X
N 1
0 0η κτ λ= =+ + =  
 
(2) if  ,   ,   ,i iy 0 x 0 0κ> = >  the constraint is binding. Thus:  i iy y Y θγϕ−+ = =  
Because of the symmetry of the firms we get the following: 
         i
Yy
N N
θγ
ϕ= =  
By using the above equation as well as the condition (A.2.1), we get the formula for the 
shadow value as follows:  
  ( )(i
N 1
N
)θγ τ λκ η ϕ
+ += −  
The solution in this case would be: 
i
( )( N 1Y , X=0, 
N
) .θγ θγ τ λκ ηϕ ϕ
+ += = −  
As argued in Chapter V, the amount traded by oligopoly will be the lesser of  and oY .Y   
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 Stage 1: Maximization problem for the monitoring group owned by the oligopolistic 
firms 
 
The objective function:                   2e
1Max P P
2θ
θγ θγ ξθϕ ϕ− −  
 
It is exactly the same as in the monopoly case, therefore the optimal auditing probability 
is given by the same formula: 
( ) 2 22
ηϕγθ τ λ γ ξϕ
∗ = + +  
 
This optimal monitoring defines the position of the genuine carbon offsets, thus defines 
.Y  Substituting this expression instead of θ  into the formula for Y  we get:  
( )
2
2 2Y 2
ηγ
τ λ γ ξϕ
∗ = + +  
 
This is determined by the relation ' .m m mMR MO C= +  
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Appendix 5.3: Governmental Agency  
 
Stage 1: Unconstrained maximization problem for the monitoring group: 
 
 Monitoring group maximizes the social welfare minus the monitoring cost which, in 
terms of  would be expressed as follows: ,Y
[ ]
2Y Y
m
0 0
22 2
1 YW CS PS C Y dY YdY
2
Y Y 1 YY
2 2 2
ϕπ η τ λ γ
ϕη τ λ ξ γ
⎛ ⎞= + + − = − − − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞= − − − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∫ ∫ ξ
 
In terms of ,θ  the objective function of the monitoring group will be written as follows: 
( ) ( )  
                   
2 2
2
2 2
1Max W Max
22 2θ θ
θγ θγ θγη τ λϕ ϕ ϕ= − − − ξθ   
The First Order Condition for this problem specification is: 
( )
2 2W 0γ γ γη τ θ λ θ ξθθ ϕ ϕ ϕ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ = − − − =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  
In Y -space, this condition would be written as follows: 
N
'
0
m
2
2
SD
C
Y Y Y ϕη τ λ ξ γ− = +	
 	

 
This means that the first order condition is satisfied at the point where   
The optimal amount of monitoring is given by the formula:             
' .0 mD S C= +
 
( ) 2 2
ηϕγθ τ λ γ ξϕ
∗ = + + . 
 
This optimal monitoring defines the position of the genuine carbon offsets, thus defines 
.Y  Substituting this expression instead of θ  into the formula for Y  we get:  
.
( )
2
uc 2 2Y
ηγ
τ λ γ ξϕ
∗ = + +  
147
APPENDIX A6
:
 
 
 
Finding  and 
33 eM P−  
3M ?− =  
0 0c c
3 s lM : IR IR− ∩  
( ) ( )a' a's l
s s l l
C x C x1 1M M
x x x x
+ = +  
( ) ( )a' a'l s s l
3
l s
C x x C x x
M
x x
−− = −  
0c
sFrom IR  we want to find: 3eP ?=  
( ) ( ) ( )
3
a' a' a'
s l s s l
e
s s l s
C x C x x C x x1P
x x x x
−= + −  
( ) ( )
( )3
a' a'
l s s s
e
s l s
C x x C x x
P
x x x
−= −  
 
 
Finding nM :  
0d
n p eM : Pπ =∩ 0  
' d
m
d d
C F 10 P M
Nx x
∗ += − +  
' d
m
n d
C FM P x
N
∗⎛ ⎞+= − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 
 
Finding vM :  
0d
v p eM : Pπ ∗=∩ P  
' d
m
d d
C F 1P P M
Nx x
∗ ∗ += − +  
' d
m
v
C FM
N
+=  
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Finding tM :  
0c
t p eM : Pπ 0=∩  
' c
m
s s l l s s l l
C F N0 P M
N x N x N x N x
∗ += − ++ +  
( ) ' cs s l l m
t
P N x N x C FM
N N
∗⎛ ⎞+ += − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 
 
Finding wM :  
0
1
c
w p eM : Pπ =∩ 0  
1
' c
m
s s l l s s l l
C F N0 P M
N x N x N x N x
∗ += − ++ +  
( ) 1' cms s l l
w
C FP N x N x
M
N N
∗⎛ ⎞++⎜ ⎟= − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 
 
Finding rM :  
0
2
c
r p eM : Pπ ∗=∩ P  
2
' c
m
s s l l s s l l
C NP P M
N x N x N x N x
∗ ∗= − ++ +  
' c
m
w
C FM
N
+=  
 
 
 
The coordinates of point j :  
0c c
s pj : IR π∩  
( )a' ' cs m
s s s s l l s s l l
C x ' C F1 NM P M
x x N x N x N x N x
Δ ∗+ ++ = − ++ +  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
a' ' c
s s s s l l m
j
s s s l l s
P x C x ' N x N x C F x
M
x N x N x Nx
Δ∗⎡ ⎤− − + − +⎣ ⎦= + −
s
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )j
' c a' ' c
m s s s s l l
e
s s l l s s l l s s s l l s
C F P x C x ' N x N x C F xNP P
N x N x N x N x x N x N x Nx
Δ∗∗ ⎡ ⎤+ − − + −⎣ ⎦= − ++ + + −
m s+
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Comparing  to  nM wM :
( )1 1' d ' cm m s s l l
n d
C F C F P N x N x
wM P x  ? MN N N
∗
∗+ + += − − =  
 
( ) ( ) if - 
1 1
' c ' d
w n s s d l l d m mM M P N x x N x x C C
∗ ⎡ ⎤> − + − <⎣ ⎦  
( ) ( ) if - 
1 1
' c ' d
w n s s d l l d m mM M P N x x N x x C C
∗ ⎡ ⎤< − + − >⎣ ⎦  
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